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The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1939-1940 Term*
This year's symposium covers the work of the Supreme Court
of Louisiana during the judicial term just completed-from October 1939 to September 1940. As in previous surveys' the object is
to examine the activities of our highest appellate court and to
give a panoramic topical consideration of the cases decided.
I. STATISTICAL SURVEY
During its 1939-1940 term, there were 437 cases 2 docketed
in the supreme court. Two hundred and twelve, or 48.5% of the
cases, were applications for supervisory writs to the lower courts
and writs of certiorari or review to the courts of appeal. Of these,
181 were either granted or refused.3 On the other hand, the supreme court disposed of 220 cases through written opinions.'
Thus, as can be observed in Table I, a total of 401 cases or 91.8%
of the total number docketed, were actually disposed of. This can
be compared with 89%, the corresponding figure for the 19381939 term. The result is an average of 57.3 matters per court
member. In addition, a total of 103 applications for rehearing
0 This symposium has been contributed by the members of the faculty
of Louisiana State University Law School as follows: Procedure and Mandate-Clyde W. Thurmon; Family Law, Successions, Trusts, Partition, Community Property, and Mineral Rights-Harriet S. Daggett; Conventional
Obligations, Sale, Lease, and Insurance-J. Denson Smith; Property, Security Contracts, Prescription, and Conflict of Laws--Joseph Dainow; Public
Law-Jefferson B. Fordham; Criminal Law and Procedure-Wex S. Malone;
Banking and Negotiable Instruments, Bankruptcy, Corporations, Torts, and
Workmen's Compensation-Dale E. Bennett.
1. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1937-1938 Term
(1939) 1 LoUISIANA LAw REVmW 314; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1938-1939 Term (1939) 2 LOUISIANA LAw REviEw 31.
2. This figure was obtained from the Official Daily Court Record showing
the cases docketed in the supreme court from October 3, 1939, to September
28, 1940.
3. See Tables VII, VIII. This information was gathered from the Official
Daily Court Record.
4. This figure includes all cases for the 1939-1940 term officially reported
in Volumes 193, 194, 195, and 196 of the Louisiana Reports.
5. Cf. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1938-1939 Term,
supra note 1, at 31. For the corresponding figures during the 1937-1938 term
see The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1938-1939 Term, supra
note 1, at 315.
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were considered.' Although rehearings were granted in only nine
instances,1 a substantial portion of the court's time must be devoted to their consideration.
There was a total of 173 cases appealed from the district
courts throughout the state. Of this number, 56.6% of the judgments were affirmed, 22.5% were reversed and 20.9% were modified or otherwise disposed of.8 The corresponding figures for the
1937-1938 and 1938-1939 terms show that 67% and 53.5% respectively of the judgments were affirmed, while 20% and 14% respectively were reversed and 13% and 32.5% were modified or
otherwise disposed of.
Table V shows that the bulk of litigation reaching the supreme court was based on appeals from the district courts, such
appeals accounting for 78.6% of the reported cases (as compared
with 78% and 85% for the 1937-1938 and 1938-1939 terms), while
only 7.3% came upon writs of review to the courts of appeal (as
compared with 12.7% and 7.4% for the 1937-1938 and 1938-1939
terms), and 11.4% on supervisory writs to the lower courts (as
compared with 7.1% and 5.8% for the two preceding terms).
Table VI gives a geographical analysis of appeals from the
district courts. It reveals that the Parish of Orleans gave rise to
21.4% of the cases so appealed (as compared with 21.3% and
24.3% for the 1937-1938 and 1938-1939 terms). The Parish of
Caddo provided 13.3%; East Baton Rouge Parish sent 7%; Ouachita-4.6%; Jefferson--4%; and the other parishes supplied the
remaining 49.7%.
Only sixteen cases reached the supreme court on writs of
review to the courts of appeal. Of these, only 43.7% were affirmed,
50% were reversed, and 6.3% were modified or otherwise disposed of." The corresponding figures for the 1937-1938 and the
1938-1939 terms show that 26.5% and 67% of the cases brought
on writs of review were affirmed, while 58.8% and 11% were
reversed, and 14.7% and 22% were modified or otherwise disposed of.
6. During the 1937-1938 term, 163 applications for rehearing were filed,
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1937-1938 Term, supra
note 1, at 315; and during the 1938-1939 term, there were 150 applications for
rehearing, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1938-1939 Term,
supra note 1, at 31.
7. See Table VII.
8. See Table IL
9. See Tables II, III.
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Since many of the cases obviously involve more than one
legal point, the classifications in Table IV are adopted arbitrarily
for the purpose of topical analysis. Consequently, the tabulation
is based upon the principal subject matters to which the decisions
relate. It is especially significant that the greatest number of
cases dealt with Criminal Law and Procedure, such cases amounting to 21.4% of the litigation decided in written opinions. The
next largest groups were: Practice and Procedure-16.4%; Conventional Obligations-6.4%; Taxation-5%; Municipal Corporations-4.5%; Mineral Rights-4.1%; Successions and Donations4.1%; Elections-3.6%.
A.

JAMEs

BUGEA*

* Research Assistant, Louisiana State University Law School.

TABLE I
VOLUME of JUDICIAL BUSINESS
Cases disposed of with written opinions ................................
220
212*
Applications for writs filed during 193940 term ........................
181
Application for writs considered .......................................
31
Applications for writs pending ..........................................
103
Applications for rehearings disposed of .................................
Cases docketed during 1939-1940 term (excluding writ applications) .... 227
437
Total matters docketed during 1939-40 term ............................
Total cases handled by the court (excluding rehearing applications) ... 401
Grand total of matters handled by the court (including rehearing
504
applications) ..................................................
• This figure includes applications for supervisory writs to the lower
courts as well as applications for writs of certiorari to the courts of appeal.
See Table VIII.
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TABLE II (Continued)
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Amended in part,
affirmed in part
and remanded ......
Amended in part, reversed in part, and
affirmed ............
Amended and affirmed 12
5
Annulled and dismissed
Appeal dismissed ex
propio motu ........
Certified questions
answered ...........
Exceptions of no right
of action overruled..
Motion to dismiss
appeal granted ......
Motions to dismiss
6
appeal refused .....
Motion to dismiss appeal granted in part,
1
refused in part ......
Motion to remand
1
refused ............
Reversed and judgment of lower court
1
reinstated ..........
Reversed and remanded 18
Reversed and rendered 20
Transferred to courts
of appeal for lack
2
of jurisdiction ......
Writs made peremptory
Writs recalled ........
173
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TABLE III
DISPOSITION OF CASES REVIEWED ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
FROM COURTS OF APPEAL

Affirm ed ..............................
Amended and rendered .............
Court of appeal reversed and judgment of lower court reinstated ....
Reversed and remanded ..............
Reversed and rendered ...............
TOTALS

.............................

Parish of

First

Second

Orleans

Circuit

Circuit

4
1

7
1

1

3
3
2

4

16

1
9

3

TOTAL

3
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TABLE IV
TOPICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS
Adm inistrative Law ......................................................
Alim ony ..................................................................
Banking and Negotiable Instruments ....................................
Bankruptcy ..............................................................
Com m unity Property .....................................................
Conflict of Laws .........................................................
Constitutional Law .......................................................
Conventional Obligations .................................................
Corporations .............................................................
Criminal Law and Procedure ............................................
D ivorce ...................................................................
D rainage D istricts .......................................................
E lections .................................................................
Em inent Dom ain .........................................................
Insuran ce ................................................................
Lease .....................................................................
Liens and Privileges .....................................................
M andate ..................................................................
M ineral R ights ...........................................................
M inors, Tutorship ........................................................
M ortgages ................................................................
M unicipal Corporations ..................................................
P artition .................................................................
Practice and Procedure ..................................................
P rescription ..............................................................
P roperty .................................................................
Public R ecords ...........................................................
R oad D istricts ...........................................................
Sales .....................................................................
Successions and Donations ...............................................
Suretyship ................................................................
T axation .................................................................
Torts and Workmen's Compensation ...................................
T rusts ....................................................................

6
2
1
1
7
2
2
14
1
47
3
1
8
2
6
3
2
1
9
4
1
10
4
36
7
6
1
1
3
9
1
11
7
1

TABLE V
JURISDICTIONAL ORIGIN OF CASES
Appeals from district courts ............................................
Appeals from city courts ................................................
Appeal from recorders' court in the City of New Orleans ..............
On writs of review from courts of appeal ..............................
Questions certified from courts of appeal ..............................
On supervisory writs to district courts .................................
Original jurisdiction of supreme court ..................................
TO TAL .............................................................

173
2
1
16
2
25
1
220
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TABLE VI
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF APPEALS FROM
DISTRICT COURTS
A-By PARISH

No. of
Cases
Parish
4
Acadia .........................
1
Allen ...........................
1
Ascension ......................
5
Avoyelles .......................
8
Bienville .......................
2
Bossier .........................
23
Caddo ..........................
4
Calcasieu .......................
2
Claiborne .......................
1
De Soto ........................
12
East Baton Rouge ............
1
East Carroll ...................
4
Evangeline .....................
1
Franklin .......................
3
Grant ..........................
Iberia .......................... 2
1
Iberville ........................
Jackson ........................ 2
Jefferson ....................... 7
1
Jefferson Davis ..............
1
Lafayette ....................
Lafourche ................... 2
1
La Salle ....................
4
Lincoln .........................
2
Morehouse ......................
8
Natchitoches ...................

No. of
Cases
Parish
35
Orleans Civil ...................
2
Orleans Criminal ...............
Ouachita ....................... 8
1
Plaquemines ....................
1
Pointe Coupee ..................
3
Rapides ........................
8
Richland .......................
1
Sabine ..........................
1
St. Bernard ....................
1
St. Jam es ......................
2
St. Landry .....................
St. M artin ...................... 1
2
St. M ary .......................
1
St. Tammany ...................
3
Tangipahoa ....................
3
Terrebonne .....................
1
Union ..........................
1
Vermilion ......................
1
Vernon ..........................
2
Washington ....................
3
W ebster ........................
1
West Feliciana .................
3
W inn ...........................
TOTAL .......................

173

NO. of
Cases
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
23
First District (Caddo) ...................................................
7
Second District (Claiborne, Jackson, Blenville) ..........................
5
Third District (Lincoln, Union) ..........................................
10
Fourth District (Ouachita, Morehouse) ..................................
4
Fifth District (West Carroll, Richland, Franklin) .......................
1
Sixth District (East Carroll, Madison, Tensas) ...........................
0
Seventh District (Catahoula, Concordia) .................................
7
Eighth District (Caldwell, Grant, Winn, La Salle) .......................
3
Ninth District (Rapides) ................................................
3
Tenth District (Natchitoches, Red River) ...............................
3
Eleventh District (De Soto, Vernon, Sabine) .............................
5
Twelfth District (Avoyelles) .............................................
4
Thirteenth District (Evangeline) ........................................
Fourteenth District (Calcasieu, Jefferson Davis, Allen, Beauregard,
6
Cam eron) .............................................................
6
Fifteenth District (Acadia, Lafayette, Vermilion) ........................
5
Sixteenth District (St. Mary, Iberia, St. Martin) ........................
5
Seventeenth District (Terrebonne, Lafourche) ............................
2
Eighteenth District (Iberville, West Baton Rouge, Pointe Coupee) .......
12
Nineteenth District (East Baton Rouge) .................................
1
Twentieth District (East Feliciana, West Feliciana) ....................
3
Twenty-First District (Tangipahoa, Livingston, St. Helena) .............
3
Twenty-Second District (Washington, St. Tammany) ....................

B-By
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TABLE VI (Continued)
No. of
Cases
Twenty-Third District (Assumption, Ascension, St. James) ..............
2
Twenty-Fourth District (Jefferson, St. John the Baptist, St. Charles) ....
7
Twenty-Fifth District (St. Bernard, Plaquemines) .......................
2
Twenty-Sixth District (Bossier, Webster) ................................
5
Twenty-Seventh District (St. Landry) ...................................
2
TOTAL .......................................................
...... 136
Orleans Civil District
..........................................
35
Orleans Criminal District ...............................................
2
TOTAL ..............................................................
173

TABLE VII
DISPOSITIONS OF APPLICATIONS FOR WRITS AND REHEARINGS

Granted Refused
Applications for rehearings .......................
Applications for writs .............................
TOTALS ......................................

TOTAL

9
37

94
144

103
181*

46

238

284

* This figure includes applications for supervisory writs to the lower

courts as well as applications for writs of certiorari or review to the courts
of appeal. See Table VIII.

TABLE VIII
DISPOSITION OF APPLICATIONS FOR WRITS

Granted
Supervisory writs to lower courts ....... 16
Writs of certiorari to courts of appeal.. 21
TOTALS

............................

37

Refused

Pending

25
119

23
8

64
148

144

31

212

TOTAL

TABLE IX
DISSENTS*
With

Without

5
2
1
1
4
1
2

13
2
2
1
2
1

Opinion
O'Niell, C. J . ...................................
Fournet, J . ....................................
H iggins, J . .....................................
Land, J . ........................................
Odom , 3 . .......................................
Ponder, J. .....................................
R ogers, J. ......................................

Opinion

TOTAL

18
4
3
2
6
2
2

TOTALS ...................................
16
21
37
0 In cases wherein rehearings have been granted, the dissents here
tabulated are those from the opinion on rehearing. Dissents from the original
opinions therein have not been included, since in such cases the final opinion
of the court Is that rendered on the rehearing. Total number of cases in
which dissents were expressed-30.
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II. CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS
A.

FAMILY LAW

Nullity of Marriage
The case of Sunseri v. Cassagne1 came to the supreme court
as a suit to annul a marriage because of the alleged negro blood
of the wife. The court remanded the case in order to allow an
examination of certain certificates from the office of the Recorder
of Births and Marriages for the Parish of Orleans which the wife
claimed to be contrary to fact. 2 When the case again reached the
supreme court, they very properly took the view. that the real
issue was still what it had always been-namely, to determine
whether or not the wife was in reality a member of the negro
race. The court reluctantly arrived at this conclusion, which was
not changed on the rehearing. The original certificates in question indicated the white race. However, they were found to have
been informally annotated "colored" by an employee of the Recorder's office, who was severely and properly reprimanded for
this officious, bureaucratic, and dangerous act. Nevertheless, the
evidence as a whole showed the wife to belong to a negro family,
though her associates and friends in New Orleans were white.
The court's patience and care in this troublesome matter, in hearing the case three times and striving to achieve justice, is a heartening thing. The pitiful and partially successful attempt on the
part of the defendant and her relatives to lift themselves to a
higher caste versus the proper attempts of the man to protect
himself and his posterity from this social stigma is a moving
story of human affairs. The court throughout the three hearings
consistently used the words "traceable amount of negro blood"
rather than the old test of "appreciable amount." In this situation
doubtless the amount was not "appreciable," and yet relief for
this white husband was certainly necessary. The dangers of the
test of the instant case are obvious, yet it cannot be said that the
issue under these facts should have been determined otherwise
under the old phrase. If every court takes the responsibility of
such a situation as seriously, certainly no fears need be entertained on any score that justice to all will not be achieved as
nearly as humanly possible.
1. 195 La. 19, 196 So. 7 (1940).
2. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1938-1939 Term

(1939) 2 LOUisiANA LAw REvIEw 31, 38 (Sunseri v. Cassagne, 191 La. 209, 185

So. 1 (1938)).
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Separationfrom Bed and Board
In the case of Gann v. Pflueger8 the court affirmed a judgment for separation from bed and board on the ground of abandonment. The husband maintained that he had returned to the
marital domicile in answer to the summons. The court went very
thoroughly into the physical appointments as well as the emotional environment of the home of the husband's family, to which
the husband was inviting the wife to return, a domicile in which
she had been very unhappy and from which the couple had removed prior to the institution of the suit.
Alimony of $45 per month pendente lite was granted; the
husband was receiving a salary of $175 per month, plus rentals
from two pieces of property, which, however, were not paid for.
In the case of Hattier v. Martinez4 a wife was granted a
separation from bed and board on the ground of cruel treatment.
She had been non-suited in a first attempt, and thereafter a reconciliation had been tried which was brief and a complete
failure. General abuse, face slapping, and other indignities were
proved. A threatening note showing the husband's cruel and vindictive nature seemed to weigh heavily with the court. The husband's threat to "get even" was made good by an attempt to
blacken the character of the wife during the trial with evidence
which the court did not believe. Custody of a small daughter
was awarded the wife, who was making her home with her parents. The supreme court found the demand for alimony pendente
lite not to be before them, as it had been fixed by rule in the
lower court and did not constitute a part of the judgment from
which the appeal was taken and which was reversed.
Reconciliation
The case of Collins v. Collins5 involved a judicial evaluation
of facts necessary to constitute a reconciliation, or condonation
of fault, after the filing of a suit for separation from bed and
board. The wife proved cruel treatment and was granted a separation from bed and board by the lower court. On appeal, however, the supreme court reversed this judgment because a tryst
had been kept by the wife at which an incident, which Chief
Justice O'Niell was pleased to term an "affaire d'amour," took
place. Since the wife continued the suit thereafter, went through
3. 194 La. 885, 195 So. 345 (1940).
4. 197 So. 146 (La. 1940).
5. 194 La. 446, 193 So. 702 (1940).
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the trial, obtained judgment, and answered the appeal, it may
well be that the brief period of forgiveness, said by the wife to
have resulted from threats on her life by the husband, is a flimsy
basis upon which to found a reestablishment of a real marriage.
However, at least a waiting period was provided by the court
during which a sober and considered reconciliation might be
effected, which all the philosophical commentators upon marriage agree is a good thing. The case would, on the legal side,
seem to settle the query as to whether or not one episode of this
nature will constitute a reconciliation sufficient to bar a decree
of separation.
Alimony
The case of Fortierv. Gelpi6 involves a full discussion of the
amount of alimony which a husband must pay to a wife whom
he has divorced, under the four-year act of 1932, after twenty
years of married life. Originally, the alimony had been fixed at
$155.38 per month. The present suit by the husband was for reduction, as he had acquired a second wife, who had borne a
daughter. He alleged, of course, that his income had been reduced
and that his first wife's sons were no longer minors, so did not
have to be supported-certainly a doubtful statement in the
present economic era. The husband was making a salary of
$416.66 per month, plus a rent-free apartment. The first wife was
wholly supporting her mother and partly supporting her two
major sons by the plaintiff. The case is an interesting study in
family budgeting and the quantum of evidence necessary for
this type of legal presentation. The husband felt that he should
be relieved entirely of alimony, apparently because he had married again. The court disabused his mind of this conclusion but
said that his second marriage might "be considered as a factor
in determining his ability to pay." The court also said that in
fixing the amount of the first wife's "pension" the test is, "not
what it takes to support the divorced wife in the manner in
which she has been accustomed to live, but what will provide
her with maintenance."
The law provides for the marital portion an amount which
is to be awarded to either spouse left in "necessitous circumstances" by the death of a "rich" consort. In interpreting these
relative and elastic terms, the court has announced that the pur6. 197 So. 138 (La. 1940).
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pose of the law is to prevent a spouse from being suddenly left
in comparative poverty after having become accustomed to a
different scale of living.7 This law is of Roman origin and was
first instituted to protect the divorced wife. It is interesting to
note that if death removes the husband a different idea of the
wife's rights prevails than that announced in this case where
the husband departed voluntarily; though in neither situation is
the wife at fault. Doubtless, this is just one of the many penalties
a wife should pay for not "keeping her man" after she has him!
The greater interdependence of families as the struggle for
economic existence grows keener puts more and more responsibility for solving the insoluble upon an overburdened court, with
little help in this type of question from the legislature or anyone
else.
The suit of Alexander v. Jackson8 involved a claim for alimony by a wife against whom a judgment for divorce had been
rendered under the two-year act.' The question of fault was
handled just as it might have been in any ordinary suit for separation from bed and board, or divorce, except that the question
was presented in the negative form of "not being at fault." Both
parties tried to prove each other at fault. The court was more
impressed with the credibility of the wife's witnesses and the
corroboration and weight of her testimony, so "reached the conclusion ...

[she] was not at fault." The husband made $160 per

month as a mail carrier. The wife was working, but for a very
slight wage, and had long been in very poor health, as the result
of a miscarriage. There were no children. Alimony was fixed at
$30 per month. The maximum under Article 160 of the Civil Code
would have been $53.331/3, so she was awarded just a little over

one-half of this possibility. She would have done better under
the Workmen's Compensation Act! The vagaries of alimony allotments may have to be solved ultimately by a similar statutory
scale!
Custody of Child
The case of State ex rel. Landry v. Robin ° involved a contest
between a father and maternal grandparents for the custody of a
baby girl, whose mother had died. On the first hearing, the court
7. See Daggett, The Community Property System of Louisiana (1931) 96
et seq., and cases cited.
8. 197 So. 510 (La. 1940).
9. La. Act 430 of 1938.
10. 193 La. 789, 192 So. 349 (1939).
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decided, with two justices dissenting, that the district court
should be upheld in its conclusion that the infant should be left
with the grandmother. On the second hearing, the court ordered
a remand in order that the father's fitness and financial ability
to care for the child might be investigated-preferably by a woman field worker for the Department of Public Welfare, who
would visit both homes and then report her findings. The same
two justices again dissented. Underlying the law stated by all
members of the court in the case ran the governing principle of
the child's best interests. The court's recognition of their grave
responsibility in this case, their extreme care and patience, is the
most powerful safeguard for a child and renders him far safer
than could any mere statute. The rule that the parent takes the
child of right, unless his unfitness is shown, is simple in its statement, but difficult of application, as shown by this case. A recitation of the purely factual matters involved would serve little
purpose in this r6sum6.
The case of Guillory v. Dupuy" affirmed a judgment in the
wife's favor for separation from bed and board on grounds of
cruel treatment, and an award of custody of the one remaining
minor boy to this mother of twelve. The boy had been trained by
his older brother, with the consent of his parents, to be a jockey.
He had now completed his apprenticeship and was a very successful rider. It was "conceded by counsel that the father's sole
motive in instituting the proceedings was to determine who would
have the custody and control of the minor and reap the benefit of
his earnings as a jockey.' 1 2 The charges of "unfitness" of the
mother and older brother to have custody were adjudged to be
without foundation.
Tutorship
In the case of Globe Indemnity Company v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Company' a father, as natural tutor, took out a bond
with the Aetna Surety Company to insure to the minor his "faithful administration." The bond was given, under authority of Act
223 of 1920 as amended by Act 68 of 1924, Act 106 of 1924, and
Act 283 of 1926, in place of a general or special mortgage. The
natural tutor later bought his children's share of the community
property, as he had a right to do, and took a ten thousand dollar
11. 197 So. 240 (La. 1940).
12. 197 So. at 241.
13. 193 La. 721, 192 So. 234 (1939).
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bond with the Globe Indemnity Company to secure the "payment
of the purchase price with interest." The natural tutor went bankrupt and was removed from the tutorship, and the dative tutor
collected from the Globe Indemnity Company. 1 This suit was
entered by the Globe Indemnity Company to recover from the
Aetna Company one-half of the amount paid by the Globe, plus
one-half of the expenses incurred in defending the suit successfully brought by the dative tutor against the Globe Company.
The Aetna Company pleaded that "the bonds furnished were not
to secure the same debt nor were the plaintiff and the defendant
the sureties for the same debtor-the bond furnished by the
plaintiff securing an adjudication liability and the bond given by
the defendant securing an administration liability."'15 On a rehearing, reversing the first conclusion of the supreme court, the
lower court was sustained and the Aetna's plea held good. The
court said:
"Under the provisions of Article 3058 of the Revised Civil
Code, one surety cannot recover against another surety unless
the two sureties were bound for the same debt and the same
debtor. The Aetna Company was the surety for Pecastaing,
not as the parent and co-owner of his minor children, but as
their natural tutor. The Aetna Company was surety not for
any specific amount but for the faithful administration of the
tutor. The Globe Company's liability did not depend upon any
act of maladministration but was an unconditional guarantee
that the price of the adjudication, with interest, would be
paid. Therefore, concluding that the plaintiff and the defendant were not sureties for the same debtor and the same debt,
and that the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff, the judgment of the district court should be affirmed."' 6
Since the removal of the natural tutor was for "unfaithfulness
of administration," the distinction is difficult, but certainly the
only sum owed the minors by the unfaithful tutor at the close
of his administration was the purchase price of the property adjudicated to him, which the Globe had specifically guaranteed.
Furthermore, greater protection seems to be given the minors by
this decision, if it does not result in a failure by natural tutors
to give bond at all. Bond by natural tutors is optional, and minors
14.
15.
192 So.
16.

See Pecastaing v. Globe Indemnity Co., 176 La. 31, 145 So. 259 (1932).
Globe Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 193 La. 721, 745,
234, 241 (1939).
193 La. at 751, 192 So. at 243-244.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. III

may be left without any protection in cases where the natural
tutor has little or no realty upon which the legal mortgage can
fasten. It is hoped that the legislature will remedy this defect.
In the case of Cox v. First National Bank in Arcadia17 the
facts were that one Mrs. Caskey became the administratrix of
her deceased husband's estate and natural tutrix of her minor
children. She mismanaged her trust as tutrix and was removed.
The dative tutor then brought action against the Bank of Arcadia,
claiming property in the latter's possession as being that of the
minors, improperly disposed of through various manipulations
of the tutrix. It was held that since the tutrix had never filed an
accounting of her administration of the estate of the husband,
this action was prematurely brought, as it is impossible to ascertain what property belongs to minors until the estate from which
they are inheriting is settled. All rights were, of course, reserved
to the minors to bring forward their claims at the proper time,
but "'where the same person is administrator, and also tutor of
a part of the heirs, his possession of the estate must be held to be
as administered,' """ and the minors' portion, which is residuary,
may be accounted, obviously, only after ascertainment.
B.

PROPERTY*

Accession in Relation to Land; Reimbursement for Improvements
The right of accession in relation to land is based upon the
principle that "the ownership of the soil carries with it the ownership of all that is directly above and under it."' Consequently,
when improvements are made by a person who does not own the
land, the ownership of these improvements may accede to the
real owner of the land. If the person who made the improvements
was a possessor in good faith, 2 the owner must keep the improve17. 197 So. 616 (La. 1940).
18. 197 So. at 618; Goux v. Moncla, 30 La. Ann. 743, 745 (1878).
0 Problems in property law are generally linked up with other issues;
therefore, in addition to the cases discussed under this heading, see also
under Mineral Rights, Municipal Corporations, etc.
1. Art. 505, La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. As defined in Art. 503, La. Civil Code of 1870: "He is a bona fide possessor who possesses as owner by virtue of an act sufficient in terms to
transfer property, the defects of which he was ignorant of."
See also Art. 3451, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The possessor in good faith
Is he who has just reason to believe himself the master of the thing which
he possesses, although he may not be in fact, as happens to him who buys
a thing which he supposes to belong to the person selling it to him, but
which, in fact, belongs to another."
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ments and "reimburse the value of the materials and the price
of workmanship, or .

.

. a sum equal to the enhanced value of

the soil."' If the person who made the improvements was not a
possessor in good faith, "the owner of the soil has a right to keep
them or to compel this person to take away or demolish the
same."'
5 the plaintiffs, who had been declared
In Venta v. Ferrara
the owners in a prior suit,6 wanted the defendant to demolish all

the improvements which the latter had placed upon the land.
However, since the defendant had purchased the property from
a recognized realty company by a deed which apparently conveyed good title, the court found that he had been a possessor in
good faith by all the tests of Articles 503 and 3451 of the Revised
Civil Code. Consequently, the plaintiffs were obliged to keep the
improvements, and the case was remanded (1) to permit them to
elect their choice of paying either the value of the improvements
or the enhanced value of the land, and (2) to permit the introduction of evidence regarding the value of the choice elected.
Natural Servitude of Drainage
Between neighboring properties there exists a natural servitude of drainage whereby the lower property must "receive the
waters which run naturally from the estate situated above."7 In
Adams v. Town of Ruston 8 the plaintiff complained that the defendant was taking undue advantage of the location of the respective propetries and was making the natural servitude of
drainage more burdensome by permitting waste water emptied
from the town swimming pool to flow over the plaintiff's land.
The court could not but find that the defendant's acts had made
the servitude more burdensome on the plaintiff's land, and the
only serious question concerned the kind of remedy to be granted.
3. Art. 508, La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. Ibid.
5. 195 La. 334, 196 So. 550 (1940).
6. Venta v. Ferrara, 177 La. 433, 148 So. 670 (1933).
7. Art. 660, La. Civil Code of 1870: "It Is a servitude due by the estate
situated below to receive the waters which run naturally from the estate
situated above, provided the industry of man has not been used to create
that servitude.
"The proprietor below is not at liberty to raise any dam, or to make any
other work, to prevent this running of the water.
"The proprietor above can do nothing whereby the natural servitude due
by the estate below may be rendered more burdensome."
8. 194 La. 403, 193 So. 688 (1940). It should be noted that in the published
report of this case there is a typographical error whereby Article 660 is
cited erroneously as Article 600 in the syllabi and In the text of the decision.
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On the strength of one of its earlier decisions, 9 and bolstered by
a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, 10 the court
maintained that the matter of issuing an injunction was discretionary and that it must be considered on the basis of balancing the respective interests involved. In the present case, the
court concluded that the additional burden was not sufficient to
warrant the granting of an injunction and that since the injury
caused was negligible it could be adequately compensated in
damages.
Dedication to the Public
A question regarding the dedication to the public of certain
streets in New Orleans came up in Richard v. City of New Orleans." The main substance of this case is discussed elsewhere
in the present article. 12 The point raised here is with reference
to the "title by dedication"'" of which the court speaks. It is not
clear whether the concept meant is absolute ownership of the
land or merely the servitude of the right of way.14 Apart from
the absence in the record of proof that there had ever been any
public use of the streets, the court did not consider the fact of
non-user for over a hundred years. If a servitude had been created
by the alleged original dedication, it would have been lost by
prescription.' 5 In conclusion, the opinion states that the original
owner would be "estopped by his conduct ...

from denying the

public character of the strip of ground in dispute"'16 and that the
same limitation must apply to his heirs. If there is any basis for
an estoppel, it would be an estoppel to deny the intent to dedicate. 7 Since there must be something in addition to an intention
9. Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 809-810, 155 So. 231, 233
(1934).
10. Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337-338, 53
S.Ct. 602, 603, 77 L.Ed. 1208, 1211 (1933).
11. 197 So. 594 (La. 1940).
12. See discussion in section on Municipal Corporations, infra p. 331.
13. 197 So. 594, 599 (La. 1940).
14. Cf. Arts. 658, 705, 707, La. Civil Code of 1870 (servitude); Bomar v.
City of Baton Rouge, 162 La. 342, 110 So. 497 (1926) (servitude); Paret v.
Louisiana Highway Commission, 178 La. 454, 151 So. 768 (1933) (servitude);
Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938)
(title).
15. Paret v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 178 La. 454, 151 So. 768
(1933).
16. 197 So. 594, 604 (La. 1940).
17. For the general proposition that there must be an intent to dedicate,
the court cites (197 So. at 599) one authority: Dillon, Municipal Corporations
(5 ed. 1911). It does not appear why there is no reference to Louisiana authorities, e.g., Bomar v. City of Baton Rouge, 162 La. 342, 110 So. 497 (1926),
and the cases cited therein.
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in order to complete a dedication to the public, it is not clear
how even an admitted intent to dedicate can establish the public
character of the ground. The conflict between the estoppel against
the heirs of the owner and the prescription against the city is not
discussed.
18
In Humphreys v. Bennett Oil Corporation
there was quite
a different problem regarding dedication. The defendant had
drilled oil wells on a cemetery ground and justified its operation
on the basis of a mineral lease from the owner of the land and
the church association. 19 The court found, however, that there
had been a dedication of that plot of ground for "church and
cemetery purposes" which inured to the benefit of the public in
whose favor it was made and constituted a property restriction
even upon the owners.
Title Deeds
In the event of discrepancy, the diagram or map attached to
a deed controls the description of the property. 0
In Gipson v. Gipson21 the plaintiff had executed a quitclaim
deed relinquishing his interests to the record landowner. The
assignee of a mineral lease granted by the landowner was held
to be a privy in title to the quitclaim deed and was therefore
permitted to plead an estoppel against the plaintiff who contended
that he had been induced by fraud to make this quitclaim deed.
C. SUCCESSIONS

Court Costs

The case of Succession of Taulli is a contest over court costs
and is well summarized by the syllabus of the reporter:
"Where main purpose of executor, in qualifying as dative
testamentary executor of his aunt's will and in instituting
suit, was to secure recognition of himself and his sisters as the
owners of certain property as heirs of their aunt, and to recover certain cash, and decree dismissing the suit placed all
18. 197 So. 222 (La. 1940).
19. To prevent the recurrence of such a situation, Act 81 of 1940 was
passed making unlawful the use of cemetery grounds in any mineral operations. See The Louisiana Legislation of 1940 (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEw
98, 117.
20. Casso v. Ascension Realty Co., 195 La. 1, 196 So. 1 (1940).
21. 193 La. 807, 192 So. 355 (1939).
1. 193 La. 751, 192 So. 244 (1939).
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costs of the proceedings on succession of deceased husband,
the 'costs' referred to were the usual statutory costs of court,
and items of attorney's fees, executor's commission, and expense of printing briefs were not 'court costs' contemplated
thereby, nor did they come within accepted meaning of the
term 'costs of court.' 2
Collation
The case of Naudon v. Mauvezin8 was a suit by grandchildren
to compel their uncle to collate sums advanced by his father during his life time. The prescription of five years from date of death
of donor 4 was successfully pleaded by defendant. A notarial act
of partition had been executed within the five year period set
forth by Article 1413 of the Code. The action was not for a rescission of partition nor for a reduction of a donation but for collation, as was clearly shown by the pleadings, and hence Articles
1413 and 3542 were not pertinent.
However, the case seems to have been overruled sub silentio
within a very brief time by the decision in Himel v. Connely0
The court properly refused to apply Article 3542 to an action to
compel collation, leaving the prescriptive period for this action
an open question. The French theory that the action will lie
while an action to partition exists is not altogether satisfactory
in Louisiana, under different collation statutes and when applied,
for example, to an insolvent succession, coupled with the fact
that creditors of the deceased may not bring the action to collate.
In the Succession of Diez6 the facts were that a deceased
father had had four children by his first wife and eight by his
second. After his second marriage the deceased had conveyed
certain lands to the children of his first marriage "to settle all
matters of his first wife's succession" and to compensate these
children for valuable services rendered him by them. The children
of the second marriage maintained that this transfer was a donation and that the substance of it should be collated. The notarial
act was examined, evidence was admitted, over objection, to
"verify the recitals in the notarial act and to show that the trans2.
3.
4.
5.

193 La. at 751-752, 192 So. at 244.
194 La. 739, 194 So. 766 (1940).
Art. 3542, La. Civil Code of 1870.
Himel v. Connely, 197 So. 424 (La. 1940), noted in (1941) 3
LAw RE Iww 460.
6. 194 La. 1089, 195 So. 613 (1940).
7. 194 La. at 1094, 195 So. at 614.
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fer evidenced by the act was supported by adequate consideration," and the settlement was held to be a valid dation en
paiement.
The issue of the case of Succession of Henderson8 was whether
one of the children of the testatrix had or had not received, as
recited in his mother's will, more than his share of the estate before the mother's death. The court reviewed all of the facts and
figures and found that the plaintiff had received more than his
share. It was suggested that since the defendants could not collect the notes given to the deceased by the plaintiff, because of
his bankruptcy, the defendants' proper procedure would be to
ask the court to enforce the provisions of the mother's will, which
they had a right to do.
Prescription
The case of Smith v. Tyson 9 was a companion to the six cases
decided under the title of Tillery v. Fuller0 and "would have
been consolidated with those cases had issue been joined at the
time."'" In Tillery v. Fuller it was decided:
". that the rights of plaintiffs to accept a succession as

against the co-heir who has accepted were barred by the prescription of thirty years, unless in a particular instance
prescription may have been suspended long enough by the
minority of an heir.'

12

The plaintiff in the instant case pleaded suspension of prescription under the doctrine contra non valentem agere non currit
prescriptio,since she was a nonresident and ignorant of her rights
during the period when she might have exerted them. The court
reviewed the jurisprudence and decided against her plea. There
was "no contention that her inability to act was brought about
by the ill practices of the defendants,"' 3 and the court's judgment
was that mere passivity on the part of defendants did not "arrest
the course of prescription, in the total absence of allegation or
proof of machinations upon their part lulling plaintiff into a false
security.""
8. 197 So. 267 (La. 1940).
9. 193 La. 571, 192 So. 61 (1939).
10. 190 La. 586, 182 So. 683 (1938). See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1937-1938 Term (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAw REvIEw 314, 358.
11. Smith v. Tyson, 193 La. 571, 572, 192 So. 61 (1939).
12. Ibid.
13. 193 La. at 578, 192 So. at 63.
14. 193 La. at 580, 192 So. at 64.
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Disinherison
The case of Succession of Lissall set forth the doctrine that
when a child is disinherited for cause in a parent's will,16 the
disinherison is of no effect "unless the facts upon which the disinherison is founded are proved contradictorily with the presumptive heir sought to be disinherited." 17 A judgment of the
lower court placing the other heirs in possession according to an
agreement whereby they had partitioned the property, ignoring
entirely the rights of the disinherited one, who was not made a
party to the proceedings, was declared null.
Wills
In the case of Succession of Blossom"' the court held the
following will valid as not containing a prohibited substitution
under Article 1520 of the Civil Code:
New Orleans, La.
Feb. 18-1930.
I give and bequeath to Annie Baker, my adopted daughter, now at Elwyn, Pa., the usufruct of my property-and at
her death I wish this property to be equally divided between
Evelyn B. Kern of Toledo Ohio-and George D. Marshall of
Shreveport, Louisiana. This is wholly written and signed and
dated by me.
(Signed) Emma H. Baker. 19
Numerous cases were reviewed as a guide to the interpretation
of the will. The court decided the document intended a gift to
the adopted daughter of the usufruct, with naked-ownership in
the other two legatees. The gift of naked ownership was thought
to be a conjoint legacy, and since one of the two had predeceased
the testator, the other took all. Since the adopted daughter was
a forced heir, and the only one, her legitime was one-third of
the estate. The daughter had entered an alternative plea in the
event the will was declared valid, asking for one-third of the
estate. The court's final statement appears in these words:
"It is further decreed that . .. the adopted daughter of
the testatrix, is entitled to one-third of the succession and
that ... [the conjoint legatee] is entitled to the naked ownership of the remaining two-thirds .... ,,20
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

195 La. 438, 196 So. 924 (1940).
Arts. 1621-1624, La. Civil Code of 1870.
Succession of Lissa, 196 So. 924, 926 (1940).
194 La. 635, 194 So. 572 (1940).
194 La. at 637, 194 So. at 573.
194 La. at 647-648, 194 So. at 577.
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Since it was perfectly valid for usufruct to be left to one, with
naked ownership in the other, and it was so held, it does not
appear why the legatee of the naked ownership should receive
two-thirds of it and the adopted daughter full ownership of onethird, with usufruct of the remainder, if that is the meaning
of the final statement. If the value of the usufruct was found to
be one-third or more of the estate, why should it be necessary
to depart from the will? If not, why the division indicated? May
not the forced portion be received in usufruct? The 1938 trust
act provides that the legitime may be left under common law
trust. Under the Code articles as interpreted by a very old case
it may not be left under civil law trust-i.e., usufruct.
The case of Succession of Butterworth2 ' is of particular interest, since it deals with Article 1589 of the Code, which states
the rule on erasures found in olographic testaments, an article
upon which the jurisprudence has been scant and far from satisfactory. A most careful review of materials is presented here in
a full opinion; distinctions between revocations of the instrument
as a whole and the effect of erasures in the body are made-a
matter rather vaguely treated in some preceding decisions-and
a most considered judgment is made, which is adhered to in the
rehearing. The testimony of handwriting experts was admitted
and "like the testimony of other witnesses ...

considered by the

Court and accorded the weight to which it is entitled in view of
the facts and the common knowledge of mankind. '22 The bequest
in question was marked out with double ink lines, the ink being
the same as that used in writing the will. The lines evidenced a
curved characteristic appearing in the handwriting. It was concluded that these erasures were "approved by the testator, ' 2

and

hence the bequest was "considered as not made, '2 4 it being considered unnecessary that the testator expressly approve the
erasures in writing. A notation made by the commissioners drafting the Code of 1825 to the effect that the article in question was
25
placed in the Code to "prevent the mutilation" was relied upon.
The case is also of interest because it evidenced a creation
of a trust in an olographic will and a rule taken by the trustee
21. 195 La. 115, 196 So. 39 (1940), noted in (1941) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
468.
22.
23.
24.
25.

196 So. at 41.
Art. 1589, La. Civil Code of 1870.
Ibid.
Projet of the Civil Code of 1825, I La. Legal Archives 214.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. III

under the new trust act,"6 though the matter of the trust was not
an issue.
Trusts
In Hagerty v. Clement 27 an informal trust was created in a
will under Act 107 of 1920. The trustee later turned over the
property to the beneficiaries with the consent of all concerned.
Plaintiff, who had not only agreed but urged the trustee to transfer the property to himself and the other beneficiaries, then sued
the trustee, claiming a breach of trust, damages, and a reconstitution of the trust, without offering to return the money which
he had received. It was held that he had no case in law or equity.
The case presents an excellent discussion of Louisiana trust laws,
the restatement, et cetera.
Partition
In Wetherbee v. Lodwick Lumber Company2 8 a partition of
realty was sued for. The defense was that the plaintiff was not
the owner of an undivided interest. Title was tried and it was
held that the plaintiff in the partition suit was an owner, after
which partition was ordered. The defendant did not enter a suspensive appeal; hence the judgment became executory, and in
due course the property was sold at public sale and bought in by
the defendant in the present suit. The defendant in the original
partition suit took a devolutive appeal and won on the title question, after the partition sale. He asked to have the sale set aside,
and the court held that the sale was valid as it was a judicial sale
and fully transferred ownership. "The validity of sales made in
the execution of judgments after they become executory is not
affected by a subsequent reversal of the judgment on devolutive
appeal.

'29

The plaintiff's right to an accounting from the cor-

poration which had been declared not to have been a valid coowner was reserved.
The interesting points of procedure, warranty, et cetera, are
discussed elsewhere in this r~sum6 under the appropriate headings.
In Hollingsworth v. Caldwell ° plaintiff sued for partition by
26.
27.
Revisw
28.
29.
80.

La. Act 81 of 1938.
195 La. 230, 196 So. 330 (1940),
465.
194 La. 352, 193 So. 671 (1940).
194 La. at 369, 193 So. at 676.
195 La. 30, 196 So. 10 (1940).

noted in (1941)

3 LoUISIANA
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licitation of a tract of land in Ouachita Parish. The land was appraised at $2,628.50. The plaintiff, after confirmation of default,
obtained an order to sell "at public auction to the last and highest bidder, for cash, regardless of appraisal."3 1 Plaintiff bid in the
property for $115. After costs and attorney's fees were paid, $4.10
was left for defendants. In answer to a rule by plaintiff to homologate, the defendants sought to annul the sale, alleging fraud,
false representations, et cetera. Upon the second hearing the court
ordered a new sale upon an equitable ground, as the gross inadequacy of the price was so glaring. The supreme court reversed
the judgment and held that the judicial sale of partition was
definitive. The court grounded their conclusion largely on the
Wetherbee case, 82 discussed previously in this r6sum6. There are
many points of difference. The Wetherbee case left the original
co-owner with relief. It involved a matter of title and the failure
to take a suspensive appeal. There were no glaring inequities
apparent on the face of the proceedings of the Wetherbee case.
Here the issue was pursued in the homologation proceedings of
the partition sale. The plaintiff and general entrepreneur of the
whole affair was the buyer of the property. He paid $115 for
property worth $2,628.50, out of which costs and attorney's fees
had to be paid. There was no collateral attack alluded to by the
court but a direct attack in homologation. The defendants, owners of one-half, were left with $2.05 and no relief of any other
kind. The distinction made as between partition and the sale to
partition seems unsatisfactory and unwarranted under these facts.
The cases cited for the inapplicability of Articles 1374, 1375, and
1376 do not support or discuss this distinction. It would seem that
a partition by licitation would have to be concerned with the
sale rather than the simple mathematics involved in dividing a
sum into parts.
Haas v. Reese"3 is a companion suit to Amerada Petroleum
Corporationv. Reese,3 4 which disposes of the issues herein. The
court said:
"The fact that the plaintiff in this case acquired royalty
deeds from seven of the co-owners, in addition to mineral
leases from three of them, without the consent or concurrence
of the other co-owners, does not make any difference in the
31.
32.
33.
34.

196 So. at 11.
Wetherbee v. Lodwick Lumber Co., 194 La. 352, 193 So. 671 (1940).
195 La. 376, 196 So. 564 (1940).
195 La. 859, 196 So. 558 (1940).
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result, for the reason, as explained in the Amerada case, that
where property is held in indivision between several coowners, none can confer rights on the entirety of the common
property without the consent of all the others.""
Delta Drilling Company v. Oil Finance Corporation6 was a
suit for a partition of a lease having no producing well. Estoppel
was pleaded, based on an alleged agreement not to partition until
all the oil and gas had been produced and sold. The court examined the contract, found it to be nothing more than an operating
contract, and hence overruled the estoppel and remanded the
case87 with ample authority of Code articles and previous decisions.

D. CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
The principle that reformation of a written contract to express the true intent of the parties may be allowed where there
was mutual mistake in its confection occupied the court in three
cases. In Smith v. Tullos' and Tate v. Ludeau2 reformation was
allowed. In both mutual error was convincingly shown. In the
third case, the plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proving
such error by clear and convincing evidence.3 Articles 1826 and
1955 of the Civil Code were relied on as well as numerous cases
from other jurisdictions.
Metcalf v. Monsour 4 was a suit to annul a series of transfers
of a tract of land for fraud and misrepresentation. In rejecting
the plaintiff's demand, the court applied the well settled principle
requiring exceptionally strong proof to sustain a charge of fraud.,
To the same effect was the decision in McGinty v. McGinty6
where the court, although refusing to set aside the sale in toto,
did allow annulment insofar as a portion of the land was concerned. This was based on a finding that the description of this
85. 196 So. at 564.
36. 195 La. 407, 196 So. 914 (1940).
37. See Arts. 1297-1298, La. Civil Code of 1870.
1. 195 La. 400, 196 So. 912 (1940).
2. 197 So. 612 (La. 1940). In this case there was error in the preparation
and execution of a lease through the innocent substitution of one form in
lieu of the one contemplated by the parties.
S. Reynaud v. Bullock, 195 La. 86, 196 So. 29 (1940).
4. 197 So. 235 (La. 1940).
5. Belcher v. Booth, 164 La. 514, 114 So. 116 (1927); Garnier v. Aetna Ins.
Co. of Hartford, Conn., 181 La. 426, 159 So. 705 (1935).
6. 195 La. 328, 196 So. 548 (1940).

1941]

WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

291

portion was written into the act of sale after it was signed and
without the consent of the vendor.
An attempt to set aside a sale of realty on the ground of
lesion beyond moiety failed in Abbott v. Lawrence.7 The court
applied the established principle that to justify rescission on the
ground of lesion beyond moiety the evidence must show conclusively that the value of the property on the date of the sale
was in excess of twice the amount paid for it by the defendant.
The decision was based on Articles 1860 and 1861 of the Civil
Code.
In Highland Realty Company v. Feraud8 the court allowed
specific performance against the defendant's contention that the
plaintiff did not have a good and merchantable title. Plaintiff
traced his title through a partition sale. In finding it unobjectionable the court applied the rule that where property is ordered
sold for the purpose of effecting a partition, it passes in its entirety, regardless of what the deed to the purchaser may recite,
or of any inaccuracy in a map annexed theretof
Bandel v. Sabine Lumber Company ° was a suit for specific
performance together with damages caused by the defendant's
granting a mineral lease on property he had agreed to sell to
plaintiff by a bond for deed contract. The lease was granted subsequent to the time the plaintiff had made the agreed payments
entitling him to a conveyance. The judgment of the lower court
granting specific performance only was amended by the supreme
court to include damages measured by the consideration paid to
the vendor for the lease. This claim for damages for breach of
the executory contract was held to be a personal action prescribed
by ten years. 1
On the basis of past decisions, a reluctance on the part of
the court to find a stipulation pour autrui might justifiably be
claimed. Indeed, the court has said that there must be practically
an express declaration to support such a finding. No such reluctance seems to have been felt in the case of Pelican Well & Tool
2
There the plaintiff, a creditor,
Supply Company v. Johnson.1
7. 194 La. 699, 194 So. 753 (1940).
8. 194 La. 535, 194 So. 11 (1940).
9. In deciding this point the court relied very heavily upon the recent
case of Samuels v. Parsons, 146 La. 262, 83 So. 548 (1919).
10. 194 La. 31, 193 So. 359 (1939), noted in (1940) 2 LOUISANA LAW Rsvmw
749.
11. Art. 3544, La. Civil Code of 1870.
12. 194 La. 987, 195 So. 514 (1940).
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claimed to be the beneficiary of such a stipulation. His debtor, in
agreeing to allow more time to the defendant for the payment of
the purchase money under a contract of sale, expressed himself
as follows: "'provided titles have by that time been accepted by
your attorney and provided further, you will, on or before ten
days from this date, pay the Globe Supply Company his [sic]
claim . . .and the Earl H. Carter claim . . . , together with
the other bills we owe against our former operations on said
lease. . . "'I' The writing further provided that, "Your signature of acceptance hereto will constitute a contract between us,
and the same shall become a part of our former contracts above
mentioned." Plaintiff was the holder of one of the "other bills"
mentioned. Defendant's contention was that payment of the bills
named, including plaintiff's, was merely a condition on which the
extension would be allowed and not a promise binding on him.
The court found, however, that a promise was intended and allowed recovery under Articles 1890 and 1902 of the Civil Code.
The case may be indicative of a relaxation of the earlier and
stricter view.
The rule that parol evidence is admissible to resolve an ambiguity in a written agreement governed the case of Hamill v.
Moore.1
I
In Blakewood v. Town of Franklinton15 the plaintiff sought
to recover $6,447.43, alleged to be due him for professional services rendered as a civil engineer. On finding that the parties
had not formally agreed on the compensation for such services
the court allowed recovery on a quantum meruit basis. The principle applied is well settled.
The case of Cooley v. Meridian Lumber Company16 involved
a difficult problem of interpretation with respect to a deed conveying "all the timber standing, being and growing on and upon"
certain land, and allowing the vendees fifty years for the removal
thereof. The defendant claimed the right to all the merchantable
timber produced during the period granted for the removal. In
rejecting this contention the court found, first, that a sale of
"timber" means a sale of merchantable timber, and, second, that
the merchantable timber covered by the deed should be determined as of the date of the contract. The Chief Justice felt that
13.
14.
15.
16.

194
194
195
197

La.
La.
La.
So.

at 993, 195 So. at 516.
486, 193 So. 715 (1939).
391, 196 So. 909 (1940).
255 (La. 1940).
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the majority opinion amounted to making a contract for the parties different from the one they had made for themselves. He
supported this position by (1) referring to certain subsequent
conduct of the landowner suggesting what the latter considered
the contract to cover, (2) the rule of Article 2474 of the Civil
Code imposing the risk of ambiguity upon the seller, and (3) an
earlier Louisiana case which he regarded as being directly in
point. The majority opinion contained an extensive examination
of cases from other jurisdictions as well as from Louisiana.
The principle that a contract should be read as a whole in
order to determine the true meaning of any particular provision
was applied in Dufrene v. Bernstein.1 7 In Thurston v. Mitchell1 8
the evidence adduced was held sufficient to show that the consideration was the sum claimed by the plaintiff, and not the
smaller sum paid by the defendant.
In Cerami v. Haas 9 it was held that recordation by the offeree
of a promise to sell royalty interest was an act constituting a
sufficient acceptance thereof. The court therefore dismissed the
offeror's action in jactitation to have the document erased from
the conveyance records upon finding that he himself had never
offered to perform. The offeror's remedy was said to be an action
for specific performance pursuant to Article 2462 of the Civil
Code. Of course this should not be taken as denying a vendor's
right to have such a contract resolved for nonperformance by the
purchaser after proper demand.
E. COMMUNITY PROPERTY
In the Succession of Bell' a widow and widower, each having
children, contracted a marriage of which no children were born.
The first community of the husband had not been partitioned.
This suit was brought against the man, who had survived both
wives, by a child of his second wife's first marriage to settle the
second community. The husband had bought out his children's
interest in the first community and had included in some of the
titles a recital that he was buying with his separate funds, but
failed to say so in another. The settlement was effected according
to the following well established rules:
17. 197 So. 236 (La. 1940).
18. 194 La. 1037, 195 So. 531 (1940).
19. 197 So. 752 (La. 1940).
1. 194 La. 274, 193 So. 645 (1939).
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"... . It is so well established in the jurisprudence of this
State that property purchased by the husband during the community without declarations in the title showing that that
price paid was the separate funds of the husband and that it
was his intention to acquire the property for the separate
benefit of his estate, or words to that effect, that it is unneces'2
sary to cite authorities to that end."
"In order to preserve the title in the separate estate of
the husband, it is necessary to recite two things in the deed:
First, that the price is paid with the separate funds of the
husband; and, second, that it is the husband's intention to acquire the property for the benefit of his separate estate, or
words to that effect."3
"There is no fixed rule or standard of proof required to
establish that the contribution of the separate funds of the
husband has been used to benefit the community. To establish such a claim it must be shown with reasonable certainty
that the community still had the benefit of the contribution
at the time of its dissolution, and that the separate funds were
not wasted by the husband or disposed of for his separate
'4
benefit."
In the case of In re F. H. Koretke Brass & Manufacturing
Company," an injunction suit was brought by plaintiff to prevent
her former husband and his two aunts from depriving her of her
one-half of the community, the judicial partition of which was
pending. The community property consisted of the assets of a
business operated by her husband under the name of a corporation the charter of which had expired before any of the community assets were acquired. The husband and aunts had
instituted so-called liquidation proceedings and had themselves
appointed commissioners without bond. The court granted the
injunction, making the following statement:
"'In the absence of any judicial precedent set by our own
courts, we are disposed to follow the weight of authority established by the courts of other jurisdictions and to hold that,
when a charter of a corporation expires by limitation of time
as fixed in the charter, the corporation is thereby dissolved
2. 194 La. at 279, 193 So. at 646.

3. 194 La. at 280, 193 So. at 646-647.
4. 194 La. at 282, 193 So. at 647.
5. 195 La. 415, 196 So, 917 (1940).
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and ceases to exist, and is without any corporate power either
de jure or de facto. "8'
The case is of interest chiefly for the corporation rules, which
are discussed elsewhere in this symposium.7 The right to partition community property after dissolution of the community and
the right to enjoin in proper cases are, of course, well recognized.
It is important to note, however, that the relief was given under
Article 303 of the Code of Practice, which is much broader in
scope than Articles 149 and 150 of the Civil Code. The blanket
clause "or from doing some other act injurious to the other party"
appearing in Article 303 of the Code of Practice took care of this
unusual procedure of the husband, which might have been hard
to fit technically into the more specific clauses dealing with community property.
The suit of Carter v. Third District Homestead Association8
arose as a mandamus proceeding by a wife against the homestead association to compel the latter to issue her a duplicate
stock certificate and pass book representing certain shares of
stock issued in her name, the evidence of which the husband refused to turn over to her, as he claimed that the stock was purchased with community funds. The issue was, of course, between
husband and wife. The question was grounded on an interpretation of Acts 120 of 1902 and 140 of 1932, permitting married
women to buy stock in building and loan associations, the contention of the wife being that these acts also made the stock her
separate property regardless of the source of the funds. It was
so held. That being the case, the wife had a right to insist under
statute and well established jurisprudence that her separate property be turned over to her, even during the existence of the community. The husband had no right to collect the possible debt
that the separate estate of the wife owed to the community until
the latter estate was dissolved. The case of Viguerie v. Viguerie,9
thought to be out of line with these well established principles,
was overruled. It would appear from the rehearing of the Viguerie
case that the court merely denied that the wife had a privilege
on the movables, and hence dismissed her writ of injunction, and
not that she did not have an action against her husband for restitution of her separate property. Be that as it may, the conclusion
6.
7.
8.
9.

196 So. at 919.
Discussed in the section on Corporations, infra p. 350.
197 So. 230 (La. 1940).
133 La. 406, 63 So. 89 (1913).
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reached in the case under discussion is undoubtedly correct and
is heartening to the student of community property, who has been
rightly disturbed of late because of confusion of jurisprudence.
In the case of Investors Homestead Association v. Anglada °
the plaintiff asked for a deficiency judgment against the husband
of the borrower, whose property had been put up for security, and
under sale had not brought the amount of the loan. The property
had been acquired by the wife by inheritance, a fact known to
plaintiff. The husband had signed "to authorize the wife." The
usual transaction of selling to the loan company and then rebuying so that the loan company would have the benefit of a vendor's privilege as well as of a mortgage to secure the loan was
gone through with. The theory of the plaintiff's suit was that by
virtue of this performance, the property had been acquired during the marriage, hence was community property and the loan
a community debt. The court very properly held the property and
debt to be separate property of the wife and refused to hold the
husband or community for the deficiency. Any time a deficiency
judgment is defeated, progress has been made in the present
trend toward some equitable method of spreading the risk of
economic "depressions." The loan company in this case felt that
they had sufficient security when they made the loan or they
would not have accepted it. Since the borrower lost her piece of
property in its entirety, on a low market, the lender only shared
in a loss which was the fault of neither party. Obviously, the case
was not decided on these grounds but on the purely statutory
regulations of community and separate property. The court suggested that had the husband not limited his signature by the express words "to authorize," the result might have been different.
It might be well to heed this warning in conveyancing. Over the
defendant's objection, a letter from the husband was introduced
by which the loan company wished to prove a new transaction to
which the husband himself had subscribed. The supreme court
found that the letter had been properly admitted under the parol
evidence rule, but that it was not a promise to pay by the husband, as he was acting throughout the affair as his wife's agenta matter which he was permitted to explain in his testimony. The
decision is unquestionably correct and satisfactory in both law
and equity.
The suit of Womack v. McCook Brothers Funeral Home1 was
10. 193 La. 596, 192 So. 69 (1939).
11. 194 La. 296, 193 So. 652 (1940).
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brought by a surviving widow to recover a one-half interest in
community property sold by the administrator of her husband's
succession to pay funeral expenses and taxes, without notice to
her. The supreme court stated that since the wife's half of the
property could not be sold to pay the husband's funeral expenses
and since taxes are not debts, the sale of plaintiff's one-half of
the community was a nullity and not an informality cured by
two years' prescription under Article 3543 as amended by Act
231 of 1932. However, plaintiff had claimed the residue from the
administrator's sale of the succession property as a necessitous
widow, and though she later withdrew the claim, she was thus
precluded from denying that the administrator's sale had been
legally conducted.
In Rawlings v. Stokes- a husband domiciled in Mississippi
acquired a piece of property in Louisiana during the existence of
his marriage, which was subsequently terminated by divorce.
The property in Louisiana was unquestionably community property. Preceding the divorce the spouses executed a mortgage trust
agreement, and the wife accepted a note for fifteen thousand
dollars, secured by Mississippi property, as a full settlement of
all present or future claims against her husband or his estate.
Later, the husband gave a note secured by the Louisiana property in dispute. The husband subsequently became a bankrupt.
The present plaintiff bought in the Louisiana property at a foreclosure sale and brought an action to settle the question of
whether or not the divorced wife had ever been divested of her
one-half interest in the property. Having found that she had not
released it, nor lost it by prescription of ten years, since there
had been no title translative of her interest upon which to ground
this plea nor any facts to create an estoppel against her, the court
gave lengthy attention to the plea that she had been divested of
title for failure to formally accept the community in 1922, at the
time of the dissolution of the community by divorce. Article 2420,
setting forth this rule, was not specifically repealed by statute
until 1926, a few weeks after the decision of the Phillips case 8
deciding that Article 2420 had long been abrogated by Act 4 of
1882. The court affirmed the distinction set forth in Lyons v.
Veith" and held that retroactive effects of the Phillips case
might properly be given in husband and wife situations, but not
12. 194 La. 206, 193 So. 589 (1940).
13. Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926).
14. 170 La. 915, 129 So. 528 (1930).
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in contracts made on the faith of Article 2420 as interpreted by
the court prior to the Phillips case. No contract here had been
made until after the specific repeal of Article 2420; hence the
wife was held to have retained title to the undivided one-half of
the property.
F.

PARTICULAR CONTRACTS

Sale
Act 124 of 19061 allows an attorney to acquire an interest in
the subject matter of a suit, proposed suit or claim, in payment
of his professional fees. The recent case of Hope v. Madison2 presented to the court for the first time the question of the validity
of such a transfer when made after the suit has been filed. The
court felt no hesitancy in holding the 1906 act applicable. It thus
appears that transfers in payment of attorneys' fees have definitely been taken out of the scope of the articles of the Code
dealing with litigious rights.
The cases of Mizer v. Tennant4 and Lee v. Perkins' also called
for the application of Act 124 of 1906. In both, however, the contracts of employment were entered into before the litigation was
begun. The latter case presented the additional problem of a
transfer by the defendant to a third party during the pendency
of the suit. In an earlier opinion 6 the court had remanded the
case to permit the plaintiffs to avail themselves of the provisions
of Article 2652 of the Civil Code on the subject of litigious redemption. At the time this was done the supreme court was not
apprised of the fact that the mineral interest involved in the suit
had been retransferred to the defendant prior to the filing of the
motion to remand. Relying upon an earlier decision, 7 the court,
on the present hearing, ruled that the retransfer placed the status
of the mineral interest in the same position as before the original
transfer. This being true, there remained no basis for litigious
redemption.
1. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 455.
2. 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666 (1940). This case is also discussed in the
section on Procedure, infra p. 362.
3. A discussion of contingency fee contracts, and especially La. Act 124
of 1906, may be found in a Comment (1939) 1 LouIsIANA LAW REVIEW 593,
605-607.
4. 197 So. 748 (La. 1940).
5. 197 So. 607 (La. 1940).
6. 192 La. 1049, 190 So. 126 (1939).
7. Illg & Valentino v. Regan, 166 La. 70, 116 So. 673 (1928).
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In Wetherbee v. Lodwick Lumber Company,8 which is a
sequel to the recent case of Continental Securities Corporationv.
Wetherbee, the court correctly stated that the principle of
Article 245310 and the doctrine of Richardson Oil Company v.
Herndon11 have no application to a sale on execution pending a
devolutive appeal.
Lease
In the Succession of Gravolet12 a lessor intervened, claiming
the sum of $2,160 for the remaining nine years of a ten year lease,
and also recognition of its lessor's lien and privilege. In opposition, it was contended that under Act 190 of 1926,18 the lessor's
privilege arising under "any lease on any building used wholly
or in part for mercantile purposes" does not extend, in case of
the failure or death of the lessee, for any period longer than six
months after such event. The property leased consisted of a tract
of land on which there were no buildings at the time the original
lease was made, although at the time of the execution of the
second lease (the one in litigation) several buildings had been
erected and were owned by the lessee and used in his shrimp
canning and oyster business. It was held that the second lease
covered the land only, and that therefore the 1926 act was inapplicable. In answer to the contention that the insolvency of the
succession operated to mature the rent for the remaining nine
years of the lease the court relied on the fact that Article 2054 of
the Civil Code applies only to cases where the insolvency has
been judicially declared. The lease was also held subject to sale
by the administratrix.
The case of Selber Brothers v. Newstadt's Shoe Store14 grew
8. 194 La. 352, 193 So. 671 (1940). This case is also discussed in the section on Partition, supra p. 288.
9. 187 La. 773, 175 So. 571 (1937), noted in (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 308.
10. La. Civil Code of 1870. This article provides that:
"The thing claimed as the property of the claimant can not be alienated
pending the action, so as to prejudice his right. If judgment be rendered for
him, the sale is considered as a sale of another's property, and does not
prevent him from being put in possession by virtue of such judgment.
"Nor shall it be lawful for debtors or third possessors of property, subject to a mortgage of any kind, to transfer or alienate such property, pending
an action to enforce the mortgage, and any transfer or alienation made in
contravention of the provisions of this article, shall have no effect as against
the plaintiff, or plaintiffs, in such pending action." See also La. Act 22 of
1904 (Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 6552-6554].
11. 157 La. 211, 102 So. 310 (1924).
12. 197 So. 572 (La. 1940).
13. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6603.
14. 194 La. 654, 194 So. 579 (1940).
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out of a contract of lease where the rent was based in part on the
gross sales of the lessee. In reversing the judgment of the lower
court sustaining an exception of no cause of action, the supreme
court found an implied obligation in the lessee to conduct the
business with fair regard for the interest of the lessor, and remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether the
lessee had violated this obligation by changing the character of
the business conducted in the leased premises. Articles 1903 and
2711 of the Civil Code were found applicable.
Rhodes v. Sinclair Refining Company15 was a suit to recover
damages for the alleged unlawful ejectment of the plaintiff from
a service station he was operating under a lease from defendant.
The evidence sustained the trial court's finding that defendants
did not forcibly and unlawfully eject plaintiff from the leased
premises, but that plaintiff voluntarily relinquished the station.
Only this question of fact was involved.
The case of Hill v. American Co-operative Association 6 was a
suit by an officer of a corporation to recover salary claimed under
an alleged contract. Finding an existing contract for a period of
a year and a discharge, without cause, during such period, the
court allowed recovery of the balance of the salary for the term
of the contract."
Mandate (Agency)
In Oliphant v. Town of Lake Providence18
the court of appeal
certified to the supreme court the question of liability vel non of
the town on an agreed statement of facts. The Town of Lake
Providence owned and operated the light and water utilities plant
and had employed one Chaney as general superintendent. He was
required to be ready at all times, whether day or night, to respond to all calls connected with his duties. To facilitate the discharge of these duties the town furnished him an automobile
which was kept at his residence at night. On the night of January
3, 1936, Chaney, accompanied by his son, drove to a garage to
get his personal car. While at the garage, he entered into a discussion regarding the purchase of tires for a truck which the
town owned. The authority to purchase materials for the department was included in his duties. He directed his son to drive the
15.
16.
17.
case is
18.

197 So. 575 (La. 1940).
197 So. 241 (La. 1940), noted in (1940) 3 LOUISiANA LAW REvIEw 235.
Art. 2749, La. Civil Code of 1870. The principal point at issue in this
discussed in the section on Corporations, infra p. 350.
193 La. 675, 192 So. 95 (1939).
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town car back to his home and store it for the night. While driving the car to the place directed he struck and injured the plaintiff. The question certified was the legal responsibility of the
town for negligence of the driver. On rehearing, with three judges
dissenting," the court reversed its previous decision and exonerated the town from liability basing its decision on the case of
James v. J. S. Williams & Son,20 "to the effect that, when an employee has taken his employer's vehicle out for the personal use
or convenience of the employee, he is not acting any more within
the scope of his employment when he is returning the vehicle
than when he is taking it out. 12

1

The fact that the superintend-

ent's duties required him to be ready at all times to respond to
an emergency call, that he incidentally performed a service relating to his employment, and that he had possession of the car
at all times was not determinative of the issue. The substance of
the holding of the court is that when the agent took the car on
a mission wholly his own and completely outside the scope of his
employment, he did not re-enter the master's work on the return
trip. The court did not pass on the question as to when the liability of the master re-attaches in case the agent is sent out on a
mission for the master and, while out, deviates from the scope
22
of his employment and goes on a private mission.
In Cason v. Cecil 8 it was held that the actions of an agent,
though not expressly authorized, are binding upon the principal
if the facts show an implied agency resulting from the conduct
of the principal. In this case the owners of certain mortgage notes
placed them in the hands of the bank for collection. Being unable to collect one of the notes from the debtor when it became
due their authorities informed the owners of that fact and
recommended a sale of the note to a third person as a means of
collecting the bank's money. The court found that the conduct of
the owners, who had full knowledge of the facts, in assenting to
this recommendation and receiving the money derived from this
sale estopped them to deny the authority of the agent to make
the sale.
19. Fournet, Ponder and Higgins, J.J. dissenting. Cf. dissenting opinion,
193 La. at 700, 192 So. at 104, reaffirming the decision rendered on the first
hearing and distinguishing the cases relied upon by the majority on rehearing from the case at bar.
20. 177 La. 1033, 150 So. 9 (1933).
21. 193 La. 675, 694, 192 So. 95, 101 (1939).
22. For a discussion of the question of re-entry, see Comment (1939) 14
Tulane L. Rev. 72.
23. 194 La. 41, 193 So. 362 (1940).
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Security Contracts
Suretyship. The making of erroneous charges by the creditor
against the debtor's account does not impair the surety's rights
against the debtor2 4 and the surety is not entitled to a release. 5
However, the court granted the surety's alternative prayer for an
accounting to show the extent of his liability under the contract.
Privileges. The validity of a materialman's lien and privilege
on several oil leases and .oil wells was disputed in Mercantile
National Bank v. J. Thos. Driscoll, Inc. 6 Materials and supplies
were furnished in connection with the operation of several leases,
but the materialman filed only a single lien in globo covering all
the supplies. However, the several leases were all owned and operated by the defendant and all the supplies were purchased
under one open account. For these reasons, the court held that the
filing of the single lien was a sufficient compliance with the law.
This decision was carefully distinguished from other cases where
the filing of separate liens was required because there were separate and distinct contracts for supplies or because the supplies
were furnished for the properties of different owners. In the present case the court also held that an overstatement in the notice
filed would not preclude the lien claimant from establishing a less
extensive claim.
Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Company v. Wilson 2 was a
suit for the recognition and enforcement of a materialman's lien.
The plaintiff contended that the one year prescription had been
interrupted by the filing of the present suit in accordance with
the provisions of Act 298 of 1926.29 However, the court held that
the 1938 amendment3°--which became effective after the recordation of the lien and before the filing of the suit-was exclusively
a remedial change in the procedure for preventing prescription,
and since there had not been a timely reinscription, as required
by the 1938 act, the lien had been prescribed.
Mortgages. Where the holder of a series of promissory notes
secured by a single mortgage sold one of the notes to a third
24. Art. 2061, La. Civil Code of 1870.
25. Basso v. Export Warranty Co., 194 La. 303, 193 So. 654 (1940).
26. 194 La. 935, 195 So. 497 (1940).
27. La. Act 145 of 1934 [Darts. Stats. (1939) § 5101.1-5101.5] as amended
by Act 100 of 1940.
28. 197 So. 566 (La. 1940).
29. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 5106-5122.
30. La. Act 298 of 1926, § 12, as amended by La. Act 323 of 1938, § 1
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5117].
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party, the court applied the settled rule that, if the foreclosure
proceeds are insufficient to pay all the outstanding notes in full,
the original holder cannot compete in the distribution.3 1
In Hite v. Charbonnet 2 the purchaser of mortgaged property
had assumed the mortgage and thereby became personally bound
for the mortgage debt. This mortgage as against the original
owner was not reinscribed 3 until nineteen years after its first recordation. The court held, on rehearing, that the absence of timely
reinscription had not affected the existence of the mortgage as between the parties, and that it still ranked first because it had been
reinscribed prior to the recordation of the plaintiff's mortgage as
against the purchaser. Consequently, since the purchaser who assumed the original mortgage is treated as a party to it, the judicial sale under a previous foreclosure suit had been valid.
G.

MINERAL RIGHTS

Cheramie v. Moore' was a suit to cancel a lease on the ground
of fraudulent representations on the part of the lessee, an English
speaking individual, to the lessor, a French speaking individual.
It was alleged that the lease was for one year only instead of
ten as appeared in the instrument, signed by lessor's cousin for
lessor, who touched the pen and made his mark. After a thorough
review of the testimony, the court decided that the judgment of
the lower court was correct in finding no fraud and refusing cancellation.
The case of Gailey v. McFarlain2 is of particular interest because it settled a question which may have been considered doubtful-i.e., whether reversionary interests in mineral rights may be
dealt with. The answer was affirmative, but it was held in this
case, under the court's interpretation of the instrument alleged
to have conveyed the reversionary interest, that such a sale was
not intended and did not take place. The facts of the case were
that one McFarlain, owner of a ten acre tract, sold one-half of
his mineral rights in the land and leased the other half. Later, he
31. Cason v. Cecil, 194 La. 41, 193 So. 362 (1940). For discussion on priorities in assignments, see Note (1937) 11 Tulane L. Rev. 656. See also discussion
of this case under the section on Banking and Negotiable Instruments,
infra p. 348.
32. 193 La. 581, 192 So. 64 (1939).
33. Art. 3369, La. Civil Code of 1870.
1. 194 La. 415, 193 So. 692. (1940).
2. 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940), noted in (1940) 2 LOUiSiANA LAW REviEw
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executed the deed, "the key instrument in this controversy,"
wherein he again sold mineral rights. After the leases on the
tract had expired and ten years had elapsed without exercise of
the rights of the claimants, McFarlain's lessee's assignees, under
a new lease from McFarlain, started producing oil, and the present controversy began. That McFarlain could have sold the mineral interests which reverted to him was admitted. That he did
not was a matter of interpretation of the deed. The court stressed
the fact that in the deed he had warranted but one-sixteenth,
which certainly would not logically have happened if the instrument purported to convey the whole mineral interests, claimed
to have been sold as a reversionary right.
The case indicates that the reversionary interest is an incident to the ownership of the land and hence would follow the
land, unless excluded in a subsequent sale. This point was not
at issue, of course, as McFarlain was still the owner of the land.
The court's analysis of the Bodcaw Lumber Company case" seems
to point the way, however. The phrase in the deed of the Bodcaw
case, "All other rights held therein by said vendor," was said to
have conveyed the reversionary interest. That such interest might
be excluded, however, seems to follow.
If these observations are followed through, it could happen
that a reversion might be held in abeyance indefinitely. For example, L, a landowner, sold his mineral interest to P, and after
nine years sold his reversionary interest to X. During the tenth
year of the original term of the servitude, oil was produced by
P, but only a shallow pool was opened. This deposit was exhausted after eight years and the location abandoned by P. Eleven
years thereafter, drilling a deep strata was in contemplation. To
whom would the mineral rights belong? The problem might easily be further complicated if the land should change hands in
the interim.
Chief Justice O'Niell, in a very brief opinion, concurred in
the result of the case under discussion and made the statement
that:
".... it matters not whether the deed from McFarlain to Triche,

dated July 20, 1926, did or did not convey the so-called reversionary interest, because, if that interest was so conveyed it
was subject to the prescription of ten years; and it matters not
whether the ten years should be reckoned from that date or
3. Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Clifton Heirs, 169 La. 759, 126 So. 52 (1930).
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from September 26, 1922; because, in either event, the ten
'4
years expired before this suit was filed."
This observation would point the way toward a ten year
limitation upon the holding of a reversionary interest and bring
this idea also within the general restriction of ten years for the
holding of inactive mineral rights now prevailing for all other
types-a highly desirable result under the civilian policy of
tenure.
The question of the case of Lynn v. Harrington5 was framed
in an action in jactitation brought by the landowner against the
authors in title, who had reserved the mineral rights, and their
lessees. The plea was that the ten years' prescription liberandi
causa had run because the well completed by the lessee prior to
the end of the ten year period was unsuccessful. There was a
suggestion that the well had been drilled without a "reasonable
prospect of success" with the thought of holding the mineral servitude rather than of bringing in a producer. The court found
that the "'well was not drilled as a mere gesture by the mineral
owners to preserve a servitude, but by the owner of a mineral
lease under an obligation to substantially develop with due diligence.'

"

The well established rule that the "right to the continued use
of the servitude retained is not dependent upon the successful
outcome of the exploiting, unless it be made so by contract" was
applied and prescription was held to have been interrupted. The
discussion indicates more stress than usual in the pleadings on
the purpose and motivation of the search. The court's r6sum6 of
the evidence shows more attention paid to formations, sands, et
cetera. Judge Fournet's estimate of "expert testimony" remains
the same. He finds "that their opinions are very fallible."
In the case of Levy v. Crawford, Jenkins & Booth7 the defendants, landowners, leased their whole tract to the Atlas Oil
Company, which assigned to the Gulf Refining Company part of
the lease, covering a middle portion of the tract of land upon
which the Atlas Company took the original lease. Subsequently,
the landowners transferred the surface rights in the whole tract
to plaintiff's predecessors in title and retained all the mineral
rights. Production on certain parts of the tract was continuous,
4. 194
5. 193
6. 193
7. 194

La. 150, 174-175, 193 So. 570, 579 (1940).
La. 877, 192 So. 517 (1939).
La. at 881, 192 So. at 518.
La. 757, 194 So. 772 (1940).
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but no drilling had ever taken place upon the strip in contest.
Plaintiff's theory was that the division of the original lease by
the Atlas Oil Company made prior to the sale of the land had
created three servitudes, that due to this fact prescription of nonuser had run against the undeveloped tract-non-contiguous to
the producing tract. The court very properly pointed out that
when the sale of land was made, the reservation of all the minerals was made in the instrument upon the whole contiguous
area, and hence that production upon any part had preserved the
servitude as a whole, irrespective of the leasing plan.
The case of Tyson v. Surf Oil Company" was a suit to cancel
a mineral lease on grounds of abandonment and failure to pay
royalty (rent). The alleged abandonment was a cessation of
production through failure to operate during a period of at least
a month. The reason given for the "temporary shut down" by
the plaintiff was that the wells were being "surreptitiously" operated "through by-passing the gas around the meter." The reason
given by the defendants was that they were looking for a market,
as the former purchaser of the product had gone out of business.
Neither of these statements of reason for cessation of operations
appears to have been proved. In ruling against the plea of abandonment, the court said:
"After the primary term of the lease has expired, in order
to cancel the lease, there must be some evidence that the wells
thereon are no longer capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities; or that the lessee, in closing down the wells,
has done so with intention of abandoning same."9
The court also refused cancellation because of failure to pay
the rent royalty. A situation, as in this case, where rent royalty
is to be fixed by the amount of production and is reasonably disputed does not give rise to cancellation for nonpayment as in
cases where the amount of the rent is not in question.
This case is of particular interest because of strong statements to the effect that a lease gives the same right as does a
servitude, and because of approved quotations from previous
cases to the same effect. Furthermore, the court discussed the
matter of whether Act 205 of 193810 is solely a procedural change
affecting the remedy only, or whether it is also a substantive
change. The latter opinion is expressed by Justice Rogers, con8. 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336 (1940).
9. 196 So. at 341.
10. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4735.4-4735.5.
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curring in the decree, but differing from the majority in his view
about this act.
The court interpreted the original lease together with the
subsequent unitization agreement as being divisible by their
terms, and hence found that the assignment of a part should be
considered as an independent lease subject to rescission without
effecting a cancellation of the whole agreement.
Hightower v. Maritzky1' was a successful suit to have mineral rights declared forfeited by prescription. The plaintiff inherited the land, upon which a one-fourth mineral right had been
sold. The defendants set forth five pleas against forfeiture by
prescription of ten years' non-use.
The first plea was that since the landowner in his sale of the
servitude had retained the right to lease without the consent of
the servitude owner and to retain delay rentals, surface rentals,
bonuses, and cash considerations for leases to be made, he was
in fact the agent of his grantee, holding for his grantee, and that
the latter could not acquire against him. The court disposed of
this contention by labelling the prescription in question liberandi
causa, to which the rule invoked does not apply, and further by
pointing out that by established oil and gas jurisprudence this
type of contract is not one constituting a mandate. The mere fact
that if the power to lease was exercised and production ensued,
the benefit of the lease would inure in part to the servitude owner
did not make the landowner the agent of the servitude owner.
Of course, the reference to this prescription as being liberandi
raised the old query of the Sample v. Whitaker cases, 12 a question which cannot be discussed in the brief space allowed for this
r6sume.
The second plea was that the limitations of the grant of the
servitude raised an obstacle to the use of the servitude and hence
suspended the running of prescription under Article 792 of the
Code. The court answered by explaining that this article applies
only to obstacles which the servitude owner can "neither prevent
nor remove," and further that the restriction upon the use of the
servitude was contractual-voluntarily written into the grantand that restrictive stipulations are legal and to be distinguished
11. 194 La. 998, 195 So. 518 (1940), noted in (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
755.

12. Sample v. Whitaker, 171 La. 949, 132 So. 511 (1930); Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931); Sample v. Whitaker, 174 La. 245, 140 So.
36 (1932).
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from attempts to lengthen the prescriptive period, a matter of
public policy. All of this doctrine is most logical under the articles
on servitude and is intellectually satisfying but for the thought
that if the servitude is so restricted as to preclude any use of it,
as in this case, it automatically ceases to be a servitude as that
concept is understood and becomes something else-an idea precluded under the reasoning of this decision.
The third plea, an alternative, was that an acknowledgement
had interrupted the prescription. The alleged acknowledgment
appeared in the following language used in deed of sale of the
land:
"'It is especially agreed and understood by all of the parties
hereto that at this time 4 of all the minerals in and under
the above described land has been sold, and that the vendors
herein expressly reserve to themselves, their heirs and assigns,
% of all the oil, gas and other minerals in and under the above
described land that they now own in same, and this reservation is especially considered in fixing the price of this sale.' "18
Under the settled jurisprudence the court held this statement to
have been a mere recognition of the outstanding rights and applied the well known "intention" test against the defendants.
The fourth plea, another alternative, was that the plaintiffs,
by signing joint leases and pooling agreements, had effected an
extension. The court found that the plaintiffs who signed did not
know that the defendants would join and hence no suspension or
extension resulted. It is significant that the court discussed the
Bremer case 14 in terms of extension. However, the reader's enthusiasm in this observation is somewhat dampened by the fact
that the court goes on to talk about "suspension or extension"
without distinguishing terms or results.
The fifth plea raised a new and interesting discussion. It was
contended that since the plaintiff's father had granted this onefourth mineral interest after the death of his wife and since her
half of the community interest had been inherited by plaintiffs,
use of the grant was suspended under Article 783 of the Code
until the co-owners ratified the grant by recognizing it in the
subsequent deed of sale. The court declared that the article does
not state that prescription is suspended, but only that the right
to use is suspended until consent of the coproprietors is secured
13. Hightower v. Maritzky, 194 La. 998, 1007, 195 So. 518, 521 (1940).
14. Bremer v. North Central Texas Oil Co., 185 La. 917, 171 So. 75 (1936).
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-a matter of obstacle again, which could have been removed by
suit to partition. The court stated that Articles 740 and 741 "leave
no doubt" but that the situation contemplated in Article 738 refers but to the suspension of the use of the right and not to suspension of prescription. There remains grave doubt in the writer's
mind. If the right to use does not come into being until consent
of the coproprietor is secured, how could the right be said to be
prescribing? It would appear that Articles 740 and 741 are but
protective devices against the grantor and that none of the group
bears upon the idea of loss by prescription of non-user. An analogous idea appears with regard to the leasing of property not
owned. The ruling on this plea may be nothing more than further application of the usual and highly commendable policy of
refusal to recognize artifices whereby the flat ten year prescriptive period could be lengthened or evaded.
Amerada Petroleum Corporationv. Reese15 was a suit to set
aside a partition proceeding because plaintiff, holder of a mineral lease signed by only part of the many co-owners of the land,
had not been made a party to the proceedings. The court, in a
most logically reasoned and thoroughly documented opinion, held
that the lessee was not a necessary party to partition proceedings
between co-owners of the land. Act 205 of 193816 was analyzed
in terms of both its text and the motivation of its enactment.
The court said:
"Of course the legislature did not intend by its adoption
of the act to grant to the mineral lessee the same right of
ownership in and to the property leased as that of his lessor,
so that he would be permitted to institute a partition proceeding against his lessor or against the owner of the property
under lease to him, or vice versa ....

17

The plaintiff's plea of deprivation of a valuable right was answered by the statement that he knew the insecurity of his situation
when he took a lease from only part of the co-owners of the land.
Hardship, of course, has never been a valid plea, even by a coowner of the land against another co-owner who desires partition, and the hardship hitherto experienced will doubtless be
found to have been negligible in comparison to that which may
result from the application of Act 336 of 1940, which overrules
by legislative fiat the case under discussion. Royalty has been
15. 195 La. 359, 196 So. 558 (1940).
16. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4735.4-4735.5.
17. 196 So. 558, 562 (La. 1940).
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sold in Louisiana, for example, to the 119,317/5,000,000ths and to
the 3,340,909/11,000,000ths. The" difficulties, if not impossibilities,
involved in making every holder of a mineral interest, as defined
in Act 336 of 1940, a party to a partition suit and paying off these
parties under the terms of this act are startling, if anything more
than sham representation is to be secured.
This act (amending Article 741 of the Civil Code), together
with Article 740, raises many interesting questions. Will it be
regarded as a procedural change only? This was the view taken
by the court in the case under discussion with respect to Act 205
of 1938. If it is to be regarded as going to the substance, will it
be held unconstitutional? Will the act be interpreted, together
with Article 740, as giving the right to sue for partition to holders
of royalty interests and lease interests as well as to servitude
owners? If so, again, would it be constitutional?
8
is concerned with a claim of
The case of Martel v. Hunt1
children for their mother's community share of property sold by
their father after their mother's death and during their minority.
The prescription point of the case is most interesting and will be
discussed under the appropriate heading in this r~sum6. The
acquirendi prescription of ten years' good faith was pleaded by
the subsequent vendees and failed for sufficient evidence of corporeal possession.1" The court said:

"... the only character of possession which they claim he had
at that time, or which anyone ever had, was the possession
incidental to the cutting and removal of trees from the land.""0
Civil possession 2 1 is not discussed, though the good faith of
the vendees with acquisition by deed translative of property is
conceded. The question of the possession of the plaintiff's father
and his predecessor in title is unanswered and raises many points
of interest.
Since plaintiffs were declared owners of their individual portion of this land, they were properly awarded their share of the
oil produced from it less the exploration cost expended by the
lessee in good faith. Satisfaction in this result is marred by the
court's discussion of oil as a fruit. Obviously, oil is not a fruit,
"born and reborn of the soil," as has been squarely held. In the
18.
19.
20.
21.

197 So. 402 (La. 1940), noted in (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REviEW 244.
Art. 3487, La. Civil Code of 1870.
197 So. 402, 405 (La. 1940).
Art. 3487, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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case under discussion had the court applied their references to
oil as a fruit, under the articles, the award would have gone to
the possessor in good faith, while they very properly gave it to
the owner of the land.
The lessees pleaded their warranty from their lessors, and
the court found that as a matter of evidence the lessees did not
rely upon the warranty clause in the lease when they explored
for oil, and hence should not hold their lessors for the damages
caused by their eviction. The court's common sense conclusion
and failure to apply Article 2696 flatly to a situation which it was
never expected to meet, is praiseworthy. The idea that these
damages were definitely not contemplated under Article 1934
seems sound. The language of the court follows:
"It is common knowledge that the expense of mining operations is enormous; and it is for that reason that land owners
do not ordinarily explore their own lands for minerals but, in
order to have them explored, are willing to let them out to
those engaged in that business, who have capital which they
are willing to risk on such ventures. It is unbelievable that
any sane person would, for an insignificant cash bonus and
one-eighth of the minerals, lease his land for mining purposes
if he thought by so doing he was assuming an obligation which
might result in worse than bankruptcy to himself or his heirs
in case his title should fall.
"And it is unreasonable to assume that the lessee in this
case risked the heavy expense of drilling this well on the lessors' bare warranty of title. No concern managed by experienced business men would do that. So far as this record
discloses, there was practically nothing behind the lessors'
warranty. All the lessors seemed to have owned was a small
tract of almost worthless land, so that their warranty amounted to almost nothing as compared with the expense of drilling.
Surely the Texas Company did not stake its investment on
the faith of the warranty.

'22

The case of Sittig v. Dalton23 was a suit to set aside five leases
and was met with an exception of no cause and no right of action
and was dismissed by the lower court. In each lease a rider appeared to the effect that a well must be started within ninety
days and drilling diligently prosecuted to a depth of 8,500 feet.
22. 197 So. 402, 412 (La. 1940).
23. 197 So. 423 (La. 1940).
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A well was started within the period but was abandoned at 5,000
feet. Another one was promptly started and abandoned at 916
feet. The court held that the lease expired by its own terms and
overruled the exceptions. The following clause of the lease was
pleaded by defendants:
"'... and in the event Lessor considers that operations are not
being conducted in compliance with this contract, lessee shall
be notified in writing of the facts relied upon as constituting
a breach hereof and lessee shall have sixty (60) days after
receipt of such notice to comply with the obligations imposed
by virtue of this instrument.' ,,24
The court held that this clause had "reference to drilling operations during the term of the lease" and had "no application to
the expiration of the term."
The case of Brown v. Sugar Creek Syndicate25 was a suit by
landowners to have a pooling agreement and various royalty and
mineral rights and leases cancelled. Fraud and misrepresentation,
together with lack of consideration, were urged against the pooling agreement. It was shown that there was no fraud or misrepresentation in the confection or signing of the agreement. It
was further shown that there was valid consideration in that the
right to litigate many important issues was compromised and the
plaintiff had gained by the transaction and had accepted benefits
from the contract over a period of years. Hence he was not only
bound by the contract but estopped to plead its invalidity. The
compromise was necessary mainly because the landowners had
sold more royalty than they had-a factual situation which apparently is not unusual.
The plea that the well was not profitable was disproved. The
plea that an implied obligation to drill more wells had been
broken was premature, as there had been no demand for further
development.

H. PRESCRIPTION
Liberandi Causa.
A preliminary but decisive issue in many prescription cases is
not a problem of prescription but a matter of identification of the
cause of action on which the suit is brought.' Thus where Charity
24. 197 So. at 424.
25. 197 So. 583 (La. 1940).
1. Cf. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1938-1939 Term
(1939) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 31, 85-86.
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Hospital of Louisiana is by statute 2 subrogated to its patient's
right of action for compensatory damages (to the extent of reasonable hospital and medical charges), it was held that the hospital's right of action is purely ex delicto. The one year prescription against tort actions was therefore applicable.4
Questions of interruption and suspension of prescription were
raised in Meridian Fertilizer Factory v. Collier.- A foreclosure
suit was instituted against the third possessor of mortgaged property more than five years after the maturity of the mortgage
notes, and some time after the bankruptcy of the principal debtors. The defendant's plea of prescription( was dismissed on the
grounds that the listing of the debt on the trustee's schedule was
a sufficient acknowledgment to interrupt prescription, and that
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy had the effect of suspending prescription. In view of the fact that the present suit was instituted less than one year after the trustee's sale of the property,
there was no need to consider when prescription began to run
again after the interruption or the suspension.
In Himel v. Connely7 the court decided that the five year
prescription against actions for the reduction of excessive donations8 was not applicable to a claim between coheirs for the collation of a gift received by one coheir as an advance of her share
of the inheritance.
Acquirendi Causa
An indispensable positive factor 9 for acquisitive prescription
is the claimant's physical possession of the property. The Civil
Code provides in some cases for the retention of civil possession10 as the continuation of a preceding physical possession.
However, it was stated clearly and correctly in Culpepper v.
2. La. Acts 230 of 1932 and 289 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4390.54390.6, 1067.3-1067.71.
3. Arts. 3536, 3537, La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. Peart v. Rykoski, 197 So. 605 (La. 1940), noted in (1940) 15 Tulane L.
Rev. 150.
5. 193 La. 815, 192 So. 358 (1939).
6. Art. 3540, La. Civil Code of 1870. Cf. McDaniel v. Lalanne, 28 La. Ann.
661 (1876).
7. 197 So. 424 (La. 1940, noted in (1941) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 460. See
also discussion in sections on Successions, supra p. 284, and Procedure, infra
p. 363.
8. Art. 3542, La. Civil Code of 1870.
9. Cf. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1938-1939 Term
(1939) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REviEW 31, 86-88.
10. Arts. 3442, 3444, 3501, 3502, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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Weaver Brothers Lumber Corporation1 that an original owner or
possessor cannot retain civil possession "if he suffers an adverse
claimant to hold actual or physical possession as owner of the
estate.

'12

In Martel v. Hunt-8 the defendants pleaded acquisition of the
property by the ten year prescription based on just title and good
faith. 1" The evidence showed a deed translative of the property
and the good faith of those who claimed under it. However, the
possession incidental to the cutting and removing of timber from
the land does not in itself constitute a sufficient corporeal possession to support the ten year acquisitive prescription. 5 In addition, "there must be such external signs of possession as to indicate clearly that the possessor holds control and dominion over
the property."' 6
Harrill v. Pitts7 involved a question of ten year acquisitive
prescription, and the decision depended upon the establishment
of the necessary factors of just title and good faith. On these
points it was held (1) that a deed which contains a reservation of
an unidentified part of the property is not for this reason defective, and may be a just title; (2) that good faith is presumed
under Article 3481 of the Civil Code, and the burden of proving
the contrary was not discharged in the present case because the
record contained no positive evidence that the vendee in a 1925
sale (M. T. Atkins to A. C. Pitts) had knowledge of the undisclosed marital status of the original owner in a 1903 sale (Mrs.
N. E. Drake to M. T. Atkins).
A disputed boundary case led to the plea of ten year acquisitive prescription in Hunter v. Forrest. 8 However, a deed which
does not accurately describe the property in question cannot be
the basis for such a prescription because it is not translative of
title. Moreover, this prescription is not applicable in boundary
cases.19
11. 194 La. 897, 195 So. 349 (1940).
12. 194 La. at 902, 195 So. at 350. This is directly in accord with Article
3444, in fine: "unless a third person has usurped or taken from him the possession ...."
13. 197 So. 402 (La. 1940). See also discussion under Mineral Rights Section, supra p. 310.
14. Art. 3478, La. Civil Code of 1870.
15. Art. 3487, La. Civil Code of 1870.
16. 197 So. 402, 407 (La. 1940).
17. 194 La. 123, 193 So. 562 (1940).
18. 197 So. 649 (La. 1940).
19. Arts. 825, 852, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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III. TORTS AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
A.

TORTS

Malicious Prosecution
In Eusant v. Unity Industrial Life Insurance & Sick Benefit
Association1 the defendant insurance company, acting upon advice of counsel, had caused a forgery prosecution to be instituted
against the plaintiff. Three weeks later the district attorney had
nolle prosequied the bill of information because of insufficiency
of evidence. The plaintiff then filed a suit for malicious prosecution and was awarded damages in the sum of $250 by the lower
court. The supreme court reversed this judgment, finding that
there was neither "malice" nor "lack of probable cause," both of
which were essential to a cause of action for malicious prosecution.2 Justice Fournet stressed the generally accepted principle
that where a party has made a full and fair presentation to his
attorney of all the facts known to him or which he could have
ascertained with reasonable inquiry and then acted honestly and
in good faith upon the advice received, "the absence of malice
is established, the want of probable cause is negatived, and the
action for malicious prosecution will not lie."" Justice Rogers,
dissenting, did not disagree with the legal generalizations of the
majority opinion, but differed from it as to the applicability of
the principles to the facts of the instant case. He stressed the fact
that the plaintiff was an old negro woman unable to write, and
that no effort had been made to contact a country agent of the
company who was indicated by a notation on the policy as a
possible source of information. He then concluded that the defendant company could not have honestly believed the plaintiff
guilty of forgery, but had caused her arrest and prosecution "in
order to coerce her to desist from prosecuting her suit to recover
the avails of the policy.'

4

Neither the majority nor dissenting

opinions are subject to criticism, assuming their respective conclusions of fact to be justified. The writer tends to favor the atti1. 195 La. 347, 196 So. 554 (1940).
2. The two elements of "malice" and "want of probable cause" are not
clearly separable. They are usually stated and discussed conjunctively, as
was done in the principal case for "lack of probable cause" is evidence of
"malice."
3. 196 So. 554, 556 (1940). Accord: Sandoz v. Veazie, 106 La. 202, 30 So.
767 (1901); Jordan v. Alabama G.S. R.R., 81 Ala. 220, 8 So. 191 (1886). For a
collection of cases in point, see Note (1909) 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 49.
4. 196 So. 554, 558 (1940). Accord: Odom v. Tally, 160 Miss. 797, 134 So.
163 (1931) (institution of criminal proceeding to compel payment of a debt).
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tude expressed by Justice Fournet when he reaffirmed the proposition that "actions for malicious prosecution 'have never been
favored, and in order to sustain them a clear case must be established.'-5 Criminal law enforcement is partially dependent upon
the willingness of the citizenry to assist in bringing about the
prosecution of those violating the criminal statutes. This duty
would become unduly burdensome if the courts adopted an overly
liberal attitude in civil actions for malicious prosecution.
Nuisance
Although courts have generally held that the drilling and
operation of oil and gas wells is a lawful business and not a nuisance per se,6 yet under certain circumstances it may become a
nuisance.? In the case of Dodd v. Glen Rose Gasoline Company"
the petitioners, a husband and wife, had filed suit praying for
damages and injunctive relief, alleging that defendant's use of
a six-point flare, through which waste gases were passed and
ignited, constituted a nuisance, in that it threw off tremendous
heat and smoke, caused great vibration and noise, and drew up
sand, dirt, and other impurities which were deposited on the
house and furniture of petitioners. It was further alleged that
petitioners were unable to sleep at night or to live under ordinary conditions, that their house had become practically worthless, and that the wife's health and been seriously impaired. Prior
to trial, however, defendant had voluntarily discontinued the use
of the flare and had erected a 150 foot stack or vent to carry off
the gas without burning. Petitioners' supplementary petition
averred that the stack also constituted a nuisance. The trial court
awarded damages but refused to issue an injunction. The supreme
court, on reviewing the record, found that inasmuch as the health
of Mrs. Dodd had improved to a marked degree after removal of
the flare, the stack did not constitute a nuisance, and that the
flare, if a nuisance, had been abated. The court raised the award
of damages so as to fully compensate petitioners for past injuries
suffered as a result of the flare, but there is no indication in the
opinion as to whether the court would have been willing to grant
injunctive relief had the defendant persisted in maintaining it.
5. 196 So. 554, 556 (1940), quoting from Staub v. Van Benthuysen, 36 La.
Ann. 467 (1884).
6. 4 Summers, Oil and Gas (Perm. ed. 1938) 17, § 654, n. 54.
7. Kirkbride v. Cline, 64 Ohio St. 556, 61 N.E. 1144 (1901); Gulf Pipe Line
Co. v. Pawnee-Tulsa Petroleum Co., 34 Okla. 775, 127 Pac. 252 (1912); McGregor v. Camden, 47 W.Va. 193, 34 S.E. 936 (1899).
8. 194 La. 1, 193 So. 349 (1940).
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The allowing of damages indicates, although the court refused to
specifically so find,9 that there had been a nuisance. However,
even when a nuisance is found to exist, courts often balance the
conveniences, with the result that the complaining landowner is
relegated to an award of damages. 10 In the case of drilling operations, the general public has an interest in the development of
mineral resources which may be more important than the right
of the adjoining landowner to demand complete protection from
disturbance." However, injunctive relief should be granted where
the drilling operations are causing unnecessary disturbance,
which could be alleviated by using more improved methods.
Ultimate Carrier'sLiability for Damage in Transit
In the case of Bancroft v. Yazoo & M.V. R.R.'2 a shipment
of paper was delivered in a damaged condition. The shipment
had passed over several transportation lines but it was not shown
upon which of these lines the damage had occurred. The court
held the defendant, the last carrier, liable, declaring that it is
necessary to prove only that the initial carrier received the shipment in good condition and that it arrived damaged. Liability in
the instant case is specifically covered by the Interstate Commerce Act.' 8 Prior to 1927 this act imposed liability upon the
initial carrier, but not upon the terminal carrier.4 The supreme
court's decision is in express accord with the present statute.
Earlier inconsistent decisions in cases involving interstate carriers 5 were rendered obsolete by the change in the act.
Aggravation of Existing Condition
Where an injury caused by an act of defendant aggravates
an "existing condition" of the injured party, the defendant is
liable for the full extent of the damages. 6 In Peppers v. Toye
9. "The flare itself had been removed when this case was tried on May
12, 1938, and, if a nuisance at all, had already ceased to exist ....
" (Italics
supplied.) (194 La. at 14, 193 So. at 353.)
10. Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934).
11. Windfall Mfg. Co. v. Patterson, 148 Ind. 414, 47 N.E. 2 (1897).
12. 194 La. 115, 193 So. 481 (1940).
13. 46 Stat. 251 (1931), 49 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1940) § 20(11).
14. Cf. 44 Stat. 835 (1926), 49 U.S.C.A. 20 (1929); 44 Stat. 1448 (1927), 49
U.S.C.A. 20 (1929).
15. The following cases held only the initial carrier liable: Vincent &
Hayne v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 114 La. 1021, 38 So. 816 (1905); Duvall v. Louisiana Western Ry., 135 La. 189, 65 So. 104 (1914); Hall v. Houston East &
West Texas Ry., 9 La. App. 577 (1929).
16. Harper, Torts (1933) § 129.
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Brothers Yellow Cab Company,17 the plaintiff, a passenger in defendant's taxicab, suffered minor injuries in a traffic accident.
A few days later a condition of the intestines, previously dormant,
became active, necessitating confinement for several months. The
court held that in order to escape full liability the defendant
must prove that the flare-up of the pre-existing condition was a
mere coincidence arising independent of the accident.
Irrespective of the question of foreseeability, it is the general rule that a plaintiff must establish a causal connection between injury inflicted and damages sought to be recovered. 8 The
instant decision represents an exception to that rule. It recognizes
a presumption that a dormant state would ordinarily remain
dormant, thus shifting the burden of proof and requiring the defendant to show that there was no causal connection. This is in
line with prior Louisiana cases.19
B. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Hazardous Occupations
In Rayburn v. De Moss, it was held that a carpenter, engaged
by the operator of a small dairy to rebuild a barn and injured
in the course of his employment, could not recover compensation
under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act.2 The court

merely declared that the operation of a dairy was not hazardous
per se and that the services of the carpenter were entirely disassociated from the hazardous aspects of the dairy business. The
court distinguished the case of Staples v. Henderson Jersey
Farms,"where the services were rendered in connection with the
operation of mechanical dairy equipment. However, the true test
is not the nature of the particular duties of the employee, but
the nature of the trade, business, or occupation of the employer;
also, the duties of the employee must be in the course of the hazardous aspects of the business. 4 Admitting that the operation of
17. 198 So. 177 (La. App. 1940).
18. Grant v. New Orleans Railway & Light Co., 129 La. 811, 56 So. 897
(1911); Arender v. Grant Timber & Mfg. Co., 9 La. App. 132 (1928); Landry
v. Phoenix Utility Co., 14 La. App. 334, 124 So. 623 (1929); Brent v. Union
Indemnity Co., 17 La. App. 689, 135 So. 735 (1931).
19. Lapleine v. Morgan's Louisiana & Texas R. & S.S. Co., 40 La. Ann.
661, 4 So. 875, 1 L.R.A. 378 (1888); Roth v. Russell, 141 La. 581, 75 So. 418
(1917); Causey v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 191 So. 730 (La. App. 1939).
1. 194 La. 175, 193 So. 579 (1940).
2. La. Act 20 of 1914 as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4391-4432].
3. 181 So. 48 (La. App. 1938).
4. Mayer, Workmen's Compensation in Louisiana (1937) 16-17, 20-29.
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a dairy may be a hazardous occupation, 5 the court correctly decided that the carpenter in the instant case could not recover.
Where the employer is engaged in both hazardous and nonhazardous business, the court must arbitrarily determine to which
of these the services of the injured employee appertain. In the
case of Robichaux v. Realty Operators6 the employer company
owned and operated three sugar factories and also cultivated
sugar cane on its plantations to supply these factories. The plaintiff was employed in gathering the sugar cane into piles for the
loader to pick up and take to the mills. Chief Justice O'Niell,
writing for a unanimous court, reasoned that as the cane had
been stripped, topped, and severed from the soil, it was a finished
product so far as the farming or agricultural process was concerned and was completely prepared for delivery to the mill before plaintiff's services began. He therefore concluded that the
employment was in the manufacturing end and not in the farming end of the employer's occupation, 7 and therefore specifically
hazardous under the Workmen's Compensation Act." The court's
holding that the gathering of the sugar cane into piles was connected with the manufacturing end of the employment, although
somewhat arbitrary, was in line with an enlightened policy of
liberally construing the scope of the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Statute.9
Aggravation of Pre-existing Injury
Robichaux v. Realty Operatorso also reaffirms the settled
rule that an employee is not to be denied the benefits of workmen's compensation when the accident is shown to have aggravated an existing injury which alone might eventually have
caused the disability.1 In the instant case the plaintiff workman
had a callous growth on his hand which was developing into an
abscess and which had been caused or aggravated by chopping
wood for household use. While piling sugar cane, he suffered a
blow on his hand which aggravated the growth thereon, and, as
5. Staples v. Henderson Jersey Farms, 181 So. 48 (La. App. 1938), held
that a general dairying business requiring mechanical equipment was a hazardous occupation.
6. 195 La. 70, 196 So. 23 (1940).
7. Accord: Dartez v. Sterling Sugars, 7 La. App. 414 (1928).
8. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 1(2) (a) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4391] lists under
hazardous occupations "sugar houses, sugar and other refineries .... "
9. Mayer, Workmen's Compensation in Louisiana (1937) 25, and cases
cited 78n.
10. 195 La. 70, 196 So. 23 (1940).
11. 196 So. at 25-26.
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a final result, the amputation of a finger was necessary. The coirt,
under the beforementioned rule, correctly decided that the workman was entitled to compensation for the loss of his finger.
Refusal to Submit to Operation
The case of Simmons v. Blair12 again raises the problem of
the reasonableness of the plaintiff's refusal to submit to an operation. The injury was to the plaintiff's knee, and the medical testimony as to whether the operation was a simple one unattended
by appreciable risk or pain was conflicting. The supreme court,
expressly following its prior decision in Bronson v. Harris Ice
Cream Company,18 reversed the ruling of the court of appeal
requiring plaintiff to submit to an operation as a condition precedent to the recovery of compensation and awarded compensation. The holding in the instant case is in accord with the liberal
attitude of the court with respect to the reasonableness of an
injured workman's refusal to permit an operation. 1"
Right of Spouse Living Apart to Compensation
In Robinson v. Standard Oil Company of Louisiana3 the
widow of a deceased employee sued for payments under the employees' benefit plan providing for continuance of payments to
his widow or other dependents for one year after the death of
the employee. The husband and wife had been driven by stress
of circumstances to separate, both being ill and the husband being financially unable to maintain the wife. The court, however,
found that they were living together as a matter of law, since
there was no intention on the part of either to sever their marital
relationship.10
IV. PUBLIC LAW

A. MUNICIPAL AND OTHER PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
Police Power
A familiar restriction upon municipal legislation is the requirement of consistency with the general laws and policy of the
12. 194 La. 672, 194 So. 585 (1940).
13. 150 La. 455, 90 So. 759 (1922).
14. Mayer, Workmen's Compensation in Louisiana (1937) 73-74.
15. 194 La. 904, 195 So. 351 (1940).
16. Accord: Books v. Keen & Woolf Oil Co., 9 La. App. 288, 120 So. 99
(1928); Harris v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp., 13 La. App. 416, 127 So. 40
(1930); Keyhea v. Woodard-Walker Lumber Co., 147 So. 830 (La. App. 1933);
McCaskill v. Lyon Lumber Co., 154 So. 479 (La. App. 1934). These cases, decided under the Workmen's Compensation Act, presented situations analogous
to that in the instant case under an employees' benefit plan.
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state.' The principle was invoked as one ground of decision in
City of Minden v. David Brothers Drug Company,2 where the
court declared invalid a city ordinance drastically regulating the
sale of intoxicating liquors for medicinal purposes. The city was a
local option dry area. Among other things the ordinance forbade
a pharmacist to fill a prescription for intoxicating liquor for
medicinal purposes without a municipal permit unless the nature
of the patient's ailment was stated on the prescription. The Local
Option Law expressly provided that it did not authorize a local
unit to prohibit the sale of liquor when prescribed by a physician
as a medicine and made the defense that a sale was of that character, when offered in a prosecution under the act or an ordinance adopted pursuant to it, depend upon the good faith of the
prescription and sale. The act forbade the issuance of state liquor
licenses in dry municipalities except to druggists for sale on
prescription. The special charter of the city contained a general
welfare clause and a grant of authority "to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor, and to regulate the use
and possession of same, for beverage purposes," subject to federal
and state constitutions and statutes. In addition to the consistency requirement, the court relied upon a want of statutory
authority to enact the ordinance. The Local Option Law did not
grant it and the gist of the matter as to the city charter might
have been expressed by resort to the maxim "inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius"; the express charter grant related to beverage
purposes which indicated an intent to exclude medicinal and any
other uses.
The proposed initiative ordinance involved in State ex rel.
Sutton v. CaldweUI8 would not, the court determined, violate the
consistency requirement. Act 61 of 1920 requires fire departments
in cities of ten thousand or more to be divided into two platoons
constituting a day and a night force. The proposed ordinance of
the City of Shreveport provided that maximum hours for the
uniformed force should be 144 during any 14 day period, except
for extraordinary emergencies, required 15 days annual leave
with pay for every fire department employee and set maximum
hours for alarm system operators at eight per day for a maximum
1. See State v. Burns, 45 La. Ann. 34, 11 So. 878 (1893).
2. 197 So. 505 (La. 1940). The court regarded the provisions of the ordinance as inseparable, despite the presence of a separability clause, and
struck down the whole measure although defendant was charged simply
with violating the section requiring a permit.
3. 197 So. 214 (La. 1940).
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of six days per week. The court interpreted the statutory requirements as legal minima with which the proposed ordinance would
not conflict because it would not forbid what the statute permitted or the converse but would simply impose additional requirements in line with the purpose of the act. The governing
body of the city had raised this point as one ground of defense
to a mandamus proceeding to compel submission of the initiative
measure to a referendum. While no exception is taken to the
immediate ruling, one wonders how far the ratio decidendi carries us. Suppose, for example, that the initiative measure contemplated a three platoon system. This would be in line with the
objective of the statute and does not involve anything expressly
forbidden but it does contain a structural inconsistency out of
harmony with the working plan of the act.
By proceeding to pass upon the validity of the proposed ordinance the court avoided ruling upon the standing of the governing body of the city to question its validity. Logically, it would
appear that the question as to the standing of a defendant to raise
an objection should be dealt with before considering the objection
on the merits. It is interesting to observe that what we have here
is something akin to an advisory opinion since the court has proceeded to pass upon the validity of a proposed local legislative
measure when its enactment is still highly conjectural. 4
It is an ancient rule, carried over into public law, that corporate by-laws must be reasonable.5 In the field of municipal
police regulation the same circumstances may be subject to the
application both of this rule and of the constitutional guaranty of
due process of law.8 Such a situation was presented in City of
New Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers." The case involved a
prosecution for violating a New Orleans ordinance which required that an open junk yard be enclosed by a "substantial
feather-edged board fence not less than seven (7) 1" x 12" 'Nominal Size' feather-edged boards high, nailed horizontally across 4"
x 6" 'Nominal Size' wood posts on 8' 0" centers and set three feet
4. The court, in passing, cited two California cases and one Nevada case
supporting the standing of a municipal governing body to refuse to refer
an Initiative measure to the voters because of its asserted invalidity. On
the merits it is not enough to make the obvious point that the voters have
no power to validate; the question is as to whether the inquiry into validity
should be reserved until there is an actual enactment to pass upon.
5. See generally 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5 ed. 1911) § 587.
6. Where the ordinance is enacted pursuant to specific statutory authority, however, the question is solely one of constitutionality. State ex rel. City
of Lake Charles v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 138 La. 714, 70 So. 621 (1916).
7. 193 La. 895, 192 So. 523 (1939).
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into the ground." The title and preamble indicated that its purpose was to prevent obstruction of sidewalks as a safety measure.
The court held that the ordinance violated the due process of law
clause of the state constitution8 on the ground that an inflexible
requirement of a particular kind of fence, when other types would
serve the purpose efficiently, was arbitrary and unreasonable.
The court refused to consider the possible aesthetic justification
for the ordinance because it had been adopted as a safety measure.
But why should not such a factor have been weighed? It was a
related matter, and beauty is recognized as at least a legitimate
incidental police power objective.9
By Act 10 of the first extraordinary session of 1934, entitled
"An Act To limit and regulate the imposition, levy and collection
of taxes, licenses and excises by municipalities and parishes; and
to repeal all laws or parts of laws in conflict," the legislature
forbade any municipal tax, license or excise of any character
upon any property or business or the performance of any act
whatsoever, not taxed by the state, without express and special
legislative authority, and flatly forbade the imposition and collection of such a tax under any police, implied or inherent powers
of any municipality. A Shreveport parking meter ordinance,
which required a meter deposit (five cents per hour) for parking
as a means of recouping part of the cost of the regulation, was
declared invalid in City of Shreveport v. Brister,10 because it fell
within the prohibition of the statute. The meter charge was
deemed a license tax or fee that was expressly covered by the
act, even though an exertion of the police power, and was not
sustained by the existence of a like state exaction and express
and special legislative authority for its imposition." The city was
prosecuting Brister for violating the ordinance. Further consideration was given the question affecting the validity of the ordinance in Monsour v. City of Shreveport,2 a property owners'
8. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 2.
9. See State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 284, 97
So. 440, 444 (1923).
10. 194 La. 615, 194 So. 566 (1939).
11. The city attacked the validity of the act under the requirement of
Section 16 of Article III of the state constitution that every law shall embrace but one subject and have a title indicative of its object. In rejecting
the point the court relied upon the proposition, laid down in earlier cases,
that a general indication of the subject of enactment calculated to put one
on reasonable notice to dig into the purview or body of the measure was
enough. It was assumed without elaboration that the inclusion of restrictions
on both tax and police measures did not involve dual subject matter.
12. 194 La. 625, 194 So. 569 (1940).
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and taxpayers' suit to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance,
but the court adhered to its original conclusions. Act 10 was, of
course, anathema to the municipalities and parishes of the state
and the 1940 legislature not only repealed it outright 3 but also
passed an act authorizing municipalities of over 12,500 to install
and operate parking meters and exact charges for parking on
4
their streets.1
Act 275 of 1928 conditions the issuance of a municipal or
parish permit to operate a garage or oil station upon the submission by the applicant of a petition to the governing body accompanied by the written assent of a majority of the property
owners within three hundred feet of the proposed location of the
business. By its express terms the act will take effect in a municipality or parish only when put into effect by an ordinance of the
governing authority. It is required that notice of intention to
take such action be published for not less than thirty days in the
official journal of the parish. Dumestre v. Police Jury, Parish of
Jefferson, 5 was a suit for an injunction against the enforcement
of such a parish ordinance. Dumestre had erected a garage and
oil station without a permit. It appeared that notice of intention
to enact the ordinance was not published until twenty-five days
before it was adopted. The court treated the defect as jurisdictional and granted a permanent injunction. The possibility that
there was substantial compliance was not discussed. 6 The statutory ground of decision rendered it unnecessary to consider an
attack on the constitutionality of the statute. It may be observed
in passing, however, that, while some years ago the court upheld
a property owners' consent provision in a zoning ordinance 7 in
13. La. Act 70 of 1940.
14. La. Act 231 of 1940. It should be noted that the act requires designation by ordinance of the streets to be affected. This honors the rule of nondelegability of legislative power to administrative officers applied in City of
Shreveport v. Herndon, 159 La. 113, 105 So. 244 (1925). But see State ex rel.
Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936).
15. 197 So. 209 (La. 1940). The provision of the act as to publication requires that there be "publication so to do" but it Is clear that what was
meant was, in substance, "publication of notice of intention so to do."
16. Cf. State ex rel. Sutton v. Caldwell, 197 So. 214 (La. 1940), where a
less troublesome departure from a statute was disposed of on the theory of
substantial compliance.
17. State ex rel. Dickason v. Harris, 158 La. 974, 105 So. 33 (1925). No
mention was made of State v. Garibaldi, 44 La. Ann. 809, 11 So. 36 (1892),
where a property owner's consent provision as to the establishment of private markets was stricken down as an invalid delegation of municipal police
power. There was no express statutory authority for the ordinance exacting
such consents.
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reliance upon the well-known Cusack case, 8 the enactment under
scrutiny presents greater difficulties because it applies to the
location of a filling station in unzoned rural as well as urban
areas where such businesses could not constitutionally be proscribed. That factor projects more sharply the constitutional question whether formulated in terms of delegation of legislative
power to property owners or of the reasonableness of such a device in regulating the use of property, rural and urban alike.
Municipal Finance
The fact that the constitutional debt limit provisions hardly
deserve the name is emphasized by the situation presented in
Houssiere v. City of Jennings.19 Houssiere (presumably a taxpayer of the city) sought to enjoin the delivery of three issues
of city bonds and the levy of special taxes for their payment. One
issue was for constructing drains, a second for opening, constructing, paving and improving streets and the third for the construction of waterworks and sewerage extensions and improvements.
The constitutional limit upon bond issues is ten per centum of
taxable values for each authorized purpose of issue and, since
Section 14 (f) of Article XIV of the constitution treats each of
the purposes of the bond issues in this case as separate purposes,
each issue was to be considered separately in determining
whether the limit would be exceeded. On that basis the proposed
plus outstanding bonds for each of the purposes would have been
within the limit. The court went on to point this out, although,
as it indicated, the city's plea of the bar of the constitutional
"short statute of limitations" 20 was enough to defeat the plaintiff.
The issuance of the bonds would bring the city's debt up to a
total of $664,000 against an assessed valuation of $2,216,370. There
had been voted about the same time, moreover, an issue of
$220,000 of bonds of a road district coterminous with the city.
Even assuming substantial under-assessment, the bonded debt
of the city would amount to a large percentage of taxable values,
apart from the debt of overlapping units. Obviously the requirement of electoral approval is no adequate control. Does not the
subject invite thorough reconsideration ?21
18. Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 37 S.Ct. 190, 61
L.Ed. 472 (1917). But see Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v.
Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 49 S.Ct. 50, 73 L.Ed. 210 (1928).
19. 197 So. 750 (La. 1940).
20. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIV, § 14(n). The provision bars questions
of power as well as those of a procedural character.
21. To establish effective controls the problem should be approached from
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Palmer v. Mayor and Board of Aldermen of Town of Ponchatoula2 2 involved an attack by a property owner upon a paving
assessment under Act 92 of 1934, as amended, upon a number of
grounds, all of which are worthy of notice. The contention that
the governing body of the town went ahead with the paving
improvement over the protests of a majority of the property owners affected was rejected because the statute clearly permitted
the governing authorities to proceed despite protests. There was
no constitutional right to a hearing on the question of benefits
because the assessment was not levied on the basis of a special
determination of benefits but was, as required by statute, imposed on the basis of the familiar front-foot rule, which amounted
to a legislative determination of benefits.
A second ground of contest, that it was ultra vires to lay
the assessment and impose an assessment lien before the paving
had been completed, was also answered by the language of the
statute, which made it plain that the assessment should be laid
after a contract for the work was awarded upon the basis of an
estimate of the total costs by the engineer for the municipality.
A third objection, that the unit cost of the paving as fixed
by the governing body was excessive, was supported simply by
an allegation that a neighboring municipality was constructing
pavement of as good a quality for a substantially lower estimated
unit cost. There was no charge of fraud or collusion and the point
was properly rejected by the court as a mere conclusion of the
22
plaintiff not well pleaded.

It was contended further that to impose a paving assessment
of $728 upon the property of plaintiff, which was assessed for ad
valorem taxation at $300, was confiscatory and thus constituted
a taking of her property without due process of law in violation
of the state constitution. To silence this point, the court had
merely to refer to earlier Federal Supreme Court decisions upholding paving assessments according to the front-foot rule without inquiry as to benefits. It might be added that the only basis
for an attack upon the constitutionality of the assessment in such
a case would be that the legislative determination of benefits by
the standpoints of the over-all debt of a given local governmental unit and
of the debts of over-lapping units which burden the same taxable property.
22. 197 So. 697 (La. 1940).
22a. Matters of this sort are within the discretion of the governing authority and the courts will not interpose in the absence of fraud, gross abuse
of power or oppression. McCann v. Mayor and Councilmen of Morgan City,
173 La. 1063, 139 So. 481 (1932).
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means of the front-foot rule was, with respect to the contestant,
arbitrary and thus a denial of substantive as distinguished from
procedural due process of law.
Finally, the court rejected the contention that it was necessary that the paving certificates to be issued in anticipation of
the collection of the paving assessments should have been approved by the State Bond and Tax Board before the proceedings
for their authorization were taken. While there is no quarrel with
this result, the court's disposition of the point involved a verbal
inadvertence which should be explained. In saying that the certificate from the Board is not necessary "before the issuance of
the paving certificates but is necessary only before the sale of
such certificates," the court undoubtedly meant to refer to "authorization" and not to "issuance."
The upshot of the decision in State ex rel. Howard Kenyon
Dredging Company v. Miller Gravity Drainage District Number
323 is that Act 227 of 1928, which authorized the incurring of
additional indebtedness and the levy of additional taxes by gravity drainage districts for the purpose of completing systems of
gravity drainage already eighty per centum completed, was not
retroactive and thus provided no authority for the payment of a
default judgment, rendered before the act was signed, against
such a district for extra work on a gravity drainage project.
Taxpayers sought, in Sharp v. Police Jury of Parish of East
Baton Rouge,2" an injunction restraining the police jury from
issuing $75,000 of so-called excess revenue bonds to finance the
construction of two parish incinerators and $25,000 of bonds to
finance the equipping and furnishing of a library building owned
by the City of Baton Rouge. Under an agreement of indefinite
duration but terminable by either party at the end of a police jury
fiscal year, on ninety days notice to the opposite party, the governing body of the city had authorized the police jury and the
latter had undertaken to occupy and operate the property as a
parish-wide library at parish expense. 25 Section 14 (e) of Article
XIV of the state constitution authorizes excess revenue bonds of
a parish "for the purpose of constructing and maintaining highways or public buildings for the parish" and similar bonds of a
23. 193 La. 915, 192 So. 529 (1939).
24. 194 La. 220, 193 So. 594 (1940).
25. The petition as well as the opinion of the court refer to operation
of the library jointly by the parish and the city but the agreement between
them called for operation by the parish alone.
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municipality "for all municipal improvements." The proceeds of
the library bonds were to be used largely in the purchase of
books. The question whether the incinerators would be public
buildings within the meaning of the constitutional provision turned upon whether "public" related to use by the public or devotion
of the property to a public use. The chief objection to a choice
of the latter meaning would derive from the contrast between
the broad constitutional authorization to municipalities and the
narrower one to parishes. With respect to the library bonds the
district judge took the somewhat doubtful position that authority
to finance construction included authority to finance the purchase
of books. The supreme court planted one foot on the surer ground
that the grant of authority covered maintenance as well as construction. But it is difficult to accept the ruling that the library
bonds were to be issued for constructing or maintaining a library
building for the parish. The phrase "for the parish" suggests a
parish public building, not a city building under the temporary
control of a parish obtained by contract. "Maintaining" refers to
the same subject as "constructing" and surely it was not contemplated that parish bonds be issued to finance the erection of
a parish building upon city property upon which a parish had
a one year lease. The constitutional provision relates solely to
finance. No question was raised concerning the power to construct and maintain; presumably there was unmentioned statutory authority for the intergovernmental agreement and for the
parish projects.
Finally, plaintiffs contended that the revenues relied on by
the police jury in determining the millage available for funding
into bonds included revenues not "reasonably certain of collection legally" contrary to statute. The point that the chain store
tax should not be considered because it might be repealed or
changed at any time was summarily rejected. And the two cent
gasoline tax, imposed by Act 87 of 1936, as amended, one cent of
which goes to the parishes, was declared constitutional, and thus
eligible for inclusion in the calculation of revenues. The court
did not discuss the possibility that, Section 22 (a) of Article VI
and Section 1 of Article VI-A of the constitution should be construed together as covering the whole field of such taxation
contemplated by the constitution with the effect of excluding any
additional levy.
Miscellaneous
Section 25 of Article XIV of the constitution, as amended in
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1928, provides that the City of New Orleans shall levy a special
ad valorem tax of not exceeding three mills on the dollar, in addition to such other taxes as the city was or might thereafter be
authorized to levy, for the maintenance of a double platoon system in the fire department and a triple platoon system in the
police department of the city. It requires that one-half mill of
the tax be applied to a fire department pay increase and a like
amount to a police department pay increase. While the city levied
the tax each year it did not segregate the proceeds, and after
August, 1930, it reduced the pay of the men and officers in the
fire department below the equivalent of their salaries before the
constitutional provision was adopted plus the avails of one-half
mill of the special tax. Members of the fire department who had
suffered the situation to go on for years without protest obtained,
in Ziemer v. City of New Orleans,26 a judgment restoring their
salaries to the amount received before the constitutional provision was adopted plus the avails of one-half mill of the special
tax, but their claim for back pay on that basis was denied on the
ground of laches. The effect of the decision was to require the
city to keep up its appropriations for the fire department salaries
on the old basis and, in addition, to apply the required portion of
the special tax to the purpose. The court held that that part of
the proceeds of the special tax dedicated to fire department salaries should be apportioned per capita between the officers and
men. It may be, as the court said, that such a basis of allocation
was fair and equitable, but there remains the question whether
the apportionment was a matter left by the constitution to the municipal authorities and thus placed beyond the judicial purview.
The court had occasion during the term to rule that the general bond of a parish treasurer did not cover his special duties
as treasurer of a road district in view of the requirement of the
pertinent statute that a road district treasurer give a special
bond. 27 This ruling left it unnecessary for the court to pass upon
some extremely interesting questions concerning the liability of
the treasurer on his bond with respect to certain lost, misplaced
or stolen bonds of the road district.
At the last term the court decided that under the local option
liquor law 28 a parish-wide election to determine whether the
26. 197 So. 754 (La. 1940).
27. Road District No. 1 v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 197 So. 252 (La. 1940).
28. La. Act 17 of 1935 (1 E.S.) [Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1939) §§ 1362.411362.47].
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parish would go dry might be called and held despite the fact
that at previous local option elections two wards of the parish
had adopted prohibition and rejected the notion that, since the
unity of the parish had been broken, separate local option elections would have to be held in all of the wards if it was sought
to make the whole parish dry.29 This seems fairly clear under
the statute. In the resolution calling the parish-wide election in
this instance, the police jury provided that the result should not
affect the then status of the two dry wards. The court found it
unnecessary to pass upon the validity of this provision since the
liquor dealers contesting the election had not been doing business
in those wards and the provision was deemed separable. The provision did not appear on the ballots but that does not foreclose
the matter if it was recited in the election notice, a matter as to
which the opinion is silent, because it could hardly then be said
that the provision was not an integral part of the proposition
voted upon by an elector who relied upon the notice.
City of Shreveport v. Kahn3 0 was a slander of title suit by
the city against a number of persons with respect to property
that the city had purchased for and devoted to park uses. The
deeds to the city recited that the conveyances were for park purposes only. Oil was discovered in the vicinity and the city had
agreed to lease the property for oil development. The city relied
upon a letter from one of the defendants to the prospective lessee
stating that the property had been sold to the city for park purposes only and that he and another of the defendants expected
to protect their interests. While the court held that the city had
failed to make out a case, the city substantially achieved its purpose because two of the defendants embodied a reconventional demand in their answers for an injunction against the city's leasing
the property for oil and gas development, which was rejected.
The proposed lease had been carefully drawn to the end that the
grounds around each oil well and tank on the leased land should
not be unsightly and in order that the oil and gas operations
would not be permitted to endanger the public and interfere
materially with the use of the park as a whole for park purposes.
It was held that the defendants were not entitled to an injunction
because, even assuming that the property could not be diverted
29. Frazier v. Police Jury of Winn Parish, 194 La. 1049, 195 So. 535 (1940).
30. 194 La. 55, 193 So. 461 (1939). But see Anderson v. Thomas, 166 La.
512, 117 So. 573 (1928) (large auditorium in ten-acre park deemed inconsistent with park use and construction enjoined at suit of taxpayer).

1941]

WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

331

from park uses there was no actual diversion of the property to
other purposes since the oil and gas operations would not substantially interfere with park uses. The case suggests an understandable judicial disposition not to give rigid effect to legal
principles affecting the use of property where economic developments press for recognition. It also significantly illustrates the
need for declaratory judgment procedure in Louisiana.
The facts in Richard v. City of New Orleans8' were too long
and complicated to permit of extended restatement. The contest
concerned the ownership and control of a strip of land in the
city which had been used for about one hundred years down to
1935 as a right-of-way for the Pontchartrain Railroad Company.
Plaintiffs claimed as heirs of the man who had granted the rightof-way and the city claimed that he had previously dedicated the
land as a street by designating it as such on a plan of a subdivision called Faubourg Franklin which he filed as public record
with a notary public and by reference to which he had conveyed
two of the squares in the area to other parties. After the railroad
discontinued the use of the property the city proposed to open
it as a street. This was an action for slander of title against the
city in which owners of land adjoining the strip intervened as
defendants. The court's conclusion that there was an intention to
dedicate appears warranted by the facts as outlined in the opinion.
But unless what was done amounted to a statutory dedication,
no acceptance of which is required,

2

it would appear to be essen-

tial, so far as the city and the public generally are concerned, as
distinguished from those who bought by reference to the plan
and their successors, that there be an acceptance of the dedication. There is nothing in the report to indicate that the case was
one of statutory dedication or that there had been an acceptance.
B. EMINENT DOMAIN

Two recent decisions involving condemnation by the Housing Authority of New Orleans are not easy to square. The first
case, Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Weis,' involved the
taking of certain inferior residence property in a colored residence area, for which a jury of freeholders, after inspection,
awarded $5,300. In holding that this amount was manifestly in31. 197 So. 594 (La. 1940).
32. As to statutory dedication see Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker
Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938).
1. 195 La. 224, 196 So. 328 (1940).
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adequate and increasing the allowance to $6,000, the supreme
court relied chiefly upon the fact that a relatively higher price
had been voluntarily paid by the Authority for adjoining property which was only half as deep and rented at a somewhat lower
figure than the property in suit, which brought $75.00 per month.
The award in the second case, Housing Authority of New Orleans
v. Polmer,2 was $3,000 for similar property in a colored area which
rented for $50.00 per month. The court refused to disturb the
award and strongly emphasized the governing rule that an
appellate court should not amend such an award unless based
upon a palpable error or so obviously inadequate or excessive as
to suggest favoritism. It went on to say that in the matter of
estimating values courts and text writers agree that more discretion is vested in the fact-finding tribunal in condemnation proceedings and correspondingly less in the appellate court. No
mention was made of the Weis case. It is not readily perceived
why this conception of judicial restraint was not applicable to
the Weis case.
C.

TAXATION

Property Taxes
Perhaps the most interesting tax decision of the last term is
to be found in the case of Hibernia National Bank in New Orleans v. Louisiana Tax Commission." There the court held unconstitutional as purporting, in effect, to create a tax exemption not
within the inclusive list of exemptions set out in Section 4 of
Article X of the constitution, a statute concerning the assessment
of the capital stock of banks for ad valorem taxation. The act
provided that the assessment should not exceed the par value of
such shares of stock plus any amount by which the combined
declared surplus, undivided profits and contingent reserves of a
banking institution exceeded the par value of the common capital
of the institution. What this provision amounted to was an enactment that the assessment should not exceed the aggregate of the
declared surplus, undivided profits and contingent reserves of a
bank where those items totaled more than the par value of its
capital stock. It seems evident that this was not a genuine rule
for the guidance of the tax commission in making an assessment,
but was an arbitrary rule which would operate to exclude part
2. 197 So. 247 (La. 1940).
1. 195 La. 43, 196 So. 15 (1940).
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of the value of bank shares from taxation. The court illustrated
the matter by reference to homestead exemptions; in both situations the exemption takes the form of rendering property free
from taxation to the extent of a part of its value.
A not unusual application of the general principle that one
who pays taxes voluntarily by mistake of law may not thereafter
recover the amount erroneously paid is to be found in Central
Savings Bank and Trust Company v. City of Monroe.2 The bank
had made an error of law in failing to take a certain lawful deduction in computing the city tax on its capital stock for the
years 1933-1937. It discovered the error in 1939 and, upon the
city's refusal to repay the amount of taxes attributable to the
error, it brought suit to recover that amount. The money paid
had obviously been absorbed in the fiscal operations of the city
in prior years and was not still held intact and thus subject to
recovery without real prejudice to the city. The bank sought to
establish a basis for recovery by pointing out that the amount
could be repaid out of city utility revenues without any extra
burden on the taxpayers, but such revenues, as the court indicated, enter into the budgetary operations of the city, and for
the court to order repayment out of those particular revenues
would be an unwarranted interference with the orderly administration of municipal business.
It was decided in American Homestead Company v. Zemurray3 that one who bought property in reliance upon a tax research certificate issued by a city through its proper officer was
entitled to rely upon it as conclusive evidence that all city taxes
on the property had been paid as against a subsequent purchaser
at a tax sale by the city in view of the provision of Section 74
of Act 170 of 1898, which makes such a certificate conclusive evidence of the payment of all taxes therein certified to be paid. In
view of the established rule that a sale of property for taxes
which had been paid is an absolute nullity and the conclusiveness
of the certificate as against proffered testimony as to nonpayment, the purchaser who relied upon the certificate was, in this
case, adjudicated the owner and the tax sale decreed to be null
and void.
2. 194 La. 743, 194 So. 767 (1940). As indicated in the opinion, the court
has in earlier cases developed the conception that laws governing the collection of taxes are sW gendris and constitute a system to which the quasi
contract and other general provisions of the Civil Code have little or no
application.
S. 195 La. 37, 196 So. 13 (1940).
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Section 11 of Article X of the state constitution provides that
"No judgment annulling a tax sale shall have effect until the
price and all taxes and costs are [sic] 4 paid, with ten per cent
per annum interest on the amount of the price and taxes paid
from date of respective payments, be previously paid to the pur5
chaser. . . ." Westwego Canal and Terminal Company v. Pitre
was a suit to annul a tax sale and enjoin the defendant from taking possession or interfering with plaintiff's possession of certain
land. The plaintiff did not tender or offer to refund to the tax
purchaser the price of the sale with interest and costs. The defendant denied in her answer that the tax sale was null and
asked an accounting of revenues of the property from the date
of the filing of the petition until she was permitted to take possession, but made no claim in the alternative that she be reimbursed the price of the tax sale with interest and costs. On appeal
she conceded that the tax sale was void because no notice of delinquency had been given the tax debtor. It was obvious that she
was not entitled to an accounting of profits. As for reimbursement the court held that it was not enough for the court below to
give judgment for the plaintiff and simply reserve to the defendant such right as she might have to reimbursement and sent the
case back in order that the amount due her could be determined
and the judgment so revised as to be conditioned upon reimbursement to her in accordance with the constitutional provision.
The court was faced, in First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Shreveport v. Blanchard,6 with the question whether
the claim of a mortgagee, under a mortgage which expressly
provided that the mortgagee might pay taxes where the mortgagor failed to pay and extended the security of the mortgage
to the claim for reimbursement for such a payment, was subject
to the three year period of prescription applicable to tax liens
or was governed by the ten year period relative to personal actions not otherwise prescribed. Act 170 of 1898, as amended, permits such payment by a mortgagee and provides for subrogation
or transfer of the tax lien. The act expressly provides that payment of the tax by a person other than the tax debtor, such as
the mortgagor, shall not be deemed a payment or satisfaction
4. Prior to the 1932 amendment of the section this provision was grammatical but by that amendment the verb "are" was inserted after the words
"all taxes and costs." Literally the provision is now meaningless but it is, of
course, proper to resort to interpretation.
5. 195 La. 107, 196 So. 36 (1940).
.6. 197 So. 280 (La. 1940).
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of the tax. In holding that the ten year prescriptive statute governed, the court concerned itself primarily with interpreting the
statute, but it did point out that there was nothing in the contract between the mortgagor and the mortgagee which precluded
the latter from obtaining subrogation to the tax lien while preserving his right of action against the former personally. It occurs
to the writer that the whole matter hinged upon an interpretation of the act of mortgage-surely there was a payment of the
taxes by the mortgagee within the meaning of that document.
The obtaining of the benefit of the statute with respect to subrogation to the tax lien might well be deemed incidental to that
payment and not inconsistent with the mortgage.
Use Tax
Act 2 of 1938, generally known as the Public Welfare Revenue Act, imposes a tax upon the use in this state of each item
or article of tangible personal property as well as a sales tax on
sales at retail. In writing the use tax provisions into the statute
the legislature doubtless was taking its cue from the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in Henneford v. Silas
Mason Company7 in which that Court upheld a similar tax imposed by the state of Washington. The Louisiana tax was held,
in State ex rel. Cooper v. Pape,8 to apply to the use of an automobile purchased in Texas on March 3, 1939, by a resident of
Texas, and brought by her to Alexandria on March 15, 1939,
where she joined her husband. He was employed by the contractor on a public works job which was expected to keep him there
until near the end of the year. She did not attack the validity of
the act but relied upon her asserted nonresidence. Like the Washington statute, the Louisiana act provides that the tax shall not
apply to the use of an article upon which a like tax equal to or
greater than the amount imposed by the act had been paid in
another state. So far as it appeared Texas exacted no such tax.
But, unlike the Washington act, the Louisiana act does not except
from its operation the use of an article brought into the state by
a nonresident for his use or enjoyment while in the state. There
can be little doubt, therefore, that there was taxable use in Louisiana in this case within the meaning of the statute.
A very interesting application of the use tax was involved
in Saenger Realty Corporation v. Grosjean.9 The plaintiff was
7. 800 U.S. 577, 57 S.Ct. 524, 81 L.Ed. 814 (1937).
8. 194 La. 890, 195 So. 346 (1940).
9. 194 La. 470, 193 So. 710 (1940).
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seeking to recover an amount paid under protest under the use
tax statute with respect to the use of a motion picture film exhibited at its theater in New Orleans. It obtained a copy of the
master negative of the film from a distributor, in accordance with
the usual practice of distribution, under a contract to pay a certain amount per week to exhibit the film. The statute defines
tangible personal property as personalty which is in any wise perceptible to the senses. The tax is imposed upon the lease or rental
of such property as well as upon use. The tax was upheld on the
ground that the film was tangible personal property which the
plaintiff had leased for use. It is doubtful that the tax could be
avoided by framing the contract as a royalty agreement with
respect to a limited copyright license, which is an intangible interest, since, regardless of the character of the agreement, the
film would be tangible personal property and its use within the
state would be enough to subject it to the operation of the statute.
License Taxes
Best and Company, the operator of a large New York department store, had its representative display samples and take
orders at a Shreveport hotel for interstate shipment directly to
the purchasers subject to acceptance in New York, without any
authority on the part of the representative to deliver any merchandise or accept payment. The company's Louisiana activity
was simply the first step in interstate transactions and in an
action by the state to recover a license tax upon the privilege of
engaging in that activity by any one not a regular retail merchant in the state the court had no choice but to declare that
the applicable provisions of Act 33 of 1938 imposed an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce. 10 While the recent
decisions of the Federal Supreme Court disclose a tendency
to uphold nondiscriminatory taxation of interstate commerce,"
at least where it is not calculated to result in a heavier burden
10. State v. Best & Co., 194 La. 918, 195 So. 356 (1940).
11. See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 60
S.Ct. 388, 84 L.Ed. 565 (1940), and companion cases, upholding the New York
City sales tax as applied to sales negotiated in New York and completed by
interstate shipment to New York. These cases are discussed in Note (1940)
2 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 737. The license tax cases are distinguished In the
opinion in the Berwind-White case. (309 U.S. at 55-56, 60 S.Ct. at 397, 84
L. Ed. at 576.)
Since our manuscript was handed to the printer, the United States Supreme Court has declared a very similar North Carolina tax invalid as applied to a like activity of the same concern involved in the Louisana case.
The court considered the tax discriminatory against nonresident merchants.
Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 61 S.Ct. 334 (1940).
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by reason of like taxation by other states,12 the tax here was
clearly discriminatory; the license tax on intrastate retail business is graduated on the basis of gross sales and runs only to $500
for sales up to $499,000, whereas the tax complained of was $250
for each 60 days of display of goods regardless of the amount of
sales.
Gasoline Taxes
The ruling in Sharp v. Police Jury of Parish of East Baton
Rouge"8 that the two cent gasoline tax which is allocated in part
to
to the parishes was constitutional has already been adverted
14
in the discussion of the cases relating to municipal finance.
There appears to have been some confusion as to the meaning of the provision of the gasoline tax statutes allowing in the
computation of the tax in each instance a deduction of three per
centum of the total gallonage to enable the dealer to cover his
losses in handling the motor fuels. The question that has been
debated is whether the taxes are imposed upon the total gallonage manufactured, or imported into the state for sale, use or
consumption in the state less an allowance of three per centum
of that total, or upon the total gallonage actually sold, used or
consumed in the state less such allowance. The supreme court
was emphatic in adopting the first alternative in State v. Sinclair
Refining Company.15 There is not space to review its extended
discussion of the provisions of the statutes provoked by the existence of confusing language and actual inconsistencies. What its
interpretation boils down to is that the taxes are not to be paid
upon motor fuels "when sold, used or consumed in the State" but
upon motor fuels "to be sold, used or consumed in this State."
The words first quoted are the language of Section 22 of Article
VI of the constitution. It is to be noted, moreover, taking Act 34
12. See Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 59 S.Ct. 325, 83
L.Ed. 272 (1939), in which a Washington occupation tax on the commissions
of a Washington sales agency received in the business of getting orders for
and supervising interstate shipments of Washington fruit was declared invalid. For a discussion of the recent cases see Lockhart, State Barriers to
Interstate Trade (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1253.
13. 194 La. 220, 193 So. 594 (1940).
14. An argument in support of the validity of the tax could be grounded
upon Section 7 of Article XVIII of the constitution, which authorizes the
legislature to levy taxes to effectuate its authority to establish a system of
economic security and social welfare without qualification except as to ad
valorem taxes, but for the fact that the gasoline tax statute, Act 87 of 1936,
expressly authorizes the use by a parish of up to half of what is allocated
to it under the act for any public purpose. 15. 195 La. 288, 196 So. 349 (1940).
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of 1934 as a sample, that both the title and levying clause of each
of the statutes refer to the tax as one upon motor fuel "sold, used
or consumed in the State." This brings us abruptly up against
a nice constitutional question-does not the constitutional provision contemplate a consumers' tax? 13 Can the question be disposed of on the theory that what the court was talking about
was the measure, not the subject, of the tax? It is elementary, of
course, that that interpretation which leaves a statute consistent
with organic law is to be favored.
CorporationFranchise Taxes
At its 1938-1939 term the court upheld a statute which imposed a franchise tax on corporations and provided that the tax
should be a first lien upon the property of the corporation although the effect was to give the tax lien priority over an existing mortgage and vendor's lien.17 The court then made plain that
it was expressing no opinion on the question whether the holder
of a mortgage which contained the pact de non alienando might
protect himself in such a situation by bringing an action quasi
in rem. This question was presented to the court at the last term
and answered adversely to the mortgagee in State v. J. Bodenger
Realty Company."5 It seems fairly obvious that the method of
enforcing the lien does not go to the constitutional question because it does not govern priorities. The mortgage and vendor's
lien in that case were created by authority of Section 9 of Act
120 of 1902, relating to building and loan associations, as amended by Act 280 of 1916, which provides that such a vendor's privilege and mortgage shall have priority over all other liens, charges,
privileges, encumbrances and mortgages upon the property recorded or arising in any manner subsequent to the recordation
of the vendor's privilege and mortgage. But the court thought
that this provision referred simply to priority over other liens,
charges and encumbrances arising out of transactions between
individuals or private corporations. The question still remains,
however, whether or not a statute of this sort by giving the tax
lien supporting a corporation franchise tax, not a property tax,
16. See State v. Liberty Oil Co., 154 La. 267, 97 So. 438 (1923).
17. Hibernia Mortgage Co. v. Greco, 191 La. 658, 186 So. 60 (1939), discussed In The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1938-1939 Term
(1939) 2 LOUISIANA
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31, 110.

18. 197 So. 741 (La. 1940). For another recent case substantially In accord
see State v. Wynne, 134 Tex. 455, 133 S.W. (2d) 951 (1939). The Wynne case

is criticized in Note (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 889. But see Note (1940) 89 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 119.
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priority over an existing mortgage does not amount to taking the
mortgagee's property, that is, his first-ranking security interest,
to satisfy the tax imposed on the mortgagor. 9
Severance Taxes
Section 9 of Act 140 of 1922, which imposes a state severance
tax, provides that every person purchasing any natural resources
severed from the soil or water under contracts requiring the purchaser to make payment directly to the owners of the natural
resources shall deduct from any amount due the owner the
amount of the severance tax before making such payments and
account to the Supervisor of Public Accounts for such deductions.
State v. J. W. Jeffries Lumber Company ° was an action by the
state to recover severance taxes on timber bought by the defendant from persons who hauled it to the mill and sold it there without previous negotiations or contract. The statute required that,
except as otherwise provided, the making of the reports of the
tax and the payment of it should be by those actually engaged
in severing natural resources. They were required to deduct from
the value of the product severed the proportionate amount of the
tax owed by each of the owners of such natural resource at the
time of severance. It is evident that the draftsman was thinking
in terms of such natural resources as oil and gas, which are commonly severed by royalty-paying lessees, and thus the problem
of interpretation was rather artificial as to such things as timber.
The court concluded that the reference in Section 9 to the owners
of natural resources meant the owners referred to in the provision just outlined, namely, the owners at the time of severance,
and on that basis held that the defendant was not liable. Mr.
Justice Land dissented on the ground that the reference in Section 9 to the owners of natural resources was unqualified as to
the time of ownership, which indicated a legislative intention to
render the provision applicable to all purchasers whether initial
or subsequent. The court's conclusion is certainly a salutary one
from the standpoint of those engaged in dealing with natural
resource products. The state, moreover, is not left entirely unprotected, because the statute imposes a lien good even against
bona fide purchasers with notice which will survive until the
identity of the property is lost.
19. Viewed in that light there may well be a distinction between the
power to tax and the power to impose a tax lien on property. Surely the
latter power does not carry so far as to permit the imposition of a lien upon
A's property to secure payment of a tax against B.
20. 193 La. 646, 192 So. 86 (1939).
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

By Act 195 of 1938 the legislature created the Louisiana Milk
Commission and endowed it with authority to make and impose,
among others, all regulations necessary to secure to the public a
pure and wholesome supply of milk and such other regulations
as the commission might deem advisable for the protection of
producers.1 Violations of regulations established by the commission were made misdemeanors punishable by fine and imprisonment. The defendant in State v. Maitrejean2 was prosecuted for
failing, as a distributor of milk, to post a bond in a sufficient
amount to cover at least 15 days' shipments from producers, as
required by a rule made and promulgated by the commission.
The supreme court reversed a judgment of conviction on the
ground that the statutory provision embodied an invalid attempt
to delegate to the commission the legislative power to define a
crime. Mr. Justice Ponder filed a lengthy dissenting opinion. That
the definition of crimes is exclusively a legislative function is a
well-known principle of Louisiana law, but that this suffices to
distinguish the decision from federal cases in which criminal
sanctions supporting administrative regulations have been upheld' is by no means obvious. Legislative power generally may
not be delegated but the decisions are legion which uphold the
delegation of what amounts to a measure of legislative authority
where its exercise is governed by a sufficiently definite standard
laid down by the legislature. Thus it would seem to have been
in order in this case to have tested the enactment in terms of
whether it contained a sufficient guiding standard. The implications of the decision probably go so far as to preclude the
legislature from providing penal sanctions for administrative
regulations where such regulations, adopted pursuant to authority granted by statute, are governed by fairly precise standards
prescribed by the statute.
Barnett v. State Mineral Board4 was an action to enjoin the
board from granting a mineral lease with respect to land claimed
by the plaintiff under a conveyance from a levee board. The State
Mineral Board defended on the ground that title was still vested
in the state for the reason that the instrument of conveyance
1. Cf. the far-reaching Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937, 50 Stat. 246 (1937), 7 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq. (1939).
2. 193 La. 824, 192 So. 361 (1939).
3. A leading case is United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 81 S.Ct. 480,
55 L.Ed. 563 (1911).
4. 193 La. 1055, 192 So. 701 (1939).
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from the state to the levee board was signed only by the state
auditor and not by both the state auditor and the register of the
state land office as required by statute. The judgment of the lower
court recognized the plaintiff as owner of the land apart from the
mineral rights therein. The supreme court annulled this judgment and granted judgment for the plaintiffs, recognizing them
as the owners of the land, including the mineral rights, and permanently enjoining the State Mineral Board from leasing those
rights. While it may have been that, upon a proper construction
of the statute pursuant to which the conveyance from the state
to the levee district was made, the execution of the instrument by
the state auditor alone was legally sufficient, 5 the court chose to
place reliance upon a curative statute, passed in 1926. That act
had to be squared with Section 4 of Article IV of the Constitution
of 1921, which requires that in all cases of the sale of state lands
(with an exception not material here) the mineral rights shall
be reserved. The court observed that the statute did not convey
any right of property but was merely one of repose and thus concluded that it did not run counter to the constitutional provision.
It went on to declare, however, that assuming that the conveyance from the state had been so defective that title remained in
the state, still the curative act would be effective. This conclusion
is not free from logical difficulties. In examining it one may pretermit the question as to whether or not the constitutional provision applies only to sales and thus not to gratuitous transfers to
political subdivisions. Strictly speaking, the alleged defect in the
conveyance from the state to the levee district was either fatal
or not; if it was fatal no title passed. Thus it would seem that
if the constitutional provision was applicable to this sort of conveyance from the state to the levee district the curative act would,
under those circumstances, be abortive under the principle that
the legislature may validate or ratify anything that it could have
authorized in the first instance if, and only if, it still has power
6
to grant such authority.
The State Mineral Board is a creature of Act 93 of 1936. The
question arose, in Placid Oil Company v. Hebert,7 whether the
power of the board under that act to let mineral rights in lands
belonging to the state or title to which is in the public, applies
to the streets of a town operating under Act 136 of 1898. The
5. See the discussion of this aspect of the case in Note (1940) 14 Tulane
L. Rev. 631.
6. Katzenberger v. Aberdeen, 121 U.S. 172, 7 S.Ct. 947, 30 L.Ed. 911 (1887).
7. 194 La. 788, 194 So. 893 (1940).
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court answered the question in the negative, pointing significantly
to the circumstances that the act expressly authorized the board
to lease mineral rights with respect to the beds of parish roads,
but was silent as to the streets of a municipality.
It was also held in another case decided during the last term,
State v. Humble Oil & Refining Company,8 that Act 93 of 1936
did not transfer from the parish school boards to the State Mineral Board the authority to lease the mineral rights in so-called
sixteenth section lands, the revenues of which are dedicated by
Section 14 of Article XII of the constitution to school purposes.
The authority of the parish school boards depends upon the provisions of Act 100 of 1922. The court referred to that statute as
a special one which, of course, made it easier to hold that the act
was not repealed by a later general law.9 It is not clear just what
the basis was for labeling the earlier statute a special act. The
decision is fully supported, however, by the point, made in the
opinion, that the later act was open to the interpretation that it
did not repeal the earlier one, and the adoption of that interpretation was necessary to avoid holding it unconstitutional in view
of its requirement that the revenues from leases by the State
Mineral Board go into the general fund of the treasury which
would defeat the "trust" imposed upon sixteenth section lands
for school purposes.
E. ELECTIONS
The court has been quite commendably persistent in its view
that in order to state a cause of action in an election contest it
is not enough for the petition to allege in general terms such
matters as that there had been fraud, intimidation, assault, bribery and irregularities in the manner of conducting the election.
Such allegations are regarded as mere conclusions of the pleader.'
Landry v. Ozenne2 and Molero v. Rowley 8 were primary election
contests involving the Democratic nomination for sheriff in the
parishes of Iberia and St. Bernard, respectively. In the Landry
case in particular the petition contained a plethora of allegations
which practically ran the gamut of misconduct on the part of
election officials and third parties, but it did not clearly and with
8. 197 So. 140 (La. 1940).
9. See, for example, Third District Land Co. v. Geary, 185 La. 508, 169 So.
528 (1936).
1. See State ex rel. Todd v. Mills, 191 La. 1, 184 So. 350 (1938).
2. 194 La. 853, 195 So. 14 (1940).
3. 194 La. 527, 194 So. 7 (1940).
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particularity specify acts of misconduct in the absence of which
the election would have resulted favorably to the contestant. The
court reiterated the proposition that the election officials are presumed to do their duty. The Molero case merits no special comment.
Several interesting questions confronted the court in Bell v.
Guenard.4 Plaintiff and defendant were opposing candidates in
the Democratic primary for the office of clerk of court. The results
as promulgated by the party executive committee for the parish
showed 910 votes for the defendant and 909 for the plaintiff. In
addition to an inadequate general allegation about certain ballots
which had been cast for him being rejected as spoiled, plaintiff
alleged that by error in the tabulation of votes in one precinct
the total recorded for him was one short and that in another
precinct a ballot voted for him was rejected as spoiled for the
sole reason that there was a mark in the box opposite the name
of each of two candidates running for nomination as representative in the legislature. As to the first point a recount showed that
plaintiff was right. The court upheld the recount even though
defendant objected that the ballot box had not been properly
safeguarded. It appeared that the box had been left sealed in a
record vault in the courthouse which was open to the public. The
key to the box had been dropped in it through the slot in the
top and the slot covered over and the box carefully sealed by
the commissioners of the election. The trial judge inspected the
box when it was brought into the court room and satisfied himself that it had not been tampered with. The court held that
under those circumstances it was not error to permit the box to
be opened and the ballots inspected. With respect to the plaintiff's second point, the court held that the marked ballot was
spoiled and thus properly rejected since the mark might reasonably be deemed to serve the purpose of identification. The desirability of a strict rule on this subject, where the voter is protected by a privilege of returning a torn, soiled or defaced ballot
to the election officers and getting a fresh one, is quite evident.
There is some doubt, however, about the existence of such a
privilege in primary elections in view of the fact that provision
for it in the 1906 primary law was removed in 1912 and has not
reappeared in any subsequent primary law.5
4. 194 La. 956, 195 So. 504 (1940).
5. See La. Act 49 of 1906, § 24, as amended by La. Act 198 of 1912, § 4.
The new primary law is Act 46 of 1940.
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The net result was that there was a tie and thus neither party
was nominated. Since the facts as to whether the ballot was spoiled were alleged by plaintiff it would appear that his petition
failed to state a cause of action unless it is enough to allege facts
making out a tie. But the court did not view the matter in this
light; it assumed that he alleged a cause of action grounding a
prayer to have him decreed the nominee.
Act 46 of 1940 authorizes any qualified elector to file objections with a party executive committee against candidacies. It
requires in the section dealing with the filing of notices that,
where in the statute it is provided that objections, protests, and
the like, be filed with a party committee or party officer, the objection or other paper be filed with the chairman of the proper
committee and permits such filing with the secretary of the committee where the chairman is not available or refuses to accept
the document. Villermin v. Republican Executive Committee for
the Third Congressional District6 was a suit by a registered Republican voter against the committee to annul its ruling rejecting a protest the plaintiff had filed against the candidacy of a
certain person for the nomination by the Republican party to
Congress. Plaintiff relied on the primary election law and the
registration law in attacking the ruling on the ground that
the candidate had switched from the Democratic party less than
six months before filing his application to become a candidate.
But the court found it unnecessary to go into this problem because the objections had not been filed with the chairman of the
committee as required by the statute. They had simply been filed
with the secretary and the chairman advised by long distance
telephone. A similar suit brought by a registered Democrat was
consolidated with the Villermin suit for trial, but the same defect
in the service of the objections obtained there and the court thus
did not have to pass on the interesting question whether the statute permitted "any qualified elector" who was a member of a
different political party to file objections.
Long v. Martin7 and Long v. Looney8 were contests over the
Democratic nomination for secretary of state. The person who
won the primary died some weeks before the date fixed for the
second primary for other state offices. It devolved upon the state
central committee of the party to nominate someone for secretary
6. 197 So. 743 (La. 1940).
7. 194 La. 797, 194 So. 896 (1940).
8. 194 La. 811, 194 So. 900 (1940).
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of state, and at a meeting of the committee held shortly after the
second primary, Long was selected by majority vote. A day or
two later at a meeting called for the purpose of declaring and
certifying to the secretary of state those nominated at the second
primary, the committee, a quorum being present, amended the
call for the meeting to cover such other matters as might come
before the committee and thereafter adopted a resolution annulling Long's nomination and a further resolution selecting Gremillion as the nominee for the office of secretary of state. A few
days later a new state central committee, whose members were
elected at the primary, met and adopted a resolution nominating
Gremillion for secretary of state. The court held that in the absence of fraud, since there was no statutory prohibition and no
restriction of the power of the committee to rescind the selection
of a nominee and to make a new selection, the court could not
question the committee's action in changing the nomination at
any time before the name of the nominee was printed on the
official ballot. It did not find it necessary to determine the effect
of the ratifying action of the new committee. The court disposed
of the case with remarkable dispatch in order to "beat the deadline" for printing the ballots for the general election. If the circumstance that the meeting at which the nomination was changed
was a special meeting without a perfect attendance had adverse
significance because the action taken was not within the call, the
result can nevertheless be supported on the theory that the action
of the new committee was effectual to nominate Gremillion.
The relators in State ex rel. Graham v. Republican State
Central Committee of Louisiana9 sought mandamus to compel
the committee to certify their names as qualified candidates for
nomination for Governor on the Republican ticket in the 1940
primary. Objections to their candidacies on the principal ground
that they were dummy candidates had been sustained by the
committee on October 30, 1939. The primary election law provided, in effect, that no appeal should be taken from the action of the
committee to a court unless taken within two days. This suit was
filed on November 2, 1939. One of the intervening days, November 1, 1939, was a legal holiday. The trial court upheld the plea
of prescription, but nevertheless, with respect to the merits, found
that the evidence before the committee was insufficient to sustain
the charge that the relators were dummy candidates. The supreme court annulled the judgment insofar as it sustained the
9. 193 La. 863, 192 So. 374 (1939).
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plea of prescription on the ground that even though the statute
was silent on the subject the intervening legal holiday should not
be counted in computing the prescriptive period because a contrary interpretation would involve consequences too absurd to be
deemed within the contemplation of the legislature. The reasoning of the court applies as well to Sundays as to legal holidays."
After disposing of this point favorably to the relators, the court
went on to decide the case for them on the merits on the basis
of the facts as found by the trial judge in view of the summary
character of the suit and the necessity for its prompt disposition.

F.

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLIC LAW CASES

Section 16 of Article III of the state constitution requires that
a statute have a title indicative of its object. This is a much less
exacting requirement than that embodied in many state constitutions, which is, in substance, that a statute have a title clearly
expressing the subject of enactment. At all events, the court has
rather emphatically taken that view of the matter. This is exemplified by State ex rel. California Company v. Jefferson &
Plaquemines Drainage District.- The statute under scrutiny in
that case related to the collection of taxes and the disposition of
property sold for nonpayment of taxes in the drainage district,
but its title did not identify the district; it merely referred to
"said drainage district." The court first held that this did not
meet the constitutional requirement, but after reconsideration on
rehearing concluded that it did on the ground that the title was
not so defective as to be calculated to deceive a person interested
in the subject matter of the act. Mr. Justice Rogers dissented on
the ground that to meet the constitutional requirement the title
must, without extrinsic aids, be in itself indicative of the subject
of the enactment.
The court handed down a very wholesome decision, in State
ex rel. Wogan v. Clements, 2 withrespect to the access of citizens
and taxpayers to public records. In that case certain parties who
10. In State ex rel. State Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Michel, 52 La. Ann.
936, 27 So. 565 (1900), the court adopted the view that where Sunday is not
mentioned and the period allowed by law for action is longer than a week
an intervening Sunday is to be included in the computation, but that where
the period is less than a week the converse is true. The case involved the
constitutional period under the then existing constitution of the state for
action by the Governor on a bill passed by the legislature.
1. 194 La. 312, 193 So. 657 (1940). See also City of Shreveport v. Brister,
194 La. 615, 194 So. 566 (1939), discussed supra, p. 323.
2. 194 La. 812, 195 So. 1 (1940).
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sued as registered voters and taxpayers obtained mandamus
against the conservation commissioner requiring him to give them
access to the records and books of his department. The suit was
begun on August 28, 1939. The case was decided by the supreme
court on March 11, 1940. The principal defense was that at the
time of the application by relators the records in question were
in the custody of the Supervisor of Public Funds. The so-called
Public Records Act, which provides for access to public records,
expressly ordains that it shall not apply to records in the custody or control of the Supervisor of Public Accounts unless otherwise provided by law. In this instance the Supervisor of Public
Accounts did not remove the books and papers of the conservation department from their usual places but had his assistants
use them there, and conservation employees made use of them
as usual except for such interruptions as were entailed by reference to those records from time to time by the assistants of the
Supervisor of Public Accounts. Under those circumstances the
public records of the department were, in the opinion of the
court, in the custody and control of the conservation commissioner and thus subject to the examination of the plaintiffs as
provided by statute. There were three separate concurring opinions, the burden of each of which was that the majority was
wrong as to who had custody and control of the records, but that
since the Supervisor of Public Accounts had retained control for
an unreasonable time those records had, by the time the court
was ready to dispose of the case, become subject to public inspection because the law contemplated simply that the Supervisor's freedom from such inspection be for a reasonable time
only. It seems rather clear that the concurring judges hit upon
a less satisfactory rationalization than the majority both because
the "reasonable time" limitation is not spelled out in the statute
and because, even if it were in general terms, what was a reasonable period would be a question of fact in a given case not to be
decided summarily by an appellate court without a trial of the
issue. It is interesting to note, in passing, that at the 1940 extraordinary session of the legislature a very salutary measure making the records of the State Bond and Tax Board open to public
examination was enacted."
The overworked and rather vulnerable classification of the
3. La. Act 5 of 1940 (E.S.).
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powers of a state as (1) governmental and (2) proprietary' was
resorted to in applying the doctrine of estoppel to state officers
and, in effect, to the state itself in State ex rel. Shell Oil Company v. Register of State Land Office 5 and Reeves v. Leche.6
There is no quarrel with the decisions, however, because the
matters sought to be relied upon were procedural defects, of a
minor character at that, in publishing invitations for bids for
state mineral leases, and clearly did not go to the power of the
state officials to act. It appears, moreover, that the doctrine is
applied quite liberally in this jurisdiction against the state and
its subdivisions.
The 1938 amendment to Section 1 of Article XI of the state
constitution increased the exemption of homesteads from seizure
and sale from two thousand dollars to four thousand dollars. It
was quite correctly decided in Daniel v. Thigpen7 that the amendment was an unconstitutional impairment of the obligations of
a mortgage and a chattel mortgage contracted before its adoption. It was also held that to enforce his security a creditor did
not have to prove that the value of the homestead exceeded the
two thousand dollar exemption since the exemption merely precludes forced sale for a sum less than two thousand dollars and
does not give the homesteader an absolute right to prevent a
sale.
V. COMMERCIAL LAW
A.

BANKING AND NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

Purchaseand Discharge Distinguished
The principal issue in Cason v. Cecil' was whether the present holder of a certain mortgage note had "purchased," or had
"paid off and discharged" the instrument. The note in question
was past due and had been left with a bank to be "taken up" by the
bank or any other party who would put up the necessary money.
The full balance due was paid by one of the bank's customers,
4. If the exploitation of the mineral interests owned by the state were
strictly proprietary then it would appear that the activity, and doubtless the
income from it, would be subject to federal taxation under the doctrine of
South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 26 S.Ct. 110, 50 L.Ed. 261 (1905),
and Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 54 S.Ct. 725, 78 L.Ed. 1307 (1934).
5. 193 La. 883, 192 So. 519 (1939).
6. 194 La. 1070, 195 So. 542 (1940).
7. 194 La. 522, 194 So. 6 (1940).
1. 194 La. 41, 193 So. 362 (1940) (rehearing denied Jan. 9, 1940). Another
question In the case as to the rights upon foreclosure, of the purchaser of
one in a series of mortgage notes, is discussed supra, p. 302.
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who clearly contemplated an investment, and the note was
turned over to him. The court properly treated the transaction
as a "purchase" of the note, stressing the fact that the person
taking up the note was neither a party to the paper nor in any
way bound for its payment. While stating that the "purchase" or
"discharge" issue was a fact question of intention, Justice Odom
reiterated the well settled and logical rule that when one who is
not a party to a negotiable paper pays for it and receives the
paper, the presumption is that he has bought it and has not paid
off and discharged it.2
Accommodation Maker
While an accommodation maker is primarily liable to a holder in due course, he is only secondarily liable as between himself
and his co-makers.3 However, in Bank of Baton Rouge v. Hendrix"
it was held that an accommodation maker who was sued on the
instrument could not call the accommodated parties in warranty.5
If forced to pay the note, he must bring a separate action to
secure reimbursement from his co-makers.

B.

BANKRUPTCY

The general provision in the Chandler Act that title to a
bankrupt's property vests in the trustee upon his appointment'
must be read along with the requirement that the trustee must,
within ten days after his qualification, record a certified copy of
the order approving his bond in each county (parish) where the
bankrupt has immovable property. 2 Such document, when recorded, shall impart the same notice as the recording of a deed or
other instrument affecting title.3 In Derryberry v. Matterson' an
owner of Louisiana land had been adjudged a bankrupt in New
2. 194 La. at 43, 193 So. at 366, citing 8 Am. Jur. 478. Accord: Ogden,
Negotiable Instruments (4 ed. 1938) 424.
3. The law implies an undertaking by the accommodated party to reimburse the accommodation maker. Brannon, Negotiable Instruments Law
(6 ed. 1938) 460, 461; 36 A.L.R. 548, 566 (1925).
4. 194 La. 478, 193 So. 713 (1940).
5. Art. 379, La. Code of Practice of 1870, was held to be Inapplicable
because there was no express contract of warranty. See further discussion
of this point, infra 359.
1. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70(a), 30 Stat. 565 (1899), as amended by
Act of June 22, 1938, c. 575, 52 Stat. 879 (1938),

11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a)

(Supp.

1939).
2. Chandler Act, § 47(c), 52 Stat. 861, 11 U.S.C.A. § 75(c) (Supp. 1939).
3. Chandler Act, § 21(f), 52 Stat. 853, 11 U.S.C.A. § 44(f) (Supp. 1939).

4. 193 La. 624, 192 So. 78 (1939), noted in (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAw REview
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York, but the trustee had failed to promptly file the necessary
papers in this state. The court held that a purchaser who had innocently relied upon the local records in buying land from the
bankrupt, subsequent to adjudication but prior to any recordation
of the order approving the trustee's bond, secured a good title.
This decision is in line with the intendment of the Bankruptcy
Act, 5 and accords with the policy of this state that acts affecting
title to immovable property must be recorded in order to be
6
effective as to third persons.
C. CORPORATIONS

Dissolution of Corporation with Expired Charter
The corporate existence may be terminated by expiration of
the stated period of corporate existence. The corporation ceases
to exist and is without any power to transact corporate business
but continues to own its property until actual distribution pursuant to law.1 The dissolution provisions of the Business Corporation Act of 19282 do not provide for this contingency. In the case
of In re F. H. Koretke Brass & ManufacturingCompany the court
held that the only applicable procedure for judicial liquidation
of the affairs of an already defunct corporation is a receivership,
as provided for by Act 26 of 1900. 4 The procedure set out in the
receivership statute must be closely followed. In the instant case
the order appointing the so-called liquidator was set aside on the
grounds that the court had signed it without waiting the necessary ten days after entry in the receivership book,5 and without
compliance with the requirement that the liquidators furnish
bond."
Waiver of By-Law Provisions
In Hill v. American Co-operative Association the corporate
directors had entered into a contract employing a comptroller for
5. Beach v. Faust, 2 Cal. (2d) 290, 40 P. (2d) 822 (1935); Vombrack v.
Wavra, 331 Ill. 508, 163 N.E. 340 (1928). See also Section 21(f) of the Chandler

Act, supra note 3.
6. Art. 2266, La. Civil Code of 1870.
1. Screwmen's Benevolent Ass'n of La. v. Monteleone, 168 La. 664, 123 So.

116 (1929). Accord: In re St. Vincent De Paul Benevolent Ass'n of New Orleans, 175 So. 140 (La. App. 1937); Bailey v. Porter-Wadley Lumber Co., 28
Fed. Supp. 25, 28 (D.C. La. 1939).
2. La. Act 250 of 1928, §§ 53-62 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1133-1142].
3. 195 La. 415, 196 So. 917 (1940).
4. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1219, 1220.
5. La. Act 159 of 1898, § 8 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1216].
6. La. Act 26 of 1900, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1220].
7. 197 So. 241 (La. 1940), noted in (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 235.
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a fixed term. This was clearly prohibited by a by-law stating that
such officer should be appointed to serve "during the pleasure of
the board." Justice Fournet pointed out that the articles of incorporation expressly empowered the board of directors "to make,
alter and change" the by-laws, and declared that this included
the power to waive those adopted." Thus it was concluded that
the resolution of the board of directors, appointing the plaintiff
as comptroller for a period of a year, modified and prevailed over
the inconsistent by-law providing for terminable appointments.
The court was careful to distinguish the situation where, as is the
case unless the articles otherwise provide, the power to make and
amend by-laws is vested in the stockholders." In this latter situation it had previously been held that by-law requirements could
not be waived by the board of directors. 10
D. INSURANCE

Two cases involved insurance contracts containing the usual
permanent and total disability provision. In Harris v. New York
Life Insurance Company' the court found that such a provision
does not require that the insured shall be rendered absolutely
helpless, but is satisfied if he is unable to perform the substantial
and material acts necessary in the transaction of his regular business or occupation in the usual and customary way. Pattersonv.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company2 was a case involving a
claim by the beneficiary for disability benefits due to the loss of
his hearing. (The loss was eighty per cent in one ear; seventy per
cent in the other.) The court recognized that the worker was
8. 197 So. at 246 (on rehearing). Accord: Farmers' State Bk. v. Haun,
30 Wyo. 322, 222 Pac. 45 (1924); State v. Wiley, 100 Ind. App. 438, 196 N.E. 153
(1935); Realty Acceptance Corporation v. Montgomery, 51 F. (2d) 636 (1930).
9. 197 So. 241, 245. Section 29, I, of the Business Corporation Act, La.
Act 250 of 1928 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1109, I] provides, "The shareholders of
a corporation may make and alter by-laws not inconsistent with the law or
the articles; or, if the articles so provide, the board of directors may make
and alter by-laws, subject to the power of the shareholders to change or
repeal the by-laws so made ... "
10. Hunter v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 26 La. Ann. 13 (1874); Fowler v. Great
Southern Tel. & Tel. Co., 104 La. 751, 29 So. 271 (1901).
However, even where the by-law making power rests solely with the
shareholders, by-laws may be totally abrogated through continued disregard
by the directors, with the acquiescence of the shareholders. Grand Valley
Irr. Co. v. Fruita Imp. Co., 37 Colo. 483, 86 Pac. 324 (1906); Blair v. Metropolitan Sav. Bank, 27 Wash. 192, 67 Pac. 609 (1902); Huxtable v. Berg, 98
Wash. 616, 168 Pac. 187 (1917).
1. 197 So. 579 (La. 1940).
2. 194 La. 106, 193 So. 478 (1939).
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totally disabled within the meaning of the policy, although he
was an able-bodied, healthy individual of thirty-three years of
age who might obtain some laboring work foreign to his usual
occupation.
In Muse v. MetropolitanLife Insurance Company' the policy
considered by the court provided indemnity against loss of a
hand by severance at the wrist. The court refused to allow recovery to an assured whose hand, although virtually torn into pieces,
nevertheless still had the thumb and first and second fingers
hanging by a small amount of skin attached to the palm. Although the court recognized the injured hand as being useless, it
found that such an injury did not come within the provisions of
the policy. The ruling was based upon the wording of the policy
showing a clear intention to cover only the loss of the use of the
hand through a complete physical loss of the member.
In Clesi v. National Life Insurance Company' the supreme
court had under consideration a policy recognizing degrees of
sickness. Full indemnity was provided for a sickness so serious as
to confine the insured to the house, whereas only partial indemnity was allowed where the insured was disabled from work or
business, but was not prevented from leaving his house. On finding that the insured had failed to prove total confinement to his
house, the court properly limited recovery to partial indemnity.
Act 256 of 19125 provides that the payment of death benefit
certificates or policies issued by fraternal societies is restricted
to the group of persons enumerated in the act. In Seeberry v.
District Grand Lodge Number 216 the plaintiffs were the heirs of
a deceased member and claimed the proceeds of a death benefit
certificate, notwithstanding the association's by-laws which provided for a reversion to the association in the absence of a surviving eligible designated beneficiary. The named beneficiary had
been their mother, who had died before the insured. While the
plaintiffs were among those enumerated in the act, the association itself was not made a permissible beneficiary thereunder.
The defendant advanced the contention that its by-laws were
valid, and not in conflict with the prohibitions contained in the
act against beneficiaries outside the designated classes. This was
treated by the court as an attempt by a mere manipulation of
3.
4.
5.
6.

193 La. 605, 192 So. 72 (1939).
197 So. 413 (La. 1940).
Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4135-4165.
194 La. 666, 194 So. 583 (1940).
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words to make the association a beneficiary in violation of the
act.
In the case of Curran& Treadaway v. American Bonding Company of Baltimore7 the plaintiff sued on a fidelity bond to recover
indemnity for a loss resulting from an act of embezzlement by an
employee. The defendant contended that its liability had terminated prior to the embezzlement in question because the employer had previously given a check to the guilty employee to
enable him to make good a shortage in his accounts with another
party. A provision of the bond was that "This bond shall terminate upon discovery by the employer ... of any fraudulent or

dishonest act on the part of such employee, whether in the service of the employer or otherwise." In rejecting this defense, and
awarding the plaintiff judgment, the court said:
"It is to be observed that while every act of embezzlement involves a shortage, every shortage does not involve an
act of embezzlement .... Thus, it has been held that an em-

ployee who becomes indebted to his employer through mistake or carelessness, or using funds of the employer for his
personal use with no intent to defraud, is not guilty of embezzlement and therefore of a dishonest act within the meaning of a fidelity bond."8
VI. PROCEDURE
The procedural field of law, supposedly only a means to an
end, was a prolific source of litigation during the 1939-1940 term
of court. As usual, a majority of the cases were disposed of by
the application of elementary principles of law and require only
passing comment. However, several cases were of far reaching
effect and are worth notation for future reference.
Parties
Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. Reese1 reaffirmed the
well settled rule that all coheirs or owners in indivision of property to be partitioned must be made parties to the proceedings
in such an action and the failure to make anyone a party vitiates
the partition as to all. However, the court held that a mineral
lessee, the owner of a real right since the passage of Louisiana
7. 193 La. 763, 192 So. 335 (1939).
& 193 La. at 770, 192 So. at 337.
1. 195 La. 359, 196 So. 558 (1940). Cf. companion case, Haas v. Reese,
195 La. 376, 196 So. 564 (1940).
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Act 205 of 1938, was not a necessary party to the proceedings and
2
had no interest to complain about irregularities therein.
Courts
The jurisdiction of the district court over the person of the
defendant was raised in two cases. In Pittman Brothers Construction Company v. American Indemnity Company8 the court held
that the domicile, insofar as the service of legal process was concerned, of a foreign surety which had complied with the laws of
Louisiana 4 was necessarily at the office of the Secretary of State
at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and unless the nature of the suit
against such corporations brought it within one of the exceptions
to the general rule it had to be sued at its domicile. This suit
was brought against the American Indemnity Company, a foreign surety company, in the Parish of Calcasieu and the court
sustained an exception to the jurisdiction of the court ratione
personae. In an attempt to bring the case within the exception
allowing suits against solidary obligors to be brought at the
domicile of any one of them" the plaintiff contended that the defendant and the principal in the bond sued upon were in solido
obligors. The suit was against the surety alone. The court properly held that in order to come within the exception it was necessary to make all the obligors parties to the suit.6 The defendant
advanced the further contention that the cause of action did not
arise in Louisiana and could not be sued upon within this state.7
The facts did not support this argument.
In Hargrave v. Turner Lumber Company8 it was held that a
2. Cf. La. Act. 336 of 1940. Section 1 provides: "In any suit for partition
by licitation all parties having an interest in either the land or mineral interest shall be made parties thereto." The obvious purpose of the statute
was to overturn the rule enunciated in the noted case. See Bugea, Lazarus,
and Pegues, The Louisiana Legislation of 1940 (1940) 3 LOUIsIANA LAw REvEmw 98, 102.
3. 194 La. 437, 193 So. 699 (1940).
4. Cf. La. Act 105 of 1898, Art. II, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4018] requiring
foreign Insurance companies doing business In this state to appoint the Secretary of State as their agent for service of process and La. Act 19 of 1934
[Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 9761.1-9761.31 requiring foreign surety companies to
deposit security with the Secretary of State.
5. Art. 165(6), La. Code of Practice of 1870.
6. Cf. Hillebrandt v. Home Indemnity Co., 177 La. 349, 148 So. 254 (1933Y.
The facts of the noted case show that the other co-obligor was a nonresident; hence, the suit could not have been instituted in Calcasieu Parish
because neither party was domiciled there. Cf. Alpha v. Rose, 171 La. 753,
132 So. 222 (1931).
7. Cf. La. Act 184 of 1924, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1251]; Staley-Wynne
Oil Corp. v. Loring Oil Co., 182 La. 1007, 162 So. 756 (1935).
8. 194 La. 285, 193 So. 648 (1940).
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Louisiana court could not in a personal action secure jurisdiction
ratione personae over a succession opened in Mississippi by service of process upon one of the testamentary executors domiciled
in Louisiana who had not taken out ancillary letters of administration in this state. The accepted theory is that the representative capacity of an executor appointed by the court of another
state does not extend beyond the jurisdiction of the court which
grants it.
In the case of Derryberry v. Matterson9 the defendants contended that the district court for the Parish of Caddo did not
have jurisdiction ratione materiae to try an action of jactitation
involving immovable property situated in that parish because
the property belonged to a bankrupt and the possession of the
trustee could not be interfered with by the state court. Finding
that the property had been sold by the trustee to the defendant
subsequent to the adjudication, the court properly held that the
exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to protect its possession had ceased to exist and maintained its own jurisdiction.
Citation
In the matter of the Interdiction of Scurto'0 the supreme
court annulled an ex parte order which appointed an administrator pro tempore and ordered an inventory to be taken during
the pendency of the interdiction proceedings on the ground that
the person proceeded against was neither cited nor notified
and was not represented by counsel. It was pointed out that in
a suit for interdiction the person sought to be interdicted must
be cited" and that if an attorney does not appear to represent
the alleged incapacitated person the court must appoint counsel.
The personal knowledge possessed by the district judge in regard to condition of the person proceeded against did not obviate
the necessity of following the requirements of law in an interdiction proceeding.
Nonresidents
2
In the case of Maddry v. Moore Brothers Lumber Company
the supreme court, in answer to questions certified to it by the

9. 193 La. 624, 192 So. 78 (1939).
10. 197 So. 417 (La. 1940).
11. Cf. Interdiction of Joseph Dumas, 32 La. Ann. 679, 685 (1880).
12. 197 So. 651 (La. 1940), noted in (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW RBVIEW 231.
Cf. Maddry v. Moore Bros. Lumber Co., 197 So. 653, 658 (La. App. 1940) for
opinion of the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, conforming to instructions
given by the supreme court.
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Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, held that an employee could
maintain an action under the workman's compensation law
against his nonresident employer to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile accident occurring on the highways of
this state by service of process upon the Secretary of State as
the agent of the nonresident under the provisions of Louisiana
Act 86 of 1928 as amended. 18 The constitutionality of statutes of
this nature is sustained on the ground that they bear a reasonable relationship to the essential regulation and policing of the
highways of the state. 14 The cause of action sought to be enforced
in this case had its inception in the contract of employment, and
the accident was merely a factor giving rise to the occasion for
the enforcement of pre-existing contractual rights. Therefore, it
would appear that the validity of the statute when so interpreted
is questionable on constitutional grounds.
The court, in a per curiam opinion rendered on an application for rehearing, held in the case of Pelican Well & Tool Supply
Company v. Johnson, 5 that a personal judgment for costs could
not be rendered against a nonresident defendant who was not
personally served and over whom jurisdiction had been secured by a writ of attachment.'
Reid v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans7 was a suit to
annul a deed executed by a sheriff in a foreclosure proceeding
by executory process against the succession of the alleged deceased debtor, when, in fact, the debtor was alive but an absentee.
The foreclosing creditor, availing itself of the provisions of Act
44 of 1932,1 secured the appointment of an attorney to represent
the succession of the mortgage debtor and carried the proceeding
on contradictorily with him. The court annulled the foreclosure
proceedings and the sale effected thereunder on the grounds that
the creditor's action not only did not comply with the law but
was not even a substantial compliance therewith.
13. La. Act 86 of 1928 as amended by La. Act 184 of 1932 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 5296-52981 provides for service of process on the Secretary of State
in any action or proceeding against a nonresident motorist growing out of
any accident or collision in which said nonresident or his agent may be
involved while operating a vehicle on a highway in this state.
14. Cf. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 35 S. Ct. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385
(1915); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37 S. Ct. 30, 61 L.Ed. 222 (1916);
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091 (1927).
15. 194 La. 987, 195 So. 514 (1940).
16. Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877).
17. 193 La. 1017, 192 So. 688 (1939). Cf. Note (1940) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 629.
18. Later amended by La. Act 273 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 5021.15021.3]
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Real Actions
Smith v. Courtney19 was a suit to partition certain real property wherein the plaintiffs alleged that they acquired their title
by inheritance and that the property was unoccupied at the time
of the suit. The defendants filed an exception of no cause of
action predicated upon the fact that the plaintiffs alleged in their
petition the lands were vacant; hence, the only method by which
they could establish title was to proceed under Louisiana Act 38
of 1908; and that said act applied only to cases where parties
had a recorded title, which fact was negatived by the allegations
of the petition. In overruling the exception, the court quoted from
the case of Long v. Chailan20 as follows:
"... where the plaintiff in a suit under the provisions of Act
No. 38 of 1908 claims title by inheritance, nothing more in
the form of a recorded title can be required of him than that
the title which his ancestor had, and which the plaintiff in'
21
herited, is a recorded title.
The same rule would be applicable to all real actions where
proof of title is required.
In the case of City of Shreveport v. Kahn22 the court held
that in the absence of an answer asserting title the only possible
issues that could be raised in a slander of title suit were the possession of the property by the plaintiff and slander of title thereto
by the defendant. The action was properly dismissed as to those
defendants who did not appear when the plaintiffs offered no
evidence to prove the latter element.
In Rawlings v. Stokes" the court held that the plaintiff, by
cumulating an action of jactitation or slander of title (a branch
of the possessory action) with a petitiory action waived the for24
mer.
Reid v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans2 5 was a direct
action against the seizing creditor and the adjudicatee to annul
a judicial sale of land under executory process. The defendant
filed an exception of no cause or right of action predicated on
the fact that plaintiffs failed to allege any possession either in
19. 193 La. 910, 192 So. 528 (1939).
20. 187 La. 507, 175 So. 42 (1937).
21. 193 La. 910, 913, 192 So. 528 (1939).
22. 194 La. 55, 193 So. 461 (1939).
23. 194 La. 206, 193 So. 589 (1940).
24. Cf. Art. 150, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Jackson v. Currie, 144 La.
89, 80 So. 210 (1918).
25. 193 La. 1017, 192 So. 688 (1939).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. III

themselves or in any other person. In overruling the exception
the court held that a direct action to annul a judicial sale is recognized under our jurisprudence; that though it may partake of
the nature of a petitory action, it is not the same; and that an
allegation of possession is not necessary to maintain this action
of nullity. The court definitely defined the respective field in
which each operated. If the error that vitiates the sale is one that
renders it merely voidable and not absolutely void, then the sole
remedy is a direct action of nullity against the parties to the
transaction, and the judgment rendered therein can have no
effect against the third possessor. If the error complained of is
such as to make the sale an absolute nullity then the petitory
action may be brought directly against the possessor of the property. In the latter instance the party may, by making all the
parties in interest parties to the suit, cumulate the action of
nullity with the petitory action.
Concursus Proceedings
In the case of Hennington v. Petroleum Heat & Power Company of Louisiana26 it was held that "in a concursus proceeding
each claimant occupies a dual position of plaintiff and defendant
with reference to the other claimants"; 27 that the respective merits
of their claims would have to be tried contradictorily with each
other and that one could not gain an advantage over another
by securing a confession of judgment with recognition of a
privilege from the common debtor.
Summary Proceedings
In the case of Younger Brothers v. Spell2 8 the defendant filed
a motion to dissolve a provisional seizure obtained under the
provisions of Act 145 of 1934.29 There was incorporated in the
motion a reconventional demand for damages for the wrongful
issuance of the writ. The objection was raised for the first time
in the appellate court that the claim for damages could be asserted only in an ordinary proceeding and not in the motion to
dissolve, which is a summary proceeding." The soundness of the
26. 194 La. 188, 193 So. 583 (1940).
27. 194 La. at 196, 193 So. at 586.
28. 194 La. 16, 193 So. 354 (1939).
29. Dart's Stats. (1939) H§ 5101.1-5101.5. Later amended by La. Act 100 of
1940.
30. Summary proceedings can be resorted to only in those instances expressly allowed by law. Cf. Art. 754, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Succession
of Gary, 120 La. 1028, 46 So. 12 (1908); Bienvenue v. Bienvenue, 186 La. 429,
172 So. 516 (1937).
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objection as a legal proposition is beyond question, but the court
properly held that the right to object to the method of procedure
had been waived by failure to object thereto in limine and going
to trial on the matter.
Incidental Demands
Bank of Baton Rouge v. Hendrix31 was a suit by the holder

of three promissory notes signed by the defendants and others as
makers. One of the defendants, alleging that he was only an accommodation maker, sought to call the other makers in warranty
and to have a judgment against them for whatever amount judgment was rendered against him. In dismissing the call in warranty on an exception of no cause and no right of action, the
court held that in order to support a call in warranty there must
be an express contract or a statutory provision authorizing same.
No showing of the existence of either was made. The correctness of the decision as a matter of law cannot be questioned.
However, since the objection was based on a procedural technicality and the defendant would have the right to settle the question raised in a separate suit, it would appear desirable to amend
the procedural rules of this state to allow a settlement of all
controversies in the same suit, thereby avoiding a multiplicity
of suits.
Conservatory Writs
In Younger Brothers v. Spell32 plaintiff obtained a provisional
seizure pursuant to the provisions of Act 145 of 1934, Section 4,38
under which writ the sheriff seized the drilling rig and equipment
of the defendant. A motion to dissolve the writ, together with a
reconventional demand for damages, was filed on the grounds,.
first, insufficiency of allegations of fact to warrant the issuance
of the writ, and, second, that the facts alleged were not true.
Finding the facts alleged not to be true, the court sustained the
motion on the latter mentioned ground. The ruling of the court
in this case would indicate that in order to maintain a writ of
provisional seizure under Act 145 of 1934 it is necessary to allege
fear of removal in the words of the statute
and support the same
34
by proof when called upon to do so.

31. 194 La. 478, 193 So. 713 (1940).
32. 194 La. 16, 193 So. 354 (1939).
33. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5101.4. Later amended by La. Act 100 of 1940.
34. Cf. La. Act 190 of 1912 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2156] and La. Act 12 of
1920 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 21573 providing that in certain cases of sequestra-
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In the case of Dumestre v. Police Jury, Parish of Jefferson, 5
the court sustained the right of the plaintiff to enjoin the enforcement of an invalid penal law upon a showing that its enforcement would be highly prejudicial to and would seriously affect
his existing property rights.3 6 This last mentioned element brings
this case within the only exception to the general rule that one
cannot test the validity vel non of a criminal law by a civil
17
suit.
ExtraordinaryWrits
The sole issue presented in the case of Leidenheimer v. Schutten 8 was the proper procedure to be employed to try title to an
office in a private corporation. The court dismissed the injunctive
proceedings on the ground that the remedy provided by our
law for the trial of such issues was a quo warranto proceeding 3 9
Pleadings
The question of proper factual pleadings was raised in several cases. In State ex rel. Hourguettes v. City of Gretn 4 ° the
court refused to pass on the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance where its contents were not incorporated in the pleading
as an allegation of fact and a certified copy was not attached to
the petition or offered in evidence, basing its decision on the well
settled principle that the supreme court cannot take judicial cognizance of a municipal ordinance.41 The court went further and
stated that the plaintiffs' allegations of unconstitutionality, not
specifying in what respect the ordinance was unconstitutional,
were mere conclusions of law and not allegations of fact to be
considered in passing upon an exception of no cause of action. 42
tion the allegation of fear is sufficient to maintain the writ without proof of
the fact. Bomer-Ferguson Co. v. Shapiro, 148 La. 736, 87 So. 729 (1921).
35. 197. So. 209 (La. 1940).
36. Accord: Patout Bros. v. Mayor and Board of Trustees of City of New
Iberia, 138 La. 697, 70 So. 616 (1916); New Orleans Baseball & Amusement
Co. v. City of New Orleans, 118 La. 228, 42 So. 784, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1014, 118
Am. St. Rep. 366 (1916).
37. Cf. Godfrey v. Ray, 169 La. 77, 124 So. 151 (1929); Leesville Club v.
Town of Leesville, 169 La. 284, 125 So. 125 (1929).
38. 194 La. 598, 194 So. 32 (1940).
39. Accord: State ex rel. Palfrey v. Simms, 152 So. 395 (La. App. 1934).
Cf. Comment (1934) 8 Tulane L. Rev. 287.
40. 194 La. 460, 193 So. 706 (1940).
41. Cf. State ex rel. Cotonio v. Judge of Criminal District Court, Parish
of Orleans, 105 La. 758, 30 So. 105 (1900). See also Valenti v. Oster Bros. Carriage & Wagon Mfg. Co., 154 La. 991, 98 So. 553 (1923), to the effect that the
district court cannot take judicial cognizance of municipal ordinances.
42. Cf. City of Shreveport v. Pedro, 170 La. 351, 127 So. 865 (1930).
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In Molero v. Rowley 43 it was held that general allegations of
fraud, irregularities, et cetera, without allegations of facts, could
not be considered by the court. Obviously, these allegations were
conclusions of law and not fact pleadings as required by the Louisiana Code of Practice and the Pleading and Practice Act. 44 Two
decisions 45 were rendered by the court holding that in order to
state a cause of action in a primary election contest the petition
must contain specific allegations of fact setting forth the irregu46
larities complained of and not mere conclusions of law.
In the Succession of Giordano47 the court properly excluded
evidence in support of an affirmative defense interposed by the
defendant at the time of trial but which had not been specially
pleaded in the answer. The court said:
"The purpose of the pleading act is to advise parties litigant
of the issues in order that they might have an opportunity
to present evidence supporting their contentions. It also prevents a party litigant from springing surprises and catching
an opponent at a disadvantage. The defense interposed herein
48
is an affirmative one.
49
The case of Womack v. McCook Brothers Funeral Home
was a suit to recover an undivided one-half interest in certain
realty which had been sold in the succession proceedings of the
plaintiff's deceased husband to pay debts which, in fact, did not
exist. The defendant interposed a plea of estoppel predicated on
the fact that the plaintiff had intervened in the succession proceedings and claimed the proceeds of the sale and could not
now attack it as a nullity. The court applied the well settled rule
that "one cannot judicially claim the proceeds of a judicial sale
and afterwards attack the sale for nullity,"5 0 and sustained the
plea of estoppel.
In Lee v. Perkins51 the court allowed the plaintiffs to intro43. 194 La. 527, 194 So. 7 (1940).
44. Arts. 172(4), 173, La. Code of Practice of 1870; La. Act 157 of 1912 as
amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1483]. Cf. State v. Hackley, Hume & Joyce,
124 La. 854, 50 So. 772 (1909).
45. Landry v. Ozenne, 194 La. 853, 195 So. 14 (1940); Bell v. Guenard, 194
La. 956, 195 So. 504 (1940).
46. Cf. La. Act 157 of 1912 as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1483 et seq.]
and State v. Hackley, Hume & Joyce, 124 La. 854, 50 So. 772 (1909) for the
general rule that ultimate facts must be alleged.
47. 194 La. 648, 194 So. 577 (1940).
48. 194 La. at 652, 194 So. at 578.
49. 194 La. 296, 193 So. 652 (1940).
50. 194 La. at 302, 193 So. at 654.
51. 197 So. 607 (La. 1940).
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duce evidence of fraud to invalidate certain new facts set up in
defendant's answer even though the petition failed to affirmatively allege fraud as a basis of the cause of action. This ruling
is supported by the rule, enunciated by statute" and consecrated
by the jurisprudence, 2 that neither replication nor rejoinder is
permitted in our pleadings and all allegations of fact contained
in the defendant's answer are considered as denied and are open
to every objection of law and fact.
Exceptions, Motions, and Rules
In two cases 54 the court reaffirmed and applied the trite
principle that all well pleaded allegations of fact must be accepted as true in passing upon an exception of no cause or right
of action. In Leidenheimer v. Schutten55 the court affirmed the
elementary rule "that upon the trial of an exception of no cause
of action, the exhibits attached to and made a part of the petition must be considered in connection with the allegation thereof."5

In the case of Perez v. Meraux 57 the court held that in

passing on an exception of no cause of action it must consider
all the allegations as a whole, that the court could not single out
specific articles of the petition and require each to state a cause
of action.58
The precise scope of the doctrine of res judicata under Article 2286 of the Civil Code was litigated in two cases. Hope v.
Madison9 was a suit to annul a contract transferring certain
mineral interests to the defendant on the ground that it violated
Article 2447 of the Civil Code prohibiting attorneys from purchasing litigious rights. The lower court sustained an exception
of res judicata predicated upon a final judgment rendered in a
previous suit 0 between the same parties rejecting the plaintiffs'
demands to annul the same contract on the grounds of lack of
consideration, misrepresentation and fraud. In the brief and on
52. Art. 329, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
53. Cf. Riley v. Wilcox, 12 Rob. 648 (La. 1846); Bayly & Pond v. Stacey
& Poland, 30 La. Ann. 1210 (1878); Patton's Heirs v. Mosely, 186 La. 1088, 173
So. 772 (1937); Iglesias v. Campbell, 175 So. 145 (La. App. 1937).
54. In re F. H. Koretke Brass & Mfg. Co., 195 La. 415, 196 So. 917 (1940);
Sittig v. Dalton, 197 So. 423 (La. 1940).
55. 194 La. 598, 194 So. 32 (1940).
56. 194 La. at 602, 194 So. at 33. Accord: Tremont Lumber Co. v. May,
143 La. 389, 394, 78 So. 650, 652 (1918).
57. 197 So. 683 (La. 1940).
58. Accord: Saint v. Meraux, 163 La. 242, 111 So. 691 (1927).
59. 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666 (1940). Cf. Comment (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEw 347-365, 491-525.

60. Hope v. Madison, 192 La. 593, 188 So. 711 (1939).
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argument in the first suit the plaintiff urged the nullity of the
deed on the grounds presented in the second suit, but the court refused to pass upon the question because it had not been properly
pleaded. The case squarely presented the question of whether
or not the common law doctrine that res judicata includes, not
only everything pleaded in a cause, but also that which might
have been pleaded, prevailed in Louisiana. In overruling the exception, the court rejected the common law doctrine in favor of
the doctrine of the French law, recognizing, however, certain exceptions created by the Louisiana jurisprudence. Under the latter
doctrine, the judgment may be pleaded as res judicata only as to
the matters in issue and actually adjudicated by the court. There
being a lack of identity of issues in the two cases, the plea of res
judicata filed in the second case could not be maintained. The exceptions to the rule applied in this case, and recognized by the
court are: (1) "That generally a breach of contract or single tort
gives rise to but one cause of action, which cannot be divided and
made the subject of several suits, and if one suit is brought for
a part of the claim, a judgment thereon may be pleaded in bar
to a recovery for another portion of the claim in a second suit";61
(2) "that in seeking injunctive relief, a litigant must set out all
grounds or reasons therefor which existed at the time of his application"; 62 and (3) "that parties litigant in a petitory action,
whether plaintiff or defendant, must set up whatever title or
defense they may have at their command or a judgment on that
issue will bar a second action based on a right or a claim which
existed at the time of the first suit, even though omitted therefrom."6 8 In the case of Himel v. Connely6 4 the record showed a
total lack of identity of issues. The court applied the same principle and overruled the exception of res judicata but it recognized only two of the exceptions 5 that were stated in the Hope
61. 194 La. 337, 343, 193 So. 666, 667 (1940). It would seem that this is only
an apparent but not a real exception since the facts would bring it within
the operation of the rule. Cf. P. Oliver & Sons v. Board of Com'rs, 181 La.
802, 160 So. 419 (1935); Comment (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 491, 495, n.20,
511.
62. 194 La. 337, 343, 193 So. 666-668 (1940).
63. 194 La. at 343, 193 So. at 668.
64. 197 So. 424 (La. 1940).
65. The court recognized the second and third exception and qualified the
second with this statement (197 So. at 427): "But, in injunction suits, the
right of the head of a family to claim the homestead exemption is not waived
by his enjoining the sale on other grounds without claiming the homestead
exemption." Citing Lee v. Cooper, 155 La. 143, 98 So. 869 (1924). The qualiflca.
tion was proper under the jurisprudence of this state. Cf. Comment (1940)
2 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 491, 502-503, 525.
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case and added another, viz.: that in suits for a partition of property owned in indivision, the parties must assert whatever title
they have. 6
State ex rel. Graham v. Republican State Central Committee
of Louisiana67 was a mandamus proceeding brought by two parties
to compel the members of defendant committee to certify each of
their names to the proper authorities as qualified candidates for
nomination for the office of governor. In overruling the exception
of misjoinder of parties, the court stated that even though each
party sought to be certified as candidates for nomination to the
same office, both had a common interest and sought the same
relief from the action of the defendant in refusing to certify their
respective names and, therefore, were properly joined in the
same suit.66
In In re Perez" a petition was filed requesting the appointment of an attorney to institute removal proceedings against a
district attorney. The district attorney appeared and filed a
petition for recusation of the district judge because of personal
interest in the matter, setting forth facts tending to support
the charge. The district judge refused to recuse himself, and
assigned as his reason the fact that the appointment of the
attorney was a purely ministerial duty. The latter ruling was
reversed by the supreme court on the ground that the action
involved a determination of whether or not the petition seeking
the appointment was signed by twenty-five citizens within the
district who were taxpayers, which necessarily called for an exercise of discretion and judgment. Hence, it was a judicial and
not merely a ministerial function. In outlining the procedure
to be followed by the judge when a motion to recuse is filed
the court said: 7
"In the case of State v. Nunez, 147 La. 394, 402-405, 85
So. 52, 56, we said:
"'In State ex rel. Tyrell v. Judge, 33 La. Ann. 1293, it
appeared that a motion was made to recuse the judge as
66. The exceptions recognized in Himel v. Connely, 197 So. 424 (La. 1940)
are in line with the jurisprudence of the state. Cf. Comment (1940) 2 LoUisiANA LAW REVIEW 491, 525.
67. 193 La. 863, 192 So. 374 (1939).
68. The ruling of the noted case is In accord with the general rule allowing a joinder of parties where there is a community of interest. Cf. Gill v.
City of Lake Charles, 119 La. 17, 43 So. 897 (1907); Reardon v. Dickinson, 156
La, 556, 100 So. 715 (1924).
69. 194 La. 763, 194 So. 774 (1940).
70. 194 La. at 767-769, 194 So. at 775-776.
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having a personal interest in the result of the (civil) suit, and
the motion was overruled. After referring to the provisions
of the Code of Practice on the subject, this court said:
"'"When a refusal has thus been made to the judge's
trying the cause on account of interest, that refusal must be
respected by the judge. He must either admit his disqualification and enter up the order of recusation or deny it, and
thereby raise an issue touching his right to try the case. If he
pursues the latter course, it is plain to see that he could not
legally decide that issue himself. (Our italics.) Assuming that
he is interested as charged, that would prompt him to declare himself not interested, as much as it would move him to
follow that interest in the judgment that he would render
in the cause.
"'"Hence, it is not enough for the judge to disavow an
interest, but, where such disavowal is not satisfactory to the
party making the challenge, as in the present case, and he
insists upon showing such interest in the judge, it evinces
an unwarranted exercise of authority in this officer to assume
to determine this question, so exclusively personal to himself
and affecting his own competency. He should at once recuse
himself on this issue and refer it to be tried in the manner
pointed out by law. If on such trial the ground is shown to
be untenable and the competency of the judge to try the case
is decreed, then, and not till then, is the judge authorized to
proceed in the case. To hold otherwise would be to render
the important right of recusation or challenge nugatory and
worthless." ' "
The right to a position in the adjective law of this state
of the so-called rule or motion to strike was questioned in two
decisions. 71 The case of Perez v. Meraux 2 was an original proceeding in the supreme court to impeach and remove a district judge.
The court summarily overruled a motion to strike certain allegations from the petition on the ground that the laws of this
state do not make provisions for such a procedure. In State ex
rel. Sutton v. Caldwe17 3 the court condemned the action of the
lower court in maintaining a "so-called" motion to strike certain
articles of the defendant's answer but refused to reverse the
71. State ex rel. Sutton v. Caldwell, 197 So. 214 (La. 1940); Perez v.
Meraux, 197 So. 683 (La. 1940).
72. 197 So. 683 (La. 1940).
73. 197 So. 214 (La. 1940).
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decision of the lower court, stating merely that the striking out
"did not leave the record in any worse condition than that in
which it would be if the relators had bided their time and objected to the offering of evidence to support the allegations."7'
However meritorious might be the criticism of the court in the
last mentioned case it fails to delete this undesirable practice
since the court refused to reverse the decision of the lower court
because of this error. The continued tolerance of such encroachments, however slight, has been one of the main factors undermining our once simplified procedure. Such innovations should
be nipped at their first inception by drastic action and not merely by verbal spankings. The observation is particularly applicable to this motion or rule since our law provides an adequate
remedy. The proper method of procedure is to permit the parties
to go to trial and reject, on the objection of the opposite party,
all evidence to sustain improper and irrelevant allegations.78
In Rives v. Starcke" the court held that the filing of a plea
of prescription of ten years acquirendi causa 77 by the defendant
in a petitory action would not prevent a dismissal of the suit by
the plaintiff at any time before judgment was rendered, 78 but
that a discontinuance under those circumstances would not affect
the right of the defendant to proceed with the prosecution of his
plea to a final judgment thereon. In arriving at this conclusion
the court assimilated the plea of acquisitive prescription to a
79
reconventional demand.
Sheriffs' Sales
In the case of Daniel v. Thigpen"° it was held that a claim
74. Id. at 215.
75. Cf. Art. 329, La.Code of Practice of 1870; Jonau v. Ferrand, 3 Rob.
364 (La. 1842); Lallande v. Ball, 20 La. Ann. 193 (1868); Schneider & Zuberbier v. N. Dreyfous, 21 La. Ann. 271 (1869); Bayly & Pond v. Stacey & Poland,
30 La. Ann. 1210 (1878).
76. 195 La. 378, 196 So. 657 (1940). Cf. Note (1941) 3 LOUISANA LAW RE:VIEW 457.
77. Art. 3478, La. Civil Code of 1870.
78. The right of a plaintiff to discontinue his suit previous to judgment
being rendered upon payment of costs incurred is absolute. Cf. Art. 419, La.
Code of Practice; Rives v. Starcke, 195 La. 378, 196 So. 657 (1940), noted in
(1941) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 457.
79. The rule is well settled that a demand in reconvention cannot prevent
the dismissal of the suit by the plaintiff at any time before a judgment is
rendered but the discontinuance under those circumstances does not prevent
the defendant from proceeding with the prosecution of his demand in reconvention to a final judgment. Cf. Rives v. Starcke, 195 La. 378, 196 So. 657
(1940) and authorities therein cited, noted in (1941) 3 LoUIsiANA LAW REVIsW
457.
80. 194 La. 522, 194 So. 6 (1940)
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of a homestead exemption81 does not entitle the claimant to prevent a sheriff's sale but only gives him the right to require that
the property be not sold unless it brings more than the exemption, in which event he may claim the amount of the exemption.
In Mercantile National Bank of Dallas v. J. Thos. Driscoll,
Inc.8" the court stated the well settled rule that a valid sheriff's
sale cannot be made unless the bid is sufficient to discharge all
special privileges existing on the property which primed the
claim of the seizing creditor.8 3 In this case the property was adjudicated for a price sufficient to discharge all superior privileges.
Therefore, the validity of the sale was upheld.
In Hite v. Charbonnet84 the intervenor, claiming ownership
of a certain property by virtue of an adjudication at a previous
sheriff's sale, was allowed to enjoin a foreclosure proceeding over
the objection that he exhibited no formal deed thereto. The court
held that the previous adjudication had, of itself, the effect of
transferring to the purchaser all the rights of the party in whose
8 5
hands it was seized.
Continental Securities Corporationv. Wetherbee 6 was a suit
for the partition of property. The district court rendered a judgment ordering a partition by licitation. After the judgment of
the lower court had become executory (no suspensive appeal
having been taken within the time prescribed by law) the property was advertised and sold to the Lodwick Lumber Company,
a third person. Subsequent to the sale the defendant perfected
a devolutive appeal and the judgment of the lower court was
reversed. The defendant then filed a suit" against the purchaser
to have the partition sale declared a nullity and set aside. In
rendering a judgment for the defendant holding the title acquired
by it at the sale to be valid the court applied the established rule
that "when the appeal does not stay execution, the reversal of
a judgment in the appellate court does not avoid the sale made
under an execution issuing from the inferior court in virtue of
81. Cf. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XI, § 1.
82. 194 La. 935, 195 So. 497 (1940).

83. Cf. Art. 684, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Pasley v. McConnell, 38 La.
Ann. 470 (1886); Robinson-Slagle Lumber Co. v. Rudy, 156 La. 174, 100 So. 296
(1924).
84. 193 La. 581, 192 So. 64 (1939).
85. Cf. Arts. 690, 695, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Frierson v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 174 La. 1037, 142 So. 256 (1932); Heath v. Suburban Building
& Loan Ass'n, 163 So. 546 (La. App. 1935).
86. 187 La. 773, 175 So. 571 (1937).
87. Wetherbee v. Lodwick Lumber Co., 194 La. 352, 193 So. 671 (1940).
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the judgment."8 " The rule was held applicable to all judicial sales,
including sales made to effect a partition of real estate by licitation. The right of the defendant in the original suit and plaintiff in the second suit to an accounting from the plaintiff in the
original suit and defendant in the second suit was properly recognized and reserved.
Trial
Article 546 of the Code of Practice provides that all final
judgments must be signed by the judge, "but he shall not do so
until three judicial days have elapsed" after rendition.", In the
Succession of Lissa 0 the contention was made that a judgment
signed before the lapse of the three days was an absolute nullity,
but the court overruled the argument, stating:
"A judgment prematurely signed is not invalid. It is only ineffective until three judicial days have expired, or until a
new trial has been denied if one has been applied for subsequent to the signing of the judgment but within three days
after it was rendered. [citing cases]."' )"
Appeals and Appellate Jurisdiction and Procedure
In two decisions92 the supreme court properly held that it
had no jurisdiction ratione materiae of an appeal where the
amount in dispute, exclusive of interest, did not exceed two thousand dollars.98 The court refused to dismiss the appeals and
88. 194 La. at 370, 193 So. at 677. Accord: Citizens' Bank of Columbia v.
Bellamy Lumber Co., 140 La. 497, 73 So. 308 (1916).
89. Art. 546, La. Code of Practice of 1870. The last portion of the article
provides that except in the Parish of Orleans, all final judgments shall be
signed "before the adjournment of the court, for the term at which such
cases were tried, and whether three judicial days shall have elapsed or not."
90. 194 La. 328, 193 So. 663 (1940).
91. 194 La. at 334, 193 So. at 665.
92. Buras v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 195 La. 244, 196 So. 335
(1940); Vogt v. Jannaralli, 195 La. 277, 196 So. 346 (1940).
93. Cf. La. Const. of 1921, Art. 7, § 10. The Vogt case [195 La. 277, 196 So.
346 (1940)] was a joint suit by the husband and wife to recover damages sustained by each as a result of the defendant's tort. The amount claimed by
each was less than the minimum amount required to confer appellate jurisdiction on the supreme court but the aggregate amount of both exceeded
the requirement. The decision is in accord with the well settled rule that several plaintiffs, having separate and distinct claims, each for a sum below the
appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, cannot by cumulating their demands in one suit, give that court jurisdiction. Cf. Alesi v. Town of Independence, 142 La. 338, 76 So. 792 (1917); Hotard v. Perilloux, 160 La. 752, 107
So. 515 (1926); Shreveport Laundries v. Red Iron Drilling Co., 192 So. 895
(La. App. 1939); Lopez v. Bertel, 198 So. 185 (La. App. 1940). But where the
claims are not separate and distinct and recovery on one is dependent upon
recovery on the other the appellate jurisdiction is determined by the total
sum of both demands. Cf. LaGroue v. City of New Orleans, 114 La. 253, 38
So. 160 (1905).
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transferred both cases to the proper court of appeal in accordance with the provisions of Act 19 of 1912.94
The right to appeal from an interlocutory decree is a constantly recurring question. Article 56695 of the Code of Practice
authorizes an appeal from such orders only when they may
cause an irreparable injury. The mere statement of the rule
shows that each case must necessarily be determined from the
facts of the particular controversy before the court. In re Byrne 8
evidenced an application for the issuance of supervisory writs to
compel the lower court to grant a suspensive appeal from an
ex parte order appointing an attorney to institute suit to remove
the applicant from the office of district attorney. In denying the
writs the court held that, even if the order complained of was
an interlocutory decree 97 (a concession about which it had serious doubt since the order complained of was rendered prior to
the institution of any suit), nevertheless, there was no right to
a suspensive appeal therefrom because the order complained of
could not cause an irreparable injury" to the applicant, who
would be given ample opportunity to raise the complaints he
made when the suit is filed to remove him. In the case of Hollingsworth v. Caldwell9 the court allowed a suspensive appeal from
an interlocutory decree which reversed a previous judgment
under which certain property had been sold to the appellant and
ordered the property readvertised and sold again. The reason for
granting the appeal was that a resale of the property might
place it in the hands of another person from whom it could not
be wrested in the event the judgment was eventually reversed.'
The court said:
"... to entitle a party to an appeal from an interlocutory
judgment, it is unnecessary that the injury be absolutely
irreparable. It suffices that it may become irreparable by
94. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1427-1428. Cf. Baker v. Duson, 192 La. 391, 188
So. 40 (1939); Bacher v. Krauss, 179 La. 675, 154 So. 733 (1934).
95. Art. 566, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
96. 193 La. 566, 191 So. 729 (1939).

97. Cf. Art. 538, La. Code of Practice of 1870, which reads: "Interlocutory
judgments do not decide on the merits; they are pronounced on preliminary
matters, in the course of the proceedings." (Italics supplied.)
98. Cf. Art. 566, La. Code of Practice of 1870, which reads: "One may likewise appeal from all interlocutory judgments, where such judgments may
cause him an irreparable injury." (Italics supplied.)
99. 193 La. 638, 192 So. 83 (1939).

100. Cf. Citizens' Bank of Columbia v. Bellamy Lumber Co., 140 La. 497,
73 So. 308 (1916); Wetherbee v. Lodwick Lumber Co., 194 La. 352, 193 So. 671
(1940).
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the final judgment or action of the Supreme Court on the
judgment."'' 1
The question of who has a right to appeal from a final judgment was raised in two cases. In the Succession of Lissa 0 2 the
court held that an ex parte judgment placing the heirs in possession of the estate of the deceased was not merely an interlocutory decree but was a final judgment which could be appealed from by any party having an actual interest therein, and
that one alleging herself to be an heir but excluded from the
judgment had an appealable interest.103 In the Succession of
Burg'04 the court held that the Recorder of Mortgages for the
Parish of Orleans, having been made a party defendant in a
rule to cancel certain mortgages from the records of his office
is entitled to appeal from the judgment ordering cancellation
as a matter of right."5
The question of what constitutes voluntary execution of a
judgment so as to defeat the right to appeal was raised in two
cases. Road District No. 1 of Jackson Parish v. Fidelity & Deposit
Company of Maryland0 6 was a suit to recover a solidary judgment against the principal and surety on a surety bond. The
court denied a motion to dismiss the appeal of the surety company which was predicated on the fact that the principal had
acquiesced in the correctness of the judgment of the lower court
and had voluntarily executed same'0 7 and that, therefore, the
judgment having become final as to the principal it was final
as to his surety. Obviously, the acquiescence of one of the solidary
obligors in the correctness of the judgment of the lower court
cannot defeat the right of appeal of the remaining obligors. 108
101. 193 La. 638, 644, 192 So. 83, 85 (1939).
102. 194 La. 328, 193 So. 663 (1940).
103. Cf. Art. 571, La. Code of Practice of 1870, granting the right of appeal to parties aggrieved by the judgment but not a party to the suit.
104. 194 La. 985, 195 So. 513 (1940).
105. By way of dictum the court affirmed the well settled rule that the
recorder of mortgages is a necessary party in a proceeding to compel the
cancellation of mortgages or other incumbrances. Cf. Cappel v. Hundley, 168
La. 15, 121 So. 176 (1929), and authorities cited therein.
106. 197 So. 252 (La. 1940).
107. Cf. Art. 567, La. Code of Practice of 1870, which provides that a
party cannot appeal from a judgment when he has acquiesced by voluntarily
executing It. Succession of Landeman, 142 La. 253, 76 So. 704 (1917). But the
acquiescence must be clear and unequivocal. Cf. Breaux v. Sarvoie, 39 La.
Ann. 243, 1 So. 614 (1887); Saunders v. Busch-Everett Co., 138 La. 1049, 71
So. 153 (1916); Augustin v. Farnsworth, 155 La. 1053, 99 So. 868 (1924).
108. Cf. Parks v. Hall, 182 So. 347 (La. App. 1938). The obligations of a
surety on the type of bond Involved in the noted case must be distinguished
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01 the
In State ex tel. Mancuso v. Jefferson Parish School Board0
court held that the reinstatement of a teacher pursuant to a
judgment of the lower court was not a voluntary acquiescence
therein so as to require the dismissal of a devolutive appeal 10
since the fact that a final judgment had been rendered was discovered too late to take a suspensive appeal and a refusal to
comply with the judgment would subject plaintiff to a penalty
for contempt of court."' The court again reaffirmed the rule
that in order that there be an abandonment of the right to an
appeal there must be an unconditional, voluntary and absolute
acquiescence in the judgment on the part of the appellant."12
Several cases presented questions of procedure in taking an
appeal. In Hollingsworth v. Caldwell'" the motion to dismiss,
predicated upon the fact that appellees had not been made
parties to the appeal, was summarily overruled upon a showing
that the appeal was taken in open court at the same term of
court in which the judgment appealed from was rendered; consequently, no citation of appellees was necessary. 1 4 In Buillard
v. Davis" 5 the court reaffirmed the rule that where an order
for a devolutive appeal is obtained but the appeal is not perfected by furnishing bond, the litigant may at any time within
the period allowed for taking an appeal obtain another order for
a devolutive appeal and perfect the same by furnishing bond.
In three cases"" the supreme court reaffirmed two well established rules, viz.: first, that an appeal taken after the rendition
of the judgment but prior to the signing of a formal judgment
must be dismissed either on a motion to dismiss or ex proprio
from those in a release or forthcoming bond. Cf. Art. 259, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Fusz v. Trager, 39 La. Ann. 292, 1 So. 535 (1887); Albert Pick
& Co. v. Dickinsons, 154 La. 1067, 98 So. 669 (1924).
109. 197 So. 509 (La. 1940).
110. Cf. Art. 567, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
111. The decision in the noted case is in accord with the rule that the
payment of a judgment under protest to prevent execution thereon or after
the issuance of a fleri facias in execution thereof does not prevent the party
from subsequently obtaining and prosecuting a devolutive appeal. Johnson v.
Clark & Meader, 29 La. Ann. 762 (1877); Verges v. Gonzales, 33 La. Ann. 410
(1881); Louisiana Land & Immigration Co. v. Murff, 139 La. 808, 72 So. 284
(1916); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Becker, 11 La. App. 195, 123 So. 193
(1929).
112. Cf. authorities cited supra note 107.
113. 193 La. 638, 192 So. 83 (1939).
114. Cf. Art. 573, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Gardiner v. Erskine, 170
La. 212, 127 So. 604 (1930), and authorities therein cited.
115. 197 So. 273 (La. 1940).
116. Hollingsworth v. Caldwell, 193 La. 638, 192 So. 83 (1939); Greene v.
Baynard, 194 La. 409, 193 So. 690 (1940). Cf. Note (1940) 14 Tulane L. Rev.
627; Succession of Savoie, 195 La. 433, 196 So. 923 (1940).
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motu; and, second, that an illegal order of appeal, even though
followed by the execution of an appeal bond in accordance therewith, does not divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the
matter and that it may disregard the illegal order and cure
117
the deficiencies thereof by granting a new order of appeal.
In the case of Dreher v. Guaranty Bond & Finance Company"" the court held that the responsibility of filing the transcript of appeal in the supreme court within the time allowed
by law rests upon the appellant,119 but where the appellant shows
that the transcript was delivered to the clerk within the time
allowed by law, together with the filing fee, the appeal will not
be dismissed because the filing was not endorsed thereon until
after the expiration of the time allowed. 120 In receiving evidence

in the form of affidavits to prove this fact, the court was acting
pursuant to its constitutional grant of original jurisdiction to
receive evidence "for the determination of questions affecting
its appellate jurisdiction in any case pending before it.'

21

Act 112 of 1916122 provides that any party desiring to question the sufficiency or correctness of any bond or surety furnished in connection with any judicial proceeding must serve
117. In the Succession of Savoie, 195 La. 433, 196 So. 923 (1940), the second rule was recognized by way of dictum.
118. 193 La. 757, 192 So. 246 (1940).
119. Cf. Arts. 883, 884, La. Code of Practice of 1870. The noted case states
the well settled rule applicable to the supreme court. Kirkland v. Edenborn,
140 La. 669, 73 So. 719 (1917); Cann v. Ruston State Bank, 155 La. 283, 99 So.
221 (1924); Williams v. Leyland Line S. S. Co., 167 La. 473, 119 So. 431 (1929);
Lewis v. Burglass, 186 La. 36, 171 So. 564 (1936). On appeal to the Orleans
Court of Appeal the duty devolves upon the appellant to see that the record
is lodged in the court. Cf. Rule 2, Rules of the Court of Appeal, Parish of
Orleans; Lewis v. Burglass, 166 So. 649 (La. App. 1936); Gazzo v. Bisso Ferry
Co., 174 So. 132 (La. App. 1937). On appeal to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, the responsibility is on the appellant to see that the record is filed in
the appellate court. Cf. Rule 3, Rules of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit,
11 La. App. 769 (1929); Kinchen v. Royal Exchange Assurance, 124 So. 844
(La. App. 1929); Wiggins v. Texas & N.O. R.R., 135 So. 265 (La. App. 1931);
Mansaur v. Anding, 171 So. 187 (La. App. 1936); Sanders v. Wyatt, 171 So. 431
(La. App. 1936). Contra: Vinyard v. Stassi, 152 So. 161 (La. App. 1934),
wherein the court relies upon La. Act 32 of 1910, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 1333] and La. Act. 89 of 1914, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1446]. The last mentioned decision was explained and disregarded in the Mansaur and Sanders
cases, supra. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, the duty of
lodging the record in the appellate court devolves upon the clerk of the trial
court. Cf. Rule 2, Rules and Orders of the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit;
Stockbridge v. Martin, 162 La. 601, 110 So. 828 (1926); Twin City Motor Co.,
Inc. v. Pettit, 177 So. 814 (La. App. 1937); Bolton v. Eznack, 187 So. 840 (La.
App. 1939); Wilson v. Lee, 196 So. 373 (La. App. 1940).
120. Cf. Sanders v. Wyatt, 187 La. 80, 174 So. 161 (1937).
121. Cf. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
122. La. Act 112 of 1916 as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1921-1930].
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notice of his complaint on the adverse party who shall be given
an opportunity to furnish a new or additional bond or surety
conditioned according to law. In the Succession of Lissa 128 the
court refused to dismiss an appeal on the grounds of the insufficiency of the appeal bond because there was no showing that the
appellant had been notified of this fact and given an opportunity to correct the alleged defect.
The court disposed of several issues raised in the case of
Folse v. Dale124 by the application of well settled principles of
law. This was an action for the nullity of the judicial sale of a
judgment for the sum of $3,500 and for recognition of plaintiff's
right thereto. There was judgment in the lower court as prayed
for and the defendants were granted a suspensive appeal. The
district judge fixed the appeal bond at three hundred dollars.
After receiving two extensions the return date was fixed as November 16, 1939, and the transcript was filed on November 15.
On Monday, November 20, the appellee filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal predicated on the ground that bond in the sum of
three hundred dollars as fixed by the lower court was not in
accordance with the provisions of Article 575 of the Code of
Practice which requires a bond for one and one-half the amount
of the judgment appealed from, the appellee's contention being
that the judgment in this case was for $3,500. Appellants objected to a consideration of this motion on the ground that it was
filed too late, having been filed on the fourth day after the
return date. In disposing of the last mentioned objection the
court recognized the well settled rule that a motion to dismiss
an appeal for irregularities not relating to the appellant's right
to appeal must be filed within three days after the return date
and that this delay is not affected by the filing of the transcript
in the appellate court before the return date. Although this
motion was filed on the fourth day after the return date, the
court held that it was timely filed since the third day was a
legal holiday; consequently, appellee had all the following day
in which to file the motion. In overruling the motion to dismiss
the appeal, the court held that the judgment rendered by the
lower court was not for a specific sum and repeated the rule
that in such cases Article 575125 of the Code of Practice has no

application and that it is the duty of the judge to fix the amount
of the suspensive appeal bond.
123. 194 La. 328, 193 So. 663 (1940).
124. 194 La. 180, 193 So. 581 (1940).
125. Art. 575, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
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In the case of In re Clover Ridge Planting & Manufacturing
Company

16

the surety on an appeal bond sought to escape lia-

bility on the ground that the order granting the suspensive appeal was invalid since the judge did not fix the amount of the
bond. The order granted the appeal to the defendant "upon said
party furnishing bond with good and solvent security, according
to law." The court applied the rule that where a judgment is
for a specific sum of money the law fixes the amount of the
suspensive appeal bond at one and one-half times the amount
of the judgment and overruled the arguments advanced by the
surety. The appeal bond actually furnished by the appellant
was for a sum less than that prescribed by the law. This was
urged as an additional ground for escape from liability thereon.
The court stated that there was no prohibition against the parties
agreeing to a bond for a lesser amount than the law prescribed.
This, in effect, was what the appellee had done by failing to
make timely objection to the sufficiency of the bond. Under such
circumstances the liability of the surety was properly limited
to the amount of the bond actually given.
In Monsour v. City of Shreveport' 27 the court refused to
consider a motion to dismiss the appeal which was filed after
the case was argued and submitted.
The question of the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the
supreme court was raised in several of the adjudicated cases.
In sustaining a motion to dismiss an appeal in the case of Batts
v. Marthaville Mercantile Company"8 the court stated that there
is no right to appeal either to the supreme court or to the court
of appeal from a judgment rendered by the lower court where
the amount in dispute is less than one hundred dollars, unless
the case comes within one of the recognized exceptions.' 29 The
126. 194 La. 77, 193 So. 468 (1940).
127. 194 La. 625, 194 So. 569 (1940).
128. 193 La. 1072, 192 So. 721 (1939).
129. Cf. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10 (5), conferring appellate jurisdiction in all cases, whatever may be the amount involved: first, "where the
constitutionality or legality of any tax, local improvement assessment, toll or
impost levied by the State, or by any parish, municipality, board, or subdivision of the State is contested"; second, "where the legality, or constitutionality of any fine, forfeiture, or penalty imposed by a parish, municipal
corporation, board or subdivision of the State shall be in contest"; third,
"wherein an ordinance of a parish, municipal corporation, board or subdivision of the State, or a law of this State has been declared unconstitutional";
and fourth, "all cases involving homestead exemptions irrespective of the
amount involved . . .; except that in cases involving only movable property,
the appeal shall lie to the court having jurisdiction of the amount of the
value of the property involved."
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attempt to maintain the jurisdiction of the court on the ground
that the case came within two of the recognized exceptions was
summarily overruled with the statement that those issues were
not raised or passed upon in the lower court and the record
did not support them. Article 7, Section 10, of the Louisiana
Constitution 130 confers appellate jurisdiction on the supreme court
in all cases "wherein . . .legality of any tax ... levied by the
State . . .is contested ...
The case of State ex rel. Cooper

v. Pape12 was a suit to collect a "use tax"133 on an automobile
owned by the defendant. The defense interposed was that the
defendant's use of the automobile did not subject her to the
provisions of the Louisiana law. The appellate jurisdiction of
the supreme court was questioned on the ground that the
amount involved was less than two thousand dollars, but the
court held that "'where judicial interpretation of a tax statute
is necessary to determine whether or not the tax demanded is
imposed by law, the question of legality vel non of the tax is
raised,' 1'4 and the appeal must be to the supreme court regardless of the amount involved.' 3
The extent of the relief which the appellee may secure by
an answer to the appeal was involved in several cases. In City
of Shreveport v. Kahn 3 6 the appellants objected to a review of
that portion of the judgment of the lower court which was
adverse to the appellees on the ground that the appellees, not
having appealed, cannot have the judgment disturbed or modified by merely filing an answer to the appeal which was taken
only from that portion of the judgment which was adverse to
the appellant. In overruling this objection the court held that
an appeal brings up the entire judgment and the appellee may
secure a re-examination of any portion thereof which adversely
affects him by answering the appeal. 3 ' In Buillard v. Davis3 8
130. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
131. La Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10 (5).
132. 194 La. 890, 195 So. 346 (1940).
133. La. Act 2 of 1938, §§ 2, 3, 9 (a), (c) [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8648.5,
8648.6, 8648.12 (a), (c)].
134. 194 La. 890, 897, 195 So. 346, 349 (1940).
135. Accord: State ex rel. Grosjean v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 182
La. 577, 162 So. 185 (1935).
136. 194 La. 55, 193 So. 461 (1939).
137. The rule as stated in the case is too broad. The right of an appellee
to ask for a change in the judgment by answering the appeal, and without
appealing himself, is limited to those modifications that affect only the appellant, and does not authorize any change in the judgment as between the
co-appellees. Fields v. His Creditors, 11 La. Ann. 545 (1856); Hottinger v.
Hottinger, 49 La. Ann. 1633, 22 So. 847 (1897).
138. 197 So. 273 (La. 1940).
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it was held that a defendant who had obtained an order of
appeal but failed to perfect same did not thereby waive his right
to answer his adversary's appeal. In Blakewood v. Town of Frank2
linton"
I the court held that the failure of the appellee to answer
an appeal was an admission that it owed the appellant the
amount of the judgment rendered by the lower court even
though the answer denied owing any amount. In Cox v. First
National Bank of Arcadia 10 the court held that the judgment
of the lower court insofar as it was in favor of plaintiff was final
as to the defendant who neither appealed nor answered the
appeal perfected by the plaintiff.
In Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. Reese' the court
again invoked the rule that it could not consider an issue raised
for the first time in the appellate court when it was "neither
'1 42
pleaded, presented to, nor passed upon by the lower court.'

In the Succession of Lissa'43 the appellee filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal because the record as brought up did not
present the matter to the court so that it could pass on the
merits of the case. The court applied the well settled rule that
the merits of a case cannot be passed upon on a motion to dismiss the appeal and overruled the motion.
The supreme court in the case of Alexander v. Jackson144
refused to remand a case, in advance of a hearing on the merits
for the purpose of receiving further evidence stating that it
should first be given an opportunity to determine whether it
could pronounce definitely on the cause in the state in which
it was.14 5 In Sunseri v. Cassagne40 the court refused to remand
the case to the lower court for the purpose of receiving evidence
to impeach the opposing litigant's witnesses on the ground that
the testimony was cumulative only and should have been offered
on the trial of the case on the previous remand to the lower
court for the same purpose. Nor will the appellate court remand
the case for the reception of evidence which could only remotely
affect the judgment."4 However, in Townley v. Pomes48 the court
139. 195 La. 391, 196 So. 909 (1940).
140. 197 So. 616 (La. 1940).
141. 195 La. 359, 196 So. 558 (1940).
142. 196 So. at 563.
143. 194 La. 328, 193 So. 663 (1940).
144. 197 So. 137 (La. 1940).
145. Cf. Art. 906, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Accord: Louisiana Ice
Mfg. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 217, 9 So. 21 (1891).
146. 195 La. 19, 196 So. 7 (1940).
147. City of. Shreveport v. Kahn, 194 La. 55, 193 So. 461 (1939).
148. 194 La. 730, 194 So. 763 (1940).
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remanded the case to the lower court for the reception of additional evidence to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Although
the appellant had a trial of the case on its merits and an opportunity to present his evidence in the lower court, nevertheless,
the omission was found to be the result of the irregular method
adopted by the district court in disposing of the case and not
because of any fault on the part of the litigant.
In the case of State ex rel. Wogan v. Clements149 the rules
of the court 50 were adhered to and the litigants were denied
the privilege of presenting oral arguments in a case coming before the court on a writ of certiorari even though both parties
had assented thereto on the ground that the case involved matters
of vital interest to the public.
Rhodes v. Sinclair Refining Company"' applied the well settled rule that where there is an irreconcilable conflict in the testimony on a factual question the appellate court will not reverse
the judgment of the trial court, if the evidence of the successful
party when considered by itself is sufficient to sustain the judgment. The court in the case of Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Polmer' 52 stated and applied the rule that "an appellate
court should not amend an award made by a jury of freeholders
in a condemnation suit unless the verdict is based upon a palpable
error, such as error of calculation, or is so obviously inadequate
or excessive as to be suggestive of favoritism."'" 3
Paragraph 5 of Rule X of the Court of Appeal of the Parish
of Orleans provides that:
"Only one rehearing shall be granted unless some question has been decided, on the rehearing granted, which had
not before been considered and the court has reserved the
right to make another application." 1 4
In the case of Dumaine & Company v. Gay, Sullivan & Company" 5 the court of appeal on the original hearing rendered a
judgment sustaining the exception of no right of action and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On rehearing that court rendered a
second judgment annulling its previous judgment and affirm149. 194 La. 812, 195 So. 1 (1940). Separate concurring opinions by Higg'ins, J., Fournet, J., Ponder, J.
150. Rules of Supreme Court of Louisiana, Rule XI, § 4, 191 La. xliv.
151. 197 So. 575 (La. 1940).
152. 197 So. 247 (La. 1940).
153. Id. at 248.
154. Rules of the Court of Appeal, Parish of Orleans, Rule X, par. 5.
155. 194 La. 777, 194 So. 779 (1940).
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ing a judgment of the district court for the plaintiffs, without
reserving to the defendant the right to ask for a rehearing.
A motion filed by the defendants in the court of appeal asking
for an amendment to the second judgment so as to reserve it
the right to apply for a rehearing was overruled. The defendant secured a review of this last mentioned ruling by the supreme
court. The court held that since the judgment rendered on the
original hearing was on the exception and on the rehearing on
the merits, a wholly different ground from that on which the
first judgment was rendered, the party dissatisfied with the
second judgment was entitled to a rehearing as a matter of right
and without the necessity of obtaining an amendment of the
judgment reserving that right. In arriving at this conclusion the
court construed the above quoted rule of court to mean that
only one rehearing shall be granted to each party to a suit and
has no application where the request "for a rehearing is made
by a party dissatisfied with the judgment on rehearing because
the judgment has reversed or materially changed to his prejudice
the judgment rendered on the original hearing."15
Supervisory Jurisdiction and Procedure
In two cases 15 the supreme court dismissed applications for
the issuance of supervisory writs upon a showing that the questions presented had become moot, thus leaving nothing for consideration.
In Long v. Martin-8 the supreme court stated the general
rule that it would not exercise its general supervisory jurisdiction"" over the lower courts until the litigants have exhausted
their remedies in those courts unless the exigencies of the case
demanded it.160 The controversy involved an election contest and
finding time of the essence under the facts of this case (the matter
had to be finally adjudicated within a relatively short period of
thirteen days in order to be able to hold the scheduled election),
the court, by the exercise of its supervisory powers, required the
156. 194 La. at 783-784, 194 So. at 781.
157. State v. Hingle, 194 La. 1096, 195 So. 615 (1940); State ex rel. Perez
v. Meraux, 194 La. 1099, 195 So. 616 (1940).
158. 194 La. 797, 194 So. 896 (1940). Cf. also Long v. Looney, 194 La. 811,
194 So. 900 (1940) to the same effect.
159. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10, which reads: "The Supreme Court

shall have control of, and general supervision over all inferior courts. ..."
160. Cf. Dugas & LeBlanc, Ltd. v. Port Barre Timber & Tie Co., 144 La.

71, 80 So. 203 (1918); Keiffe v. LaSalle Realty Co., 163 La. 824, 112 So. 79R,
53 A.L.R. 82 (1927).
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entire proceedings to be brought up before any hearing could
be had in the lower court and entered judgment on the merits.
Although the reasons advanced by the court probably justified
the procedure followed in this case, it is believed that the extraordinary powers should not be exercised in the manner evidenced
by this case except in instances of extreme necessity.
Costs
The supreme court in the case of Collins v. Collins"6 ' dismissed a suit filed by the wife for separation from bed and
board because of reconciliation of the parties after the date the
suit was filed, but, acting pursuant to the provision of Louisiana
Act 229 of 1910,16" assessed the costs of court against the matri-

monial community on the ground that "It was the husband's
fault that provoked the bringing of the suit, and it is as much
to his credit as to the wife's that the suit is ended by the reconciliation of the parties.'

1 63

In McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corporation'64 it was held
that in order for a party assessed with costs of court which included expert fees to be entitled to a cancellation of the judgment he must pay the fees of the expert witnesses as well as
the costs incurred by the litigant in whose favor the judgment
for costs was rendered.
VII. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Venue
The ancient riddle of venue in criminal trials has been a
persistent headache to courts and prosecutors during the past
year. The latest teasers, for the most part, were raised by defendants in the recent wave of prosecutions for political crimes.
On eight separate occasions skillful defense counsel attempted
to pass the ball from parish to parish,' and in four instances they
were successful.
161. 194 La. 446, 193 So. 702 (1940).
162. La. Act 229 of 1910, § 2, provides "all appellate courts of this state
shall have the power to tax the costs of the lower or appellate court, or any
part thereof, against any party to the suit, as in its judgment may be deemed equitable."
163. 194 La. 446, 453, 193 So. 702, 704 (1940).
164. 195 La. 82, 196 So. 28 (1940).
1. State v. Matheny, 194 La. 198, 193 So. 587 (1940); State v. Terzia, 194
La. 583, 194 So. 27 (1940); State v. Todd, 194 La. 595, 194 So. 31 (1940); State
v. Coenen, 194 La. 753, 194 So. 771 (1940); State v. Smith, 194 La. 1015, 195 So.
523 (1940); State v. Hart, 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62 (1940); State v. Weiss, 195 La.
206, 196 So. 69 (1940); State v. Leon C. Weiss, 195 La. 208, 196 So. 70 (1940).
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According to the present constitution of Louisiana, all criminal trials must take place in the parish where the offense was
committed.2 This mandate presents no difficulty so long as the
offense charged was begun, executed, and consummated within
the bounds of a single parish. Unfortunately, however, this desirable situation obtains regularly only for such simple offenses
as crimes of passion, which are usually begun and completed
almost within the instant, or single criminal acts that violate
public decency, health, or tranquillity. Major offenses, including
nefarious schemes to purloin money or property, misuse of the
facilities of communication and transportation, and most of the
other modern and complex variations on the devil's theme are
nomadic by nature. Modern crime has little respect for parish
boundaries and scatters its many component parts throughout
the state's entire jurisdiction. An offense is begun in one parish,
executed in part in several others, and finally consummated at
still a different place. In such cases it is difficult to maintain
seriously that there is some one parish in which the offense was
committed and demand that the place of trial be accordingly
restricted. Yet this is the position which the courts are forced
to adopt by reason of the constitutional restriction on venue.
Accordingly, the judge must put his finger upon some single
part of the crime, which he regards as the "gist" of the offense,
and hold that the venue must be laid in the parish where that
part took place. In determining what is the gist of the crime,
the court attempts, if possible, to ascertain the intention of the
legislature. More often, however, the only recourse available
is to pass into a legalistic trance wherein the gist of the crime
is made manifest by divine revelation.
The recent case of State v. Matheny3 involved a prosecution
under the so-called "dead head" statute, which prohibits any
person's allowing his name to be carried on a pay roll and receiving pay for services not actually rendered. The supreme court
declared that the gist of the offense is the receiving of unearned
pay, and consequently that the defendant must be tried in the
place where he received and cashed his paycheck. In another
case decided during recent months' the indictment was for a
violation of Louisiana Act 123 of 1921,1 commonly known as the
2. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 9.
3. 194 La. 198, 193 So. 587 (1940). See also Bugea, Lazarus, and Pegues,
Louisiana Legislation of 1940 (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 98, 152-154.
4. State v. Terzia, 194 La. 583, 194 So. 27 (1940).
5. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7702. See also Bugea, Lazarus, and Pegues, supra
note 3, at 149-152.
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"double dipping" statute. This act imposes a criminal penalty
on any person who, while holding one public office of profit,
accepts a second office and thereafter either performs any of
the duties or accepts the emoluments of the first office. The
defendant's trial was begun in Morehouse Parish, but a motion
to dismiss for improper venue was sustained. The indictment
charged that the defendant, a state senator, accepted a second
office, and that thereafter he performed the duties of senator and
also received the emoluments of that office. The order of the
lower court was affirmed on appeal. The duties of a state senator
can be performed only in East Baton Rouge Parish where the
state capitol is located. Since the performance of the duties of
the first office is the gist of the offense, the venue could not be
established in Morehouse Parish, the defendant's place of residence. The emoluments of the office were paid by a treasurer's
warrant drawn and delivered in Baton Rouge, but which the
defendant cashed in Morehouse Parish. This, said the court, was
not sufficient to entitle the state to place the defendant on trial
in the latter parish. Two other cases involving indictments under
the same statute and arising on fact situations substantially
like those above set forth were similarly disposed of.6
The case of State v. Hart7 arose on a prosecution for obtaining money or property by means of the confidence game."
This case will be discussed in more detail in the paragraphs that
follow." For present purposes it is sufficient to say that the court
held that the crime of which defendant was accused is similar
to the offense of obtaining property by false pretense, and that
the trial was properly held in the parish where the money or
property was received, even though the scheme or artifice was
concocted and executed elsewhere.1" Assuming that the analogy
to false pretense was proper, the court followed well established
precedents in its conclusion on the matter of venue.
In each of the above instances the court found that the gist
of the offense was the obtaining of money through some prohibited practice. Even though the receipt of the money be
6. State v. Todd, 194 La. 595, 194 So. 31 (1940); State v. Coenen, 194 La.
753, 194 So. 771 (1940).
7. 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62 (1940).
8. La. Act 43 of 1912 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) §§ 946-948].
9. Infra, p. 383.
10. The situation that gave rise to State v. Hart, 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62
(1940), also provided the subject matter for State v. Weiss, 195 La. 206,
196 So. 69 (1940) and State v. Leon C. Weiss, 195 La. 208, 196 So. 70 (1940).
These cases were similarly disposed of.
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regarded as the essence of the crime, the problem still remains:
Where were the ill-gotten gains received? Various perplexing
fact combinations are possible. A check executed by the victim
in parish A is drawn on a bank in parish B. The check is received by the defendant in parish C and deposited for collection
in a bank located in parish D. Finally, it is cleared through correspondent banks in parishes E and F. In such a case jurisdiction
may be forced to make some astounding inter-parish leaps between banks.
In State v. Mathenyll the court was satisfied by the fact that
the defendant received and cashed his checks in Morehouse Parish, although his name was on a public pay roll in Orleans Parish. No point was made of the possibility that the check was
drawn on some bank outside Morehouse Parish. Nor did the facts
of the case require the court to distinguish the place where the
check was received from the place where it was cashed. In fact,
the court employed the terms, "receives and cashes" indiscriminately in the conjunctive, and sometimes substituted "salary,"
"'pay," or "money" for "paycheck."
A refinement, however, was required by the facts of State
v. Terzia.12 There, as we have already pointed out, the warrant
or check was drawn on the state treasury in East Baton Rouge
Parish, and was delivered to defendant at that place. However,
it was cashed in Morehouse Parish. If cashing the check constituted the gist of the offense, the venue was properly laid in
Morehouse. The majority of the court, however, refused to adopt
this position. The opinion states:
"... if the question is raised that the delivery of the warrant
was not in itself the receipt of the emoluments and that the
receipt depends on the actual cashing of said warrant, then
it is the opinion of this Court that it would make no difference as to the location of the various banks or firms through
whose hands the warrants would pass as the actual cashing
would be done after the warrants were returned to the Auditor's office in East Baton Rouge Parish, and a voucher issued
for same, which in turn would be finally cashed by the State
Treasurer. '' 18
From this it would appear that the parish in which the
11. 194 La. 198, 193 So. 587 (1940).
12. 194 La. 583, 194 So. 27 (1940).
13. 194 La. at 586, 194 So. at 28.
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drawee bank is situated constitutes the proper place for venue.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Odom urged that venue should
lie in the parish where the check was cashed. In support of his
view, he cited the earlier case of State v. Roy 14 wherein the
court had said unequivocally that the place of the drawee bank is
not the proper place of venue for the crime of obtaining money
by false pretense. The Roy case was ignored in the majority
opinion. One difference exists, however, between the facts of
the Roy and the Terzia cases; in the former case the defendant
both received and cashed the check in a single parish, while in
the Terzia case the check was received in the parish of the
drawee and cashed in a different parish. If this distinction was
of importance to the majority, it did not appear in the opinion.
The same problem recurred with variations in the case of
State v. Hart.15 The indictment charged that the defendant
Hart and several others obtained money from the Louisiana
Polytechnic Institute located in Lincoln Parish, by means of
falsifying a contract for the construction of a building on the
campus of the Institute. It charged that Leon Weiss and others
of the defendants were employed by the Institute as architects
to supervise the construction work, advertise for bids, prepare
the contract, and certify the work done for the purpose of authorizing payment of the contractor. The architects received the
bids, and the contract was awarded to Hart's firm. In preparing
the contract, the architects, with the aid and assistance of Hart,
fraudulently raised the contract price from $264,000,16 the amount
of Hart's bid, to $291,000-an increase of $27,000. The contract
provided that payment should be made in installments as the
work progressed. The first payments, totalling $260,000 (about
82 per cent of the contract price), were made by checks drawn
by the Institute on a Lincoln Parish bank. These were delivered
to Hart in Lincoln, but were cashed outside that parish. The
balance of the contract price was paid by means of checks drawn
on a Lincoln Parish bank, but presumably delivered outside that
parish and deposited by Hart to his credit in a bank situated in
Vermilion Parish. The indictment was brought in Lincoln. The
defendant's ingenious argument was to the effect that no part
of the $27,000, which constituted the proceeds of the confidence
game, was received by the defendant until the total amount of
14. 155 La. 238, 99 So. 205 (1924).
15. 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62 (1940).
16. All figures employed in the text are round numbers.
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the payments made exceeded the sum of $264,000 (the amount
to which Hart would have been entitled if there had been no
unlawful deviation from the amount of the bid). From this the
defendant concluded that venue was improperly laid in Lincoln, since the state admittedly could not prove that the checks
representing payment in excess of $264,000 were either delivered
or cashed in that parish. The court's answer to this contention
was two-fold. In the first place, each payment accepted by Hart
included a proportionate part of the $27,000 loot. Thus 82 per
cent of the proceeds of the confidence game was represented
by checks drawn on a Lincoln Parish bank and delivered in
that parish. As to this proportion of the money fraudulently
obtained, the court had no difficulty in holding consistently with
State v. Terzia that the place of delivery, which was also the
place where the drawee bank was situated, was the proper
place of venue.
The court might well have rested at this point. If a part of
the proceeds of the scheme was received in Lincoln Parish,
venue in that place would not be defeated by the fact that additional sums were delivered elsewhere. Judicial discretion might
have been the better part of valor; particularly is this true in
view of the fact that in the opinion the court chose to distinguish
the Roy case.
"In that case," said the court, "nothing whatever was done
by the defendant in Rapides parish, and no money or thing of
value was received by him in Rapides parish. ' 17 This statement

appears to confirm the suggestion already advanced-that venue
lies in the parish of the drawee bank only if this parish is likewise the one in which the receipt of the check by defendant took
place.
The court, however, was not satisfied to rest its judgment
solely on the ground above set forth. It held that all payments,
including thbse represented by checks which were both delivered
and cashed outside Lincoln Parish, were equally made in that
parish. The crime was not completed, said the court, until the
checks cashed outside the parish of Lincoln were paid by the
drawee bank within the parish. By so holding the court departed
from the only plausible point of distinction between the case before it and the Roy case. Had this additional and probably unnecessary step not been taken, it would have been possible to
17. State v. Hart, 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62, 67 (1940).
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formulate a fairly definite rule for establishing venue in criminal cases where the receipt of money was the essence of the
offense and the medium of making payment was the ordinary
commercial check. It might well have been established that the
trial must take place in the parish where the drawee bank is
situated if delivery also was effected in that parish. If, however,
the check was both accepted and cashed in some parish other
than that of the drawee bank, the trial must be held where the
check was accepted and cashed. As the jurisprudence now stands,
any effort to reconcile the cases appears almost futile.
If the case of State v. Roy can be ignored and State v.
Matheny can be disregarded because the point of contention was
not there considered, we may timidly hazard the opinion that in
all cases venue can be established in the parish where the drawee
bank is located. Certainly the latter part of the opinion in State
v. Hart goes to this extreme, and support for the same position
can possibly be spelled out in State v. Terzia.
The case of State v. Smith 8 must be regarded as sui generis
on the venue problem. The indictment was framed in an effort
to spell out the crime of embezzlement-an offense to which the
facts were not particularly well adapted. Consequently the court's
effort to determine the question of venue by resorting to the
traditional embezzlement theories and cases fell sorrowfully short
of the mark. It appears from the facts that Smith, while president of Louisiana State University, was empowered to draw
University funds on deposit. With a felonious intent he drew
$75,000 against the University's account in a Baton Rouge bank
by means of a check payable to the National Equipment Company. This check was delivered to Monte E. Hart in Baton Rouge.
Hart took the check to New Orleans where he presented it to a
bank, received $25,000 in cash, and deposited the balance to the
credit of the payee. The proceeds were then divided among Smith
and his fellow conspirators at various places, all of which presumably were outside East Baton Rouge Parish. The prosecution
for embezzlement was begun in Orleans Parish, where the trial
court overruled the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction. The case
was appealed to the supreme court upon a writ of certiorari. The
court reversed the holding of the trial judge.
The conclusion that the trial could be held only in East Baton
Rouge Parish was supported along several different lines. Vir18. 194 La. 1015, 195 So. 523 (1940).
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tually all the conflicting theories with respect to venue for embezzlement were brought into play, and fortunately, in the interest of consistency, all the devious roads happened in this case
to lead to Baton Rouge. It was first pointed out that the offense
of embezzlement is complete whenever the defendant, who has
been entrusted with money or property, forms an intent to convert it to his own use, and has possession with such intent.
Later, however, the court held that Smith's offense was not
consummated until the drawee bank in Baton Rouge paid out
the funds on deposit there when the check was presented for
payment, because "the university was never deprived of its
property or its control over the money until the check was paid."19
This raises an interesting question as to who was in possession of
the money prior to the time the check was paid-the university,
or Smith? If the university was in possession, the offense of withdrawing the money with a fraudulent intent can hardly be regarded as embezzlement. On the other hand, if Smith was in
prior possession, the statement quoted above is difficult to understand. The run of mine of embezzlement cases involve the situation wherein a bailee of tangible property violates his obligations and misuses or disposes of the property entrusted to him.
The abuse of a physical possession rightfully acquired is the
traditional theme. Smith obviously possessed nothing unless it
can be said that the power to draw on university funds was
property. Even so, no contention was made that Smith embezzled the power. The university funds in question were an undivided part of the assets of a bank, and subject to the exclusive
control and management of the bank until withdrawn by a
properly executed check.
A presently existing law on the statute books of Louisiana
affords the possibility of a comforting refuge from the troublesome problems of venue in criminal trials. Section 988 of the
Revised Statutes of 1870, which is a reenactment of Section 12
of Act 121 of 1855, reads as follows:
"When any crime or misdemeanor shall be committed on
the boundary of two or more parishes, or within one hundred
yards thereof, or within one hundred yards of any other
boundary, or shall be begun in one parish and completed in
another, it may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined
and punished in either of the parishes in the same manner
19. 194 La. at 1031, 195 So. at 529.
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as if it had been actually and wholly committed therein."
(Italics supplied.)
A history of the treatment accorded this act is outside the
scope of the present paper.2 0 It is sufficient to say that in the case
of State v. Moore2l the law was pronounced invalid under Article
IX of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of 1913, which is the
same as Article 1, Section 9 of the present constitution. When
the prosecution attempted to rely on this same act in State v.
Smith the court gave its blessing to the Moore case and reasserted
the unconstitutionality of the statute. 22 However, there is some
later evidence that the court is now more friendly disposed
toward Section 988. The following interesting dicta will be found
in State v. Hart:
"That statute [Section 988], which was enacted originally
as Section 12 of Act No. 121 of 1855, was declared unconstitutional, in the case of State v. Montgomery, 115 La. 155, 38
So. 949, but only in so far as the statute undertook to allow
a prosecution to be had in a parish other than that in which
the crime was committed, provided it was committed within
100 yards from the boundary line of the parish in which the
prosecution is had. That constitutional objection has been removed by a provision in Section 9 of Article I of the Constitution of 1921, allowing a prosecution to be had in either
parish where the crime was committed within 100 yards from
a boundary line between two parishes. But we are not aware
of any constitutional objection to the provision in Section
988 of the Revised Statutes, with reference to a crime that
2
was begun in one parish and completed in another.1
It is noteworthy that no reference is made above to State v.
Moore, which was a much more sweeping decision than the Montgomery case mentioned by the court. It is not likely, however,
that the court overlooked the former decision, which had been
reviewed at length in State v. Smith only a few months earlier.
Perhaps the pressure of seven difficult cases on criminal venue
has forced the court to the exasperated conclusion that a solution of criminal venue problems by the use of fairytale principles isn't all that it is cracked up to be, and that a simple statute
20.
21.
22.
23.

See Comment (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REvisw 222, 223.
140 La. 281, 72 So. 965 (1916).
State v. Smith, 194 La. 1015, 1024, 195 So. 523, 526 (1940).
State v. Hart, 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62, 69 (1940).
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which can be upheld without too much straining at the constitutional leash affords the best answer after all.
The outmoded offense of misprision arose from its grave to
make its contribution to a perverse season of venue problems.
The crime, as denounced by the Louisiana statute, consists of neglecting to disclose to "some committing magistrate or district
attorney" the commission of some serious crime of which the
defendant has knowledge. It is admittedly difficult to single out
some one parish where it can be said that the defendant didn't
act. The supreme court in the recent case of State v. Wells2" concluded that the trial should be held in the parish where the
felony which defendant should have reported was allegedly committed. The only alternative was to hold that the defendant could
be tried in any and all parishes where he happened to be after
learning of the crime.
Criminal Offenses
The construction to be placed upon the term property in the
various statutes denouncing the obtaining of property by false
pretense has long been a bone of contention in criminal law. The
usual interpretation accorded the term excludes labor or services, and this was the view adopted by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana in the case of State v. [Bruce] Smith, 5 decided during
the past year. The principal point has been considered in detail
elsewhere in this review."6 In passing, however, it is noteworthy
that the court, by pretermitting the case on the narrow ground
advanced, avoided the necessity of passing on another and equally
important problem. The facts were substantially that Smith had
secured the services of one Varnell to paint Smith's house at a
time when the former was a full time employee of the Louisiana
Highway Commission, with Smith as superintendent. It would
be interesting to know by what "false pretense" Smith secured
Varnell's labor. Did Smith falsely represent to his superiors that
Varnell was wanted for public work; or did he merely misuse
labor which was to be performed under his supervision? Would
the latter practice be a "false pretense" or "fraud," as those terms
are traditionally employed in criminal statutes? Perhaps before
this question can come before the court we shall have a more
comprehensive and explicit body of criminal legislation.
24. 197 So. 420 (La. 1940).
25. 197 So. 429 (La. 1940).
26. Note (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 236.
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In early law a dog was not recognized as property in the
full and unqualified sense of the term. However, it is fairly
well recognized today in most jurisdictions that a dog is considered a domestic animal and may be the subject matter of larceny.
In the recent case of State v. Chambers2 7 the defendant was indicted for the larceny of a dog. He moved to quash the indictment on the ground that no offense was charged. The prosecution relied on Act 107 of 1882,28 which reads as follows:

"Section 1. From and after the passage of this act dogs
owned by citizens of this state, are hereby declared to be
personal property of such citizens, and shall be placed on the
same guarantees of law as other personal property; provided,
such dogs are given in by the owner thereof to the assessor.
"Section 2. No dog shall be entitled to the protection of
the law unless the same shall have been placed upon the
assessment rolls."
In answer to the defendant's contention that the dog had
not been placed on the assessment rolls as required by Section
2, the court replied that under the provisions of Article 10, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution, as amended, domestic animals are now exempt from taxation and that it would now be
a vain and useless thing to have a dog assessed. The motion to
quash was denied.
The need for a revision of the statutory definition of embracery was made manifest in the recent case of State v. Whitlock.2 9 Rhodes was on trial for involuntary homicide. One of the
petit jurors was approached by the present defendant, who remarked, "Ben, if you can throw any favors to Jimmy Rhodes,
I wish you would." This request was held not to constitute an
embracery as that offense is defined by Section 861 of the Revised Statutes."° This section denounces attempts to "awe or corrupt jurors.., by menaces, threats, giving money, or promise of
any pecuniary advantage or otherwise. . .

."

It is noteworthy that

attempts to corrupt jurors through mere persuasion are not included. This deficiency is remedied in Article 362 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. An indictment under this article, however,
was not attempted because of the foregone conclusion that dif27.
28.
29.
30.

194 La. 1042,
Dart's Stats.
193 La. 1044,
Dart's Crim.

195 So. 532 (1940).
(1939) § § 356-358.
192 So. 697 (1939).
Stats. (1932) § 786.
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ficulties with the well known rule laid down in State v. Rodosta8'
were certain to be encountered.
Section 853 of the Revised Statutes as amended 82 reads as
follows:
"If any person shall knowingly harbor, conceal, maintain
or assist any principal offender or accessory thereto [sic] he
shall suffer imprisonment at hard labor not exceeding ten
(10) years." (Italics supplied.)
This statute, prior to its amendment in 1938, had been construed
8 The court in that case held that it applied
in State v. Graham.
only to the concealment of a person who had committed a burglary. This conclusion was based on the fact that the provision
had originally appeared as one of several sections of the act of
March 20, 1818, and read:
"... if any person, after any burglary committed as aforesaid,

shall knowingly harbor, conceal, maintain or assist any principal offender or accessory thereto before the fact, every such
accessory after the fact, who shall be thereof duly convicted
shall be punished for a term not exceeding one year by solitary imprisonment, and by confinement after to hard labor,
not exceeding five years."'

4

(Italics supplied.)

When the above section was retained as Section 54 of Act 120
of 1855, and again as Section 853 of the Revised Statutes of 1870,
it was condensed so as to read substantially as quoted first above,
resulting in the unusual phraseology of that section.
At the same time, in 1855, the legislature made separate
provision for the punishment of accessories after the fact generally." This led the court in the Graham case to the proper conclusion that Section 853 is not applicable to the concealment of
any and all criminals.
In 1938 Section 853 was amended. The only changes made,
however, were the omission of the words, "before the fact," and
an increase of the penalty from five to ten years imprisonment
at hard labor. Recently, in the case of State v. Wells,8 the court
had occasion to hold that these amendments did not operate to
increase the scope of the section, which is still confined to the
31. 173 La. 623, 138 So. 124 (1931), noted in (1932) 7 Tulane L. Rev. 144.
32. Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 749.
33. 190 La. 669, 182 So. 711 (1938).
34. La. Act of March 20, 1818.
35. La. Act 120 of 1855, § 177.
36. 195 La. 754, 197 So. 419 (1940).
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concealment of burglaries. No criticism can be made of the decision. If the legislature intended to expand the field of operation of the section, it is difficult to understand why they should
re-employ the old unintelligible language of the original act
which obviously requires some unexpressed precedent to complete its meaning.
During past years there has prevailed a situation wherein
certain public officers have benefited financially from contracts
made by the boards or bodies of which they were members. In
most cases the profit has resulted because the contract in question was awarded to a firm or corporation in which the officer
held a financial interest. Several variations of this situation are
possible. The officer may exert his influence with the fellow
members of his board to secure the award of the contract in
which he has a financial interest, or he himself may vote in
favor of the award. If he has thus actively exerted himself in
any way to secure personal profit from the transaction, it is clear
that he is guilty of a criminal offense expressly denounced by
Louisiana Act 128 of 1906.17 The only legal obstacle standing in
the way of conviction thereunder is the possibility that the object
of this statute is not adequately expressed in its title and that
the act for that reason runs afoul of the state constitution.8 This
point was recently raised before the supreme court.8 8 The case,
however, was disposed of on other grounds and the point in
question was not considered.
Even where nothing is done to influence the action of the
board it still may be desirable policy to prohibit any member
from having a private financial interest which could be served
by any contract made by the board on which he holds membership. In most cases it is difficult to prove that improper influence
was exerted, even if such was the case. Perhaps the best remedy is to prevent in advance the existence of a situation wherein
a public officer can hold an interest which may prove to be opposed to the faithful discharge of his public duties. This policy,
however, is difficult to implement through the criminal law. The
sheer fact that a person is financially interested in a public contract at a time when he is also a public officer undoubtedly
affords at best an intangible basis for a prosecution. It is difficult
37. Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § § 805-807.
38. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 16. See also La. Const. (1898) Art. 31;
La. Const. (1913) Art. 31.
39. State v. Abernathy, 194 La. 559, 194 So. 19 (1940).
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to see how a public officer could effectively deport himself in
order to avoid prosecution. Must he, before assuming office, divest
himself of all financial interest in any firm which might deal
with his board? Such a burden would be onerous indeed, and
would discourage many responsible citizens from participating
in public life. Perhaps he should dispose of his interest upon
learning that a contract is contemplated, or should resign his
public office upon the occurrence of such a contingency. The
difficulties here appear to be insurmountable.
Four efforts were made during the past year to punish members of public boards on the sole ground that they were interested financially in contracts made by their boards. In one instance, State v. De Generes, ° the indictment was framed under
Section 1 of Act 16 of 1920,11 which reads as follows:
"That it shall be unlawful for any Police Juror to draw
money from his Parish Treasury, either directly or indirectly
other than his per diem and mileage except that the Parish
Treasurer shall be authorized to pay the official expenses of
any officer of the Police Jury or member of the Police Jury,
who is acting under authority of the Police Jury."
The facts as gathered from the indictment were that De
Generes was a police juror in Caddo Parish and also was a member of a business firm known as De Generes Brothers. The police
jury purchased auto parts from the De Generes concern and
paid for the same from the parish treasury while defendant was
a member of the jury. A motion to quash the indictment was
sustained by the supreme court on the ground that, "in order
for a person to be legally charged in an indictment under a
statute, he must have been conscious of some intentional act,
which was contrary to the provisions of the law."" The court
concluded that there was no allegation that the defendant directly or indirectly drew any money from the parish treasury.
The fact that he was a member of a concern which profited by the
transaction and that he presumably would share in the profits
of the sale did not bring him within the purview of the statute.
The case of State v. Williamson43 was almost identical on its
facts with the De Generes case, and was similarly disposed of.
4
A third case, State v. Fulco,"
presented the same problem
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

194 La. 574, 194 So. 24 (1940).
Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6402.
194 La. 574, 580, 194 So. 24, 26 (1940).
194 La. 581, 194 So. 26 (1940).
194 La. 545, 194 So. 14 (1940).
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and again the supreme court dismissed the charge. In this case,
however, the question arose on the sufficiency of the agreed
statement of facts in support of the indictment. The court avoided
reference to the broader problem discussed in the De Generes
case, and rested its conclusion on the fact that the prosecution
failed to show that the defendant had received from the firm
any share of the profits of the contract.
A somewhat similar problem was before the court in the
case of State v. Abernathy.4" Abernathy was a member of the
Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University. He was
charged with being "directly and indirectly pecuniarily interested in the profits to be expected and derived from the performance of various contracts" 4 alleged to have been made between
the university and an office supply company of which Abernathy
was an officer and stockholder. There was no charge that Abernathy either voted for the award or did any other act to secure
it. The indictment was framed under Section 2 of Act 128 of
1906,'

which provides:

"That any member of any public board, body or commission
created by, and now or hereafter existing under the laws of
this State, and charged with either the custody, control or
expenditure of any funds or monies derived from taxation,
who shall as such member vote to award any contract for the
performance of work or the furnishing of labor or materials,
or who shall vote to award the custody of any such public
funds to any partnership of which he is a member, or in which
he is interested, or to any corporation of which he is an officer,
or who shall do any other act to secure such award by the
board, body or commission of which he is a member to any
such partnership or corporation; or who shall be either directly
or indirectly pecuniarily interested in the profits to be expected or derived from the performance of any such contract,
or the existence of any such custody so awarded, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof
shall be fined not less than one thousand dollars, or be imprisoned not less than six months, nor more than one year, or
both." (Italics supplied.)
The trial judge prepared a lengthy opinion in which he held
45. 194 La. 559, 194 So. 19 (1940).
46. 194 La. at 561, 194 So. at 20.
47. Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 806.
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that Act 128 did not contemplate the situation that gave rise to
Abernathy's trial. It appears that the portion of the act set forth
above in italics describes merely the interest which the defendant must have in the contract. The offense denounced, however,
is voting for the prohibited contract or doing some other act to
secure the award. The opinion of the trial court was adopted on
appeal. The soundness of the court's conclusion is hardly open
to question. It would be virtually impossible to administer the
act under the interpretation urged by the prosecution. The case,
however, is valuable chiefly because it affords an example of
the complications that follow in the wake of artlessly drafted
legislation.
Act 78 of 189048 makes criminal the acceptance of a bribe by
a state, parochial, or municipal officer. The supreme court held
in the case of State v. Dark" that a conservation agent of the
Louisiana Conservation Commission is an officer within the intendment of the act. In the opinion Justice Fournet pointed out
that conservation agents are vested with power to enforce laws
relating to the conservation of the state's resources, that their
duties are continuous in nature despite changes of personnel, and
that they exercise a portion of the sovereign power of the state.
The following portion of the opinion is particularly noteworthy
because of its intelligent and understanding statement of the
reason for much of the confusion on the part of the courts and
text writers with respect to the definition of a public office:
"... the courts have not been able to arrive at a definition
that will, faultlessly, fit all cases. They have been compelled,
rather, to decide whether, in the case under consideration, the
position of a given person comes fairly within the constitutional or legislative intendment and contemplation, their conclusions varying, of course, with the different constitutional
and legislative provisions in the respective jurisdictions and
the nature of the respective cases. For example, a person holding a position in a department of the state government may
be a state officer within the intendment of a law that exempts
the salaries of state officers from seizure under garnishment
proceedings, while, on the other hand, he may not be a state
officer within the intendment of a law that makes it possible
48. Dart's Crim Stats. (1932) § § 796-798.
49. 195 La. 139, 196 So. 47 (1940).
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to test a person's title and right to a state office under quo
warranto proceedings. '0
The indictment as originally filed failed to specify the public
office held by defendants and did not furnish details with respect
to the acts of partiality and favoritism with which they were
charged. The trial court permitted amendments of the indictment, and its action in so doing was sustained by the supreme
court under Articles 252 and 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court further held that the act under which the
indictment was framed was not repealed or superseded by Section 12 of Article 19 of the Constitution of 1921.61 In the opinion
it was pointed out that this act had been sustained against a
similar contention with respect to Article 183 of the Constitution
of 189852 and that the present constitution contains no definition

of bribery and no prohibition not embraced in the Constitution
of 1898.
The Indictment
Although a defendant may be charged in a single count of an
indictment both with forging an instrument and thereafter uttering

it, 5 3

he cannot be charged with the two offenses in separate

counts. An interesting problem relative to the above distinction
arose in State v. Obey.54 The defendant was charged in one
count with forging a check, and in another count with uttering
the same. The prosecution, however, was seeking a conviction
only on the count that charged the uttering. Nevertheless, the
entire indictment was read to the jury. This, the defendant
claimed, was prejudicial and amounted to the admission of
evidence of a separate and independent crime. The per curiam
of the trial judge stated that after the opening statement of the
district attorney, the judge, through special instructions to the
jury, explained that the defendant was being tried only for
uttering the forged check. The defendant's bill of exceptions was
held to be without merit. Since both offenses might have been
called to the jury's attention through a properly framed indictment, it is clear that the error complained of was not prejudicial
to the defendant.
The power to amend indictments is granted in liberal terms
50. 196 So. at 49.
51.
52.
53.
54.

State v. Dark, 195 La. 160, 196 So. 54 (1940).
The court cited State v. McGraw, 142 La. 417, 76 So. 822 (1917).
Art. 222, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. Act 204 of 1918.
193 La. 1075, 192 So. 722 (1939).
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by Article 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This article
permits amendments both as to matters of form and of substance. Where the state is permitted to amend a defect of substance the defendant's right to a continuance is carefully guarded
by the Code. Article 253 is silent, however, on the matter of a
continuance after the amendment of a formal defect in cases
where the amendment was not made in order to cure a variance
between the indictment and the proof. The defendant in the case
of State v. Jones5 was indicted for murder. On the date of trial
the district attorney was granted permission to change the date
of the alleged crime from December fourth to December third.
The defendant thereafter insisted that he was entitled to a continuance as a matter of law. There was no allegation in the petition of any fact or circumstance tending to show in what respect
the defendant was prejudiced by the amendment. The lower court
refused the motion for continuance, and this ruling was affirmed
on appeal. The granting or refusal of a continuance is a matter
within the discretion of the trial judge, and the court's conclusion was sound, unless it can be said that the amendment was as
to a matter of substance, in which case it would appear from the
language of Article 253 that the court must be satisfied that the
defendant's rights will be protected by proceeding directly with
the trial. This would appear to imply that in such instance there
is a presumption of injury in favor of defendant. Errors of time
are generally regarded as formal defects only.
Prescription
An indictment or information may negative prescription by
alleging that the offense was not made known to the officer or
body having jurisdiction until after the expiration of a year from
the date of its commission, and less than one year before the
filing of the indictment or information; this allegation may be
6
rebutted, however. In State v. Oliver"
the defendant attempted
to make such a rebuttal after conviction by means of a motion
in arrest of judgment and also a motion for a new trial. His
offer was rejected on motion in arrest of judgment for the reason that the error was not patent on the face of the record.5 7
However, the refusal of the trial court to entertain the rebuttal
on motion for a new trial was held to be reversible error. Article
8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with prescription
55. 197 So. 249 (La. 1940).
56. 193 La. 1084, 192 So. 725 (1939).
57. Arts. 517, 518, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
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provides that no person shall be "prosecuted, tried or punished"
for a prescribed offense. The court had previously stated in an
earlier case 58 that the only way to give effect to the word "punished" is to permit the defendant to raise the issue even after
conviction.
An interesting point with respect to prescription was raised
in State v. Young. 9 In July, 1938, the carcass of a slaughtered
cow was found in the woods in Jackson Parish near to the parish
line, and the defendant was indicted for cow stealing. The defendant's bond was approved by a judge who presided in the
adjoining parish of Winn, because a surety thereon was a resident of that parish. On the trial for the offense in Jackson Parish
the defendant successfully pleaded to the jurisdiction by showing that the offense, if committed at all, was committed in Winn
Parish. The defendant was indicted in Winn Parish in September, 1939. The indictment alleged that the commission of the
offense was not known to any officer or body of Winn Parish who
had jurisdiction until April, 1939 (the date of the trial in Jackson Parish). The defendant moved to quash the indictment and
showed that the judge who approved the bond knew of the offense first in July, 1938. It was conceded, however, that the judge
believed at that time that the offense was committed outside his
jurisdiction, in Jackson Parish. The supreme court held that at
the time of the disclosure in July, 1938, neither the judge nor
any officer of that parish believed that there was jurisdiction to
prosecute in Winn Parish. There was no information at that time
to serve as a starting point for a prosecution. The motion to
quash was properly overruled.
Pleas
Both the Constitution of 1921 and the Code of Criminal Procedure provide in substance that an unqualified plea of guilty to
a capital offense cannot be received by the court. 60 In State ex tel.
Turner v. Jones6l the facts appear to be that the defendant, who
was charged with murder, entered the plea of "guilty without
capital punishment," and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
The Clerk of Court stated under deposition that through error
he entered the plea as simply "guilty." After serving three years
58. State v. Block, 179 La. 426, 154 So. 46 (1934).
59. 194 La. 1061, 195 So. 539 (1940).
60. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 42; Art. 262, La. Code of Crim. Proc.
of 1928.
61. 193 La. 714, 192 So. 232 (1939).
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of her term, defendant seeks by writ of habeas corpus to procure her discharge on the ground that the plea, as it was entered
on the court record, is one which the court was without power to
receive. The supreme court properly held that the minutes of
the trial court could not be corrected through ex parte affidavits
and remanded the case for a proceeding taken contradictorily
to determine the true situation and adjust the minutes accordingly.
Although the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the defendant, with the consent of the court, to withdraw his plea of
"not guilty" and set up some other plea, 62 this is not an absolute right, and the court is entitled to exercise its sound discretion in the matter. Recently in the case of State v. Messer" the
defendant, who was charged with murder, sought permission to
withdraw the plea of "not guilty" and substitute therefor the
plea of present insanity and the plea of insanity at the time of
the commission of the offense. The trial judge, who had observed
the defendant's conduct during a previous trial for the same
crime and who had known the defendant for a number of years,
refused to allow him to enter the plea of present insanity. This
ruling was affirmed by the supreme court. The trial court permitted the plea of insanity at the time of the commission of the
offense, but refused to appoint a lunacy commission and submitted the issue of insanity to the jury. The supreme court held
that this ruling was proper under Article 267 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, as amended by Act 136 of 1932. The provision of that article, as it now reads, is that the court may appoint a lunacy commission, not that it is required to do so.
The Grand Jury
The position of the grand jury in the hierarchy of the tribunals and officers who administer criminal laws was subjected
to a thorough discussion in the case of State ex rel. De Armas v.
Platt.6 4 The controversy leading up to the decision is too well
known to require more than a brief summary here. The grand
jury of Orleans Parish during the fall of 1939 was engaged in
the investigation of state public scandals. Several members of
the body felt that their efforts were being impeded by the district attorney who was refusing to afford them the cooperation
62. Art. 265, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
63. 194 La. 238, 193 So. 633 (1940).
64. 193 La. 928, 192 So. 659 (1939).
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and information to which they were entitled. As a result, several of their number prepared and signed a petition addressed
to the district judge in which they requested that the district
attorney be recused and that a special district attorney and assistants be appointed, and that an appropriation of ten thousand
dollars for investigative purposes be made. The petitioner, a
member of the grand jury, attempted to read this document in
open court, whereupon he was admonished not to proceed until
the court might have an opportunity to examine it. The juryman persisted in reading the paper despite the judge's remonstrance. For this he was ordered arrested by the judge and was
confined. At the expiration of an hour the judge held the petitioner to have been in contempt of court and discharged him
from his office of grand juryman. The petition in the present
case before the supreme court was on writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to compel the petitioner's reinstatement.
The relief was denied, with Justices O'Niell and Odom dissenting.
The legal question before the court was a comparatively
narrow one, although its implications were sufficiently profound
to prompt the court to extend its discussion over twenty-eight
printed pages in the Southern Reporter. All the members of the
court agreed that the reading of the petition under the circumstances described was a contempt of court and that the trial
judge acted properly in so holding. Whether or not the petitioner's conduct warranted his dismissal as a member of the grand
jury gave rise to strong differences of opinion among the justices. Briefly stated, the position of the majority was that a contempt of court is a criminal offense of such a nature as to justify
a dismissal for cause. 65 Grand jurors are under the control of
the judge who impanels them, at least to the extent of requiring
them to obey the law. 66 The court emphasized the fact that the

conduct of the petitioner showed a disrespect for the authority
of the trial judge and that the petition read in defiance of the
court's order was one beyond the power of the grand jury. The
opinion drew much material from previous decisions both in
Louisiana and elsewhere to the effect that the return of a presentment which charges no crime and which is designed to cast
recriminations on some person who is unable to defend himself
because no trial is possible is a pernicious practice outside the
65. See Art. 172, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
66. This proposition was reaffirmed in State v. Richey, 195 La. 319, 196
So. 545 (1940).
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legitimate sphere of the grand jury's activities. However, as the
dissenting opinions pointed out, it is difficult to regard as a presentment the unofficial petition of several members of a grand
jury made to the court under whose direction it functions and
which merely seeks judicial assistance in making more effective
the deliberations of the grand jury. The fact that it is necessary
to charge the office of the district attorney with offensive conduct and obstructionist tactics in order to demonstrate the need
for the relief demanded appears to be beside the point; nor is
the fact that the object of the petition was for relief which the
judge to whom it was addressed could not grant a matter of
any apparent importance. Justice O'Niell pointed out that even
though the contempt proceeding should be regarded as a criminal offense, the trial for that offense was not pending at the
time of the dismissal. The position adopted by the dissenting
minority was confirmed by the 1940 session of the legislature
which amended Articles 196 and 210 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure in substantial conformity with the views expressed
by the chief justice. These amendments have been
discussed in
67
detail elsewhere in the Louisiana Law Review.
The power of the trial court to dismiss grand jurors for cause
was again considered by the supreme court in State v. Richey.6 8
The judge of the district court in Rapides Parish discharged the
entire jury on the ground that a charge of a criminal offense had
been filed against all members, and was pending. The basis of
the pending charge was that the grand jury, contrary to the
advice of the district attorney, had returned indictments for
embezzlement and a violation of the dual office holding act
under facts that could not warrant a conviction of the accused.
The return of these indictments was set forth as a violation of
Act 254 of 1912,69 known as the "Misdemeanor in Office Act."
On appeal the supreme court overruled the action of the trial
judge dissolving the grand jury. The charge that the grand jurors
had returned an indictment contrary to the advice of the district
attorney did not constitute an offense as that term is used in
Article 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which sets forth
the requirements of jurors. In order for a person to be disqualified for jury service on the ground that at the time of his exercising the duties of his office he is charged with an offense,
67.
(1940)
68.
69.

Cf. Bugea, Lazarus, and Pegues, The Louisiana Legislation of 1940
3 LOUISIANA LAW RvmEw 98, 166.
195 La. 319, 196 So. 545 (1940).
Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 801.
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the charge must set forth facts that constitute a crime under
the laws of the state.
An interesting point with respect to the exclusion of negroes
from the grand jury was decided in the recent case of State v.
White.7 0 The defendant was indicted for murder. The trial lasted
two days, during which time not a single bill of exception was
reserved, and the jury found the defendant guilty as charged.
A motion for a new trial was filed in which the defendant for the
first time alleged that negroes were systematically excluded from
the grand jury, resulting in a denial of due process and equal
protection of the laws, guaranteed by the federal and Louisiana
71
constitutions.
Ordinarily, objections to the constitution of the grand jury
must be raised by a proper motion before going to trial, and, if
hot disposed of at that time, they are regarded as waived. Does
an objection to the grand jury which is based on alleged unconstitutional discrimination against negroes differ in this respect
from other defects in the makeup of the grand jury? The supreme
court answered the question in the negative, and held that the
defendant could not raise the point for the first time in a motion
for a new trial. In support of this conclusion it cited a decision of
72
the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Hicks v. State of Arkansas
in which the same point had been raised and decided adversely
to the defendant. The United States Supreme Court had refused
an application for a writ of certiorari,' lending some additional
weight to the decision. One might plausibly contend that the
violation of the right to due process and equal protection of the
laws, solemnly conferred by both the state and federal constitutions, is something more than an ordinary defect in the grand
jury's organization and personnel. On the other hand, however,
the law is interested not only in the protection of the defendant,
but in the expeditious administration of criminal justice. If the
defendant is afforded a fair opportunity to protect his constitutional rights and neglects to do so, the dictates of fair play do not
demand that he first be allowed to take his chance with the ver70. 193 La. 775, 192 So. 345 (1939).
71. Cf. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 59 S. Ct. 536, 83 L. Ed. 757 (1939),
noted in (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW RnVIuW 841.
72. 143 Ark. 158, 220 S.W. 308 (1920).
73. 254 U.S. 630, 41 S. Ct. 7, 65 L. Ed. 447 (1920). The Louisiana Supreme
Court inadvertently stated that the Hicks case was "affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court without comment."
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dict, and, failing in that, be permitted to assail the grand jury
that indicted him.
The defendant further contended that even though he were
not entitled as a matter of right to raise the question for the first
time in a motion for a new trial, yet in a capital case the court
can and should waive the requirement of timeliness if it can see
that a fair trial has not been had and that injustice has been
done. The court rejected this argument, and properly. It may
be admitted that a systematic exclusion of negroes from the
jury deprives a colored defendant of a fair trial. However, the
judicial discretion to which the defendant directed his appeal
does not obtain for the purpose of allowing the court to weigh
conflicting policies of law such as were presented in the present
case. These policies were completely resolved when the court
first denied the defendant's claim of right. Should it now reverse its position, in effect, under the guise of exercising a discretion? The power to exercise discretion in waiving the normal
requirement of timely objection exists in order to enable the
court to individualize the facts attendant on the trial of the case
under consideration. It is a means whereby the court can personalize the situation and, if necessary, mollify the rigors of
criminal procedure. The opinion was not as clear on this point
as might be desired. However, the following statement from the
opinion appears by implication to support the view advanced
above.
"The record in the instant case not only fails to show that
a manifest injustice has been done the accused, but, on the
contrary, the record is most convincing that the defendant
was ably assisted by counsel and received a fair and impartial
trial before a most considerate judge. This is clearly borne
out by counsel's own admission on the trial of the motion for
a new trial that the reason he took no bills of exception during the trial of the case was because 'the Court constantly
ruled with me (him).' ""

Jurors
Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that
every order for the selecting or drawing of jurors shall be in
writing, signed by the judge, and spread upon the minutes of
the courts. The supreme court has recently held that this pro74. State v. White, 193 La. 775, 789, 192 So. 845, 349 (1939).
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vision is complied with where the rules of the district court
signed by the two presiding judges and spread upon the court
minutes designate the specific days upon which the regular semiannual meetings of the jury commission shall be held.75 The
article does not contemplate the necessity for a special signed
order for each regular meeting of the commission.
The prevailing rule that the incompetency of a juror must
be urged before he is sworn in was successfully invoked by the
prosecution in State v. Peyton.6 On motion for a new trial the
attorney for defendant sought to show that one juror had not
been a resident of the parish of trial for a year next preceding
his service, as required by Article 172 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. He maintained that his failure to inquire of the
juror's residence on the voir dire was of no consequence, because
the court had made clear to all the jurors the qualifications of
their office and had asked them if they lacked any of those
qualifications, and that the juryman in question had failed to
reply. The court, however, refused to accede to this contention.
Although the incompetency of a juror is an objection which
is not usually available for the first time in a motion for a new
trial, it is nevertheless open to the defendant after verdict to
show that a juror swore falsely and that this fact was ascertained for the first time after verdict.77 This was reaffirmed in
the recent case of State v. Oliver,7 8 which was remanded in
order that evidence supporting the claim of false swearing might
be heard in support of the defendant's motion for a new trial.
The fact that a juror has been peremptorily challenged on a
criminal trial is not ground for a challenge for cause in a new
trial for the same offense. This was the ruling of the trial court
in State v. Messer7 affirmed by the supreme court during the
last term. The only grounds for disqualification relative to prior
service are set forth in Article 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. These relate to service on a petit jury which had previously tried the defendant for the same offense, or on a coroner's
jury that investigated a homicide for which defendant is on trial.
The present decision was reinforced by the fact that at the time
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

State v. Peyton, 194 La. 681, 194 So. 715 (1940).
194 La. 681, 194 So. 715 (1940).
Art. 355, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
193 La. 1084, 192 So. 725 (1939).
194 La. 238, 193 So. 633 (1940).
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the defendant sought to make the challenge for cause he had
not exhausted his peremptory challenges. 0
The Trial
The Code of Criminal Procedure seeks to outline an orderly
procedure for the trial of criminal cases. Article 333 provides
that the reading of the indictment to the jury shall be followed
by an opening statement by the district attorney "explaining
the nature of the charge and the evidence by which he expects
to establish the same." It appears that this requirement was intended by the legislature merely as a step in the outlining of
an orderly trial procedure which will furnish some assistance
to the jury in its effort to comprehend and evaluate the testimony.81 Accordingly, the court has manifested a liberal attitude
toward allowing the opening statement to be supplemented or
amended by the district attorney. 2 It was also pointed out in the
recent case of State v. Sharbino8 8 that what is said in the opening
statement is not to be regarded as having any binding force on
the jury, and cannot be regarded as evidence. Hence untrue and
prejudicial statements made at this time cannot be regarded as
evidence erroneously admitted. The court held that references
in the opening statement to matters which later proved to be
inadmissible under the rules of evidence did not constitute reversible error.
The right to a speedy trial was discussed in State v. Frith.
In that case an information was filed against the defendant for
assaulting the district attorney. At the time of the alleged assault the defendant apparently was serving on the grand jury.
A few days thereafter the defendant appeared in court, pleaded
"not guilty," and requested that the case be set for hearing as
soon as possible. The district attorney, however, objected to fixing
the date of trial at that time, whereupon the defendant moved
to recuse the district attorney and his assistants. About a month
80. Art. 353, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928. In State v. Jones, 195 La.
611, 197 So. 249 (1940), the court held that a prospective juror could not be
challenged for cause solely on the ground that he was a son of the coroner

who testified for the state.
The latitude vested in the discretion of the trial judge with respect to
the mechanics of selecting jurymen is illustrated by State v. Boone, 194
La. 977, 195 So. 511 (1940).
81. But cf. Note (1940)

3 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 238.

82. State v. Peyton, 194 La. 681, 194 So. 715 (1940).
83. 194 La. 709, 194 So. 756 (1940), noted in (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REviEow 238.
84. 194 La. 508, 194 So. 1 (1940).
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later the motion for recusation was set for hearing, and the defendant immediately withdrew the motion and filed in its stead
a motion for a speedy trial. The trial court reiterated a previous
announcement that in the absence of exceptional circumstances
the fixing of the date of trial lies strictly within the province
of the district attorney, and refused the motion. The defendant
then carried his petition to the supreme court through an application for a writ of mandamus. The writ was denied. The refusal
of the district attorney to fix the case for trial was not per se a
deprivation of the right to a speedy trial, and, further, there is
no showing to indicate that the court was then open for the trial
of misdemeanor cases. There was no evidence of an unreasonable delay warranting an influence that the prosecution was
motivated in its action by extraneous considerations.
In State v. Pugh85 the defendant failed to appear on the day
set for his trial and his bond was ordered forfeited. Several
days later, however, he appeared in court, waived arraignment,
and pleaded "not guilty," whereupon a date for his trial was set.
Upon the appointed day it was discovered that one of defendant's witnesses was absent, and the defendant objected to proceeding with the trial. He was informed by the district attorney
that the latter felt that the objection was good, but that if a
continuance were granted he would not set aside the bond forfeiture already entered. Thereupon the defendant withdrew his
objection, proceeded to trial without the witness and was convicted. On appeal the conviction and sentence were annulled
and the case was remanded. The supreme court held that the
waiver of defendant's objection was produced by coercion.
Most courts have held that a substitution of judges at any
time after the jury has been accepted and sworn is reversible
error. In Louisiana, however, it has been held without comment
that a substituted judge can pass sentence, even though he was
not present at the trial and no record was kept of the evidence.86
During a recent murder trial a special judge presided during
the impanelling of the jury, and the presiding judge returned
to the bench for the remainder of the trial. The substitution
was held not to be reversible error, since the defendant failed to
show that his rights were prejudiced thereby. 7 The decision is
believed to be sound, and is not out of line with the majority
85. 194 La. 269, 193 So. 643 (1940).
86. State v. Barret, 151 La. 52, 91 So. 543 (1922).
87. State v. Todd, 194 La. 595, 194 So. 31 (1940).
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rule above. The case has been commented upon elsewhere in
this publication 8 and requires no further discussion here.
Motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence was denied in State v. Moore.89 The witnesses relied on
were present during the trial and were not summoned because
the defendant "did not know what their testimony would be."
There was no showing of due diligence on the part of the defendant or his attorney in seeking to obtain the evidence before
the case went to trial.
Claims of errors in the court's instructions to the jury were
conspicuously few during the past term. One case, State v.
Jacobs,90 may be noted, however. The supreme court held that
where the criminal statutes provide one penalty for the forgery
of an instrument of an amount less than twenty dollars and a
higher penalty where the instrument is of an amount in excess
of twenty dollars, it is proper for the judge to apprise the jury
of the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Evidence
Several cases deciding points of evidence in criminal trials
were before the supreme court during the recent term. Most
of these dealt with attempts to exclude items of evidence which
were alleged to be irrelevant and prejudicial.9 1 These cases do
not permit of treatment here. The court also considered three
92
cases in which evidence of previous offenses was held admissible.
Such evidence is permitted under the Code of Criminal Procedure for the purpose of showing a criminal intent, the existence
of a system or a conspiracy, or to impeach the defendant's credibility. In the case of State v. Martin"8 the court reiterated the
rule that a new trial can not be ordered for every prejudicial
statement volunteered by a witness and for which the prosecution is not responsible.
The prosecution successfully invoked Article 487 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure for the purpose of impeaching its own witness in the case of State v. Smith." The witness and defendant
88. Note (1940) 2

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 742.
89. 194 La. 774, 194 So. 778 (1940).
90. 195 La. 281, 196 So. 347 (1940).
91. State v. Smith, 193 La. 665, 192 So. 92 (1939); State v. Obey, 193 La.
1075, 192 So. 722 (1939); State v. Sharbino, 194 La. 709, 194 So. 756 (1940);
State v. Jacobs, 195 La. 281, 196 So. 347 (1940).
92. State v. Smith, 193 La. 706, 192 So. 106 (1939); State v. Obey, 193 La.
1075, 192 So. 722 (1939); State v. Jacobs, 195 La. 281, 196 So. 347 (1940).
93. 193 La. 1036, 192 So. 694 (1939).
94. 193 La. 665, 192 So. 92 (1939).
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had conspired together to commit a robbery. Later the witness
confessed to the commission of the crime, but the defendant
pleaded "not guilty" and was placed on trial. The witness proved
to be hostile and unwilling to testify when placed on the stand,
whereupon the district attorney asked him if he had not previously stated in writing that the defendant met him the night
after the robbery and described the commission of the offense to
him. The witness' answer was admitted over the objection that
the statement was made outside the presence of the defendant.
VIII. CONFLICT OF LAWS
Two noteworthy decisions on this subject were handed down
during the past term. In General Motors Acceptance Corporation
2
v. Nuss1 the court annulled a judgment of the court of appea
8
and brought Louisiana into line with the majority of states which
recognize a foreign chattel mortgage without insisting upon local
recordation where there has been a surreptitious removal of the
property. In Maddry v. Moore Brothers Lumber Company" an
employee sustained injuries while riding in the defendant's motor
vehicle and while acting within the scope of his employment.
The court took the unexpected position that jurisdiction could be
exercised over a nonresident foreign corporation in a workmen's
compensation suit by means of substituted service under the local
nonresident motorist statute.5 Such statutes have been considered
as applying only to actions ex delicto arising out of automobile
accidents and the constitutionality of the extension in the present
case has been questioned.6
1. 195 La. 209, 196 So. 323 (1940).
2. 192 So. 248 (La. App. 1939), noted in (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW RHVIEw
550, and (1940) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 459.
3. Cf. Note (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 550, 552.
4. 197 So. 651 (La. 1940), noted in (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 231.
5. La. Act 86 of 1928 as amended by La. Act 184 of 1932 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 5296-5298].
6. Note (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REviEW 231, 232.

